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7S outheast Europe has been marked by historical legacies of domination whereby the region has been treated either as vassals of the Ottoman empire, satellites of the Soviet 
bloc, or poor neighbours and members of the European Union (EU) –  
experiences that underwrite the region’s entrenched state of (semi-)periph-
erality and its contemporary manifestations.* These are constituted in both 
material and ideational dimensions. In the former case, peripherality refers 
to a politico-economic integration on unequal and exploitative terms and 
the resulting dependencies. In the latter, it is engendered in essentialized 
representations of inferiority that are reproduced in both global imaginings 
of the region and in its own subjectivities and positionings. 
Mainstream politics, intellectual projects, and local mobilizations have 
in many cases accommodated and even reinforced this inferior position 
* We would like to acknowledge the contributions of Zhivka Valiavicharska and Neda Genova who provided 
critical comments and valuable feedback that helped us to further develop our ideas. Our sincere thanks go 
to the editorial team of dVERSIA for their backing in realizing this project, to Nikolay Karkov for his advice, 
and to all institutions and individuals who supported the 2017 Dialoguing Posts workshop in Belgrade. All of 
the three editors contributed equally to this introduction and the special issue as a whole.
Katarina Kušić
Philipp Lottholz
Polina Manolova
Pathways towards decoloniality 
in Southeast Europe
From dialogue 
    to practice:
8by subscribing to the dream of “catching up” with and becoming part of 
Europe (and Western capitalist modernity at large). In recent years, the 
recognition of the impossibility of the promises of capitalist transition 
has produced two distinct responses. One the one side, there are those 
who mourn the unattainability of development and prosperity with tropes 
of “civilizational backwardness” and thus solidify the sense of inferiority 
and self-victimization. On the other, there are the ones who reject the 
European project in their agendas of (ethno-)nationalism, patriarchy, and 
“traditionalism”. The condition of peripherality and dependence, however, 
contains ruptures in which alternative visions can open and may offer new 
pathways and strategies for action that challenge and resist existing regimes 
and relations of power. Outside of the realm of formal politics, various ini-
tiatives and projects have confronted and exposed the contradictions and 
exclusionary logics of neoliberal transition and ideas of national grandeur 
through popular protests, activism, and art. 
This special issue seeks to explore new vantage points for tackling dis-
contents, contradictions, and unexplored alternatives in Southeast Europe 
by thinking with post- and decolonial theory and practice. We argue that 
decolonial thinking can be helpful in appreciating the region’s imperial and 
(quasi-)colonial legacy, in analysing contemporary forms of domination, 
hierarchy and resistance, and for identifying their corresponding practices 
of complicity and collaboration, but also of struggle, protest and reversals 
of the current neoliberal trajectory. 
In studying Southeast Europe, the literature on postsocialist transformations 
in wider East Europe emerges as naturally useful.* This literature has provided 
important critiques of both recent and historical forms of domination, neolib-
eralization, and dispossession in the region. Anthropology and sociology of 
postsocialism have very effectively traced and critiqued the politico-economic 
changes that have accompanied the integration of former socialist countries in 
the system of global capitalism. These include studies of large-scale decollec-
* We are wary of the geopolitical power dynamics implied in terms like East Europe and Southeast Europe. 
We understand SEE as a geographical space, a sub-region within Eastern Europe. At the same time, the 
notion helps us tease out the important commonalities – both historical and contemporary – that mark this 
space, understood as including former Yugoslavian republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and, in a broader 
sense, Greece and Turkey. We thus proceed with the acronym SEE to designate our geographic focus, but 
without trying to artificially separate our discussion from developments in the wider Eastern European region.
9tivizations, deindustrialization and privatization, changing forms of property 
rights, land ownership, administrative and governing systems, as well as the 
dismantling of “collective” institutions, workers’ entitlements, and welfare 
provisions (Mandel and Humphrey 2002; Lampland, 2002; Verdery, 2003; 
Kideckel, 2008). Others  have successfully drawn attention to the effects of 
postsocialist transformations on individual life-worlds and social relations by 
exploring the aggravation of social inequalities, the dismantling of social ties of 
cooperation and reciprocity, and the emergence of a “survival” habitus as a way 
of coping with, but also of normalizing and accepting the dramatic “changes” of 
that time (Kaneff, 2002; Stenning, 2006; Kaneff and Pine, 2011; Morris, 2016). 
They have criticized the process of “transition” and its underlying neoliberal 
orthodoxy not only for the devastating effects brought about by corresponding 
policies, but also for its teleological premise which presupposes the civilizational 
supremacy of Western modernism and the “lagging” development of formerly 
socialist countries (Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Petrov, 2014). 
Furthermore, there exists a rich scholarly field that takes inspiration from 
postcolonial thought to critically examine the construction of peripherality of the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe via analysis of cultural representations, identities, 
and metanarratives projected from the West. Maria Todorova’s (2009 [1997]) 
Imagining the Balkans explores the in-betweenness of the region, imagined 
as a bridge between Europe and the Orient. She argues that because of their 
ambiguous position – religious and racial similarity to the Western signifier 
coupled with the presence of Orthodox Christianity and Islam – the Balkans are 
not constituted as an incomplete other but as Europe’s “incomplete self” (1997: 
17). They function as a “repository of negative characteristics” (1997: 188) in 
comparison to which an idealized image of the West is constantly reproduced. 
Her work now serves as a cornerstone to what can be referred to as “critical 
Balkanist studies” which, inspired by Said’s Orientalism and other keyworks 
in postcolonial theory, continued to deconstruct dominant representations 
of the region (Wolff, 1994; Goldsworthy, 1998; Obad 2013; Fleming, 2000; 
Bjelić and Savić, 2002; and Melegh, 2006 on Eastern Europe). This liter-
ature sheds light on the Balkans as a space with its own history, sociality, 
transnational networks and practices which have escaped the hegemonic 
Western gaze in both scholarly analysis and popular imagination (Njaradi, 
2012). Important contributions have also been made in the analyses of the 
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internalization and translation of orientalising hierarchies into local dynamics 
of “othering” along national, class, racial, and gender lines (Bakić-Hayden, 
1995; Buchowski, 2006; Neofotistos, 2008). Bakić-Hayden’s (1995) work on 
“nesting Orientalism” traces this process of internalization and redirection of 
stigmatizing identities by following Balkan countries’ attempts to distance 
themselves from stereotypes and claim a more Western – and hence, more 
civilized, developed and advanced status – by othering those “further East” 
than them. Looking at the context of neoliberal reforms in Poland, Michal 
Buchowski showes how the ideological narratives of entrepreneurship and 
free market intersect with “nested Orientalisms” in the construction of classed 
“others” along the dichotomies of civilised/uncivilised, Western/Eastern, and 
capitalist/communist (Buchowski, 2006: 474). This rich strand of literature 
has thus already demonstrated the critical potential of a conversation 
between perspectives on postsocialist EE and postcolonial thought, both 
in terms of examining the external construction of peripherality and local 
categories of inferiority and domination.   
A number of scholars and intellectuals from the Balkans and beyond have 
vocalized the need to further entwine studies of SEE with postcolonial thought 
(e.g. Böröcz, 2001; Bjelić and Savić, 2002; Carey and Raciborski, 2004). This 
conversation between different perspective leads to new understandings and 
analyses of global processes of transformation, integration and hegemony, 
as well as their interconnected and embedded natures. More explicit steps 
towards the initiation of such a dialogue have been outlined by Sharad Chari 
and Catherine Verdery (2009). They argue that a dialogue between postsocialist 
inquiry and postcolonial theory has the potential to articulate a new way for 
rethinking contemporary imperialism and pertinent processes of accumulation. 
This rethinking would challenge Cold War representations and their effects on 
theory and politics, as well as provide an anti-racist critique of state-sanctioned 
processes of othering and disciplining (Chari and Verdery, 2009).
Inspired by this call and by extensive discussions on post- and decolonial 
theory world-wide, we have convened a workshop intended to foster this 
Dialoguing between the “posts” further and to specifically identify entry 
points for such a dialogue with researchers and activists from across and 
beyond Southeast Europe. In presenting a select few of the works from this 
event and the discussion it has initiated, this special issue seeks to explore 
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both the potentials and possible misalignments of post- and decolonial 
theory and practice in Southeastern Europe. We have chosen this specific 
scope at the expense of a more explicit engagement with postcolonial or 
postsocialist theory (which are nevertheless also underlying this collection). 
This intervention is an attempt to capture and contribute to an intellectual 
shift and social practice that seek to not only understand, but also to 
challenge and change the world we live in. 
The “dialoguing between the posts” scholarship have brought to the 
fore three overarching issues that we seek to take forward in this special 
issue. First, this literature highlights the interconnectedness of processes 
of economic integration and peripheralization of the region with global 
historical formations and dynamics between core and peripheries. These 
perspectives, which have exposed the imperial and in fact quasi-colonial 
ways in which geopolitical actors like the EU (Böröcz 2001) and its historical 
predecessors (e.g. Boatcă 2007) have extracted rents and shaped economic 
conduct in SEE, provide an important politicо-economic basis from where 
the region’s peripherality and inferiority can be considered in more detail 
(see Karkov and Majstorović in this issue).  
The second point we seek to address is the undecided, if not sometimes 
contradictory, positioning of the above-mentioned scholarship vis-á-vis 
the socialist legacy, its potentials, and contradictions. This concerns, 
first and foremost, the possibility that the experience of state socialism 
itself may offer inspiration and tools for building more equitable, freer, 
and peaceful societies today. By relegating local calls for social justice, 
public welfare, and worker rights to residual “socialist mentalities”, the 
idea of “catching up” robbed the region of precisely those tools that we 
need to imagine a different future. These can be found, we argue, in 
alternative understandings of citizenship and community that evolved 
in (South) East Europe’s socialist systems, and specifically in their 
alternative readings of modernity and interconnections that promised 
liberation, emancipation, and equality. On the other hand, however, it 
is necessary to interrogate how socialist SEE was also invested in racial-
ized, Euro- and ethnocentric conceptions of progress and civilization 
that have produced regressive, exclusionary, and violent effects both 
during the socialist period and in its aftermath. The critical perspectives 
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outlined above have started to uncover the historical layering of orien-
talising practices and imaginations, and the emerging scholarship on 
race in SEE has pushed this agenda further (Baker 2018a; Bjelić 2018). 
This issue’s contributions will further show how the current (ethno-)
nationalist trajectory of the region complicates, and sometimes even 
appears to preclude, the possibility of resisting neoliberal reform and 
dispossession –   especially when nationalist “political entrepreneurs” 
have seized positions from which they can benefit from connections to 
global capital and investment markets. 
The third issue is the need to strengthen the connection of SEE scholar-
ship with the public and societal debates in the region, and, more specifically, 
with ongoing struggles against neoliberal and Eurocentric logics of progress 
and development. This is challenging because both public discourses and 
resistance struggles evolve with speed and intensity that is often hard to 
keep up with for academics who largely rely on peer-reviewed journals 
and books as a medium. Recently, new kinds of scholarship and writing 
have emerged that substantively engage with and in the struggles and 
attempt to resist or reverse processes of neoliberalization in SEE (see for 
instance Razsa and Kurnik, 2012; Bilić, 2016; Bieber and Brentin 2018; 
Deiana 2018). Building on these critical engagements, we seek to identify 
existing practices of resistance and activism towards more inclusive and just 
orders, or at least the sources and potentials of such sensibilities. Along 
the lines discussed above, we seek to show how decolonial thought can 
help inquire into processes of domination, transition, and resistance by 
reading them against the background of global formations of race, capital, 
and gender. Perhaps even more importantly, we seek to identify new entry 
points for societal activism and struggle against neoliberal restructuring 
and the internalization of essentialist and hierarchizing ways of thinking, 
acting, and knowing. 
In the remainder of this Introduction, we first provide a sketch of the 
emergence of decolonial thought. Subsequently, and with reference to the 
special issue contributions, we outline its importance for and contribution 
to a form of inquiry into postsocialist change that is cognizant of and acts 
upon the regressive logics of the current modern-colonial global order and 
its locally specific manifestations. We additionally develop our argument on 
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the implications of decolonial analysis of Southeastern Europe in relation 
to how decoloniality can be thought and practiced in local struggles but 
also in global solidarities linking these. Finally, we reflect on limitations and 
caveats of the special issue both in terms of empirical topics and conceptual 
contributions. 
The emergence and potential of decolonial thought
A straightforward definition of the decolonial project is impossible. The core 
argument of decolonial theory is that, while colonialism has formally ceased 
to exist, coloniality is embedded firmly into the constitution of modernity: 
colonial forms of living and knowing continue to structure contemporary 
formations of capital, race, and gender. The corresponding persistence of 
exclusionary and violent forms of exploitation, marginalization, disposses-
sion, and silencing need to be replaced, according to decolonial thinkers, 
by decolonial ways of doing, acting and knowing. These decolonial projects 
would be built from forms of life erased by coloniality and from the expe-
riences of the marginalised in order to heal “colonial wounds”. This basic 
assumption is expressed in the conceptual unity of modernity-coloniality 
put forward by decolonial theorists and initially proposed by Aníbal Quijano: 
The modern world-system that began to form with the colonization of [Latin] America, 
has in common three central elements that affect the quotidian life of the totality 
of the global population: the coloniality of power, capitalism, and Eurocentrism. 
[...] Its globality means that there is a basic level of common social practices and 
a central sphere of common value orientation for the entire world (2000: 545).
This thought is further developed by Walter Mignolo, who argues that coloniality 
is the “darker side of modernity” and that “[c]oloniality […] is constitutive of 
modernity – there is no modernity without coloniality” (2011: 3). The “coloni-
ality of power” (Quijano) or the “colonial matrix of power” (Mignolo) operates, 
as Mignolo further elaborates, in different domains (2011: 9) that have been 
further discussed by other decolonial thinkers. Thus, the “discovery” of the 
Americas did not only start a process of colonization that supposedly ended 
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and whose after-effects are felt today. In decolonial thought, the year 1492 
presents a central moment of modernity itself: formations of race, capitalism, 
and gender can be traced to this foundational point in time. Decoloniality, 
then, does not mean the independence of nation states, nor does it imply 
simply confronting global/Western capitalism. It is concerned with bringing 
new ways of living, thinking, and being into place.
Expanding on the concept of “coloniality of being”, Maldonado-Torres 
writes that “colonial relations of power left profound marks not only in 
the areas of authority, sexuality, knowledge and the economy, but on the 
general understanding of being as well” (2007: 242). Besides the economy 
and order-making, these include global geo- and body-politics operating 
through race, gender, and sexuality (see Lugones, 2007; Maese-Cohen 
2010) and, finally, knowledge, subjectivity, and being (discussed in works 
of Sylvia Wynter and Nelson Maldonado-Torres).
Even though the two are often conflated, there are significant differences 
between postcolonial and decolonial thought.* First of all, they come from 
different geographical and theoretical positions. While postcolonial thought 
refers mostly to the Middle East and South Asia of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
decolonial scholars take as their reference point South America and earlier 
colonial conquests that started in the 15th century – their experience is one 
of settler, rather than extractive colonialism. The disciplinary origins of the 
two perspectives also differ: postcolonial thought largely remained in the 
sphere of the cultural studies and strands of Marxism (even though there are 
various works who defy this easy identification), while decolonial scholarship 
was significantly formed out of world-systems theory and development, 
underdevelopment and dependency theories (Bhambra, 2014).
While remaining attentive to the different origins and positions of these 
two schools of thought, we agree with Gurminder Bhambra (2014) and 
Marcekke Maese-Cohen (2010) who argue for placing the two in a con-
versation that draws attention to the connections and synthesis between 
post- and decolonial theory and does not idealize one at the expense of 
another. In this conversation, we hope to highlight the distinct focus that 
decolonial thought can bring to studying SEE. This focus is not intended 
* For an engaging discussion on the difference between postcolonial and decolonial projects, see this talk 
by Ramón Grosfoguel.
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to create “new” knowledge or bring an “integrated” understanding of the 
region, but explore whether a dialogue with decolonial thinkers can be as 
productive as the one between  regional scholars and postcolonial ideas. 
A significant dimension of decolonial thought is its categorical rejection of 
projects of “inclusion” and “integration.” Some strands of both postcolonial 
politics that focus on the nation-state, and postcolonial theory inspired 
by thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, have been criticised for their failing 
to construct an alternative outside of the Western reference that they so 
eloquently deconstruct (eg. Mignolo, 2007). This discussion remains outside 
of the scope of the special issue (see Dirlik, 2002; Moreiras, 1999), but we 
find this specific articulation of decolonial thought especially important 
for our purposes. Within SEE and EE more generally, critiques of local 
marginalizations and dispossessions too often based their arguments on 
an identification with Europe, instead of analysing how these regimes of 
oppression are globally connected or asking what an alternative mode of 
organising life and politics would be. In looking for alternatives, we join 
scholars like Maese-Cohen who insist on placing different perspectives 
alongside each other as a specific kind of investment:
an experiential, pedagogical, socioeconomic, and philosophical investment in 
alternative modes of liberation – modes that are not necessarily “new” but that 
bear the traces of nonhegemonic or subaltern thinking, the survival of which 
evinces simultaneously the constitutive underside of modernity and the possibility 
of other worlds (2010: 14).
We thus follow an understanding of decoloniality as an epistemic and a 
political project. Broadly speaking, this project refers to decolonising all 
spheres of life by enunciating the way in which life in the current capitalist 
system is governed by a “colonial matrix of power” and, in more practical terms, 
a delinking of life from this matrix and the regimes of hierarchy, exclusion 
and violence it is embedded in. In Mignolo’s words, “decolonial thinking and 
doing focus on the enunciation, engaging in epistemic disobedience and 
delinking from the colonial matrix in order to open up decolonial options –  
a vision of life and society that requires decolonial subjects, decolonial 
knowledges, and decolonial institutions” (2011: 10). 
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This implies two concrete types of action. First, on the level of knowledge 
production, a decolonial approach entails devising approaches that uncover 
erasures and tell stories of people who have been marginalised, silenced, 
and dehumanised in Eurocentric accounts of history (Mignolo, 2011: 
xxx; Mignolo and Walsh, 2018: 208). This has most significantly been 
demonstrated in the work of the scholar and activist Linda Tuhiwai Smith 
(2008) in her book Decolonizing Methodologies and in cognate scholarly 
cooperation with indigenous resistance movements (see Rutazibwa and 
Shilliam, 2018: 8-9). Second, on the level of praxis, organization, and policy, 
“decolonizing” means, as indicated by Mignolo, “opening up global but 
noncapitalist horizons and delinking from the idea that there is a single and 
primary modernity surrounded by peripheral or alternative ones” (2011: 5). 
This anti-capitalist strand of decolonial theory is linked to Arturo Escobar’s 
work on postdevelopment and presents a possible synergy with Marxist 
theory – including its adaptation in postcolonial scholarship – and political 
movements (see Rao, 2017). Nikolay Karkov’s contribution in this issue traces 
in further detail the emergence of a decolonial anti-capitalist critique; how 
it is rooted in, but also differing from, postcolonial scholarship; and, finally, 
how it presents an important avenue of the unfinished dialogue between 
the (Global) South and the East, i.e. the postsocialist world. 
We briefly elaborate on the two key dimensions of decoloniality, which 
can be glossed as “epistemic” and “practical”. Decolonial thinking, as 
already indicated, means thinking from that which is erased, oppressed, 
silenced, exploited, and buried under the modernity/coloniality project. It 
is thinking from the other side, from after the slash between coloniality/
decoloniality. Thus, a decolonial project would start with reconstructing 
experiences, thoughts, and ways of being and living locally. Here, local 
or autochthonous does not signify traditions that are accepted as part of 
global forms of knowledge shaped through the modern-colonial project. 
Instead, decolonial thought draws from that which is expunged from the 
modern-colonial project and seeks to recover silences and mend the violence 
and exclusions wrought by modernity-coloniality. This emphasis on locality 
does not imply another revival of area studies and parochial conclusions, 
but points to the need of approaching modernity/coloniality from specific 
locations and viewpoints that have so far been excluded. Perhaps more 
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importantly, decolonial thinking from such a geographically and socially 
specific standpoint would challenge how modernity has been and continues 
to be constructed as “normal”, desirable, and superior to any alternative 
mode of social organisation. 
This epistemic dominance of Eurocentric frames of thought is well 
summarised by Quijano when he writes:
The tragedy here is that we have all been led, knowingly or not, willingly or not, 
to see and to accept that image as our own reality and ours only. Because of it, 
for a very long time, we have been what we are not [...] And because of it, we 
can never catch our real problems, much less solve them, except in only a partial 
and distorted way (2000: 222).  
In this sense, decolonial thought argues that the reality that we see is the 
reality provided by the institutions, practices, and knowledge regimes of 
modernity/coloniality. While the totalizing tendency of such a view – as 
well as its inattention to race and gender as dimensions of oppression* – 
has been problematized by decolonial feminist scholars (Lugones, 2007; 
Maese-Cohen, 2010), this formulation of epistemic power is especially 
important for approaching SEE. In this reality, the rising problems and 
deprivation, both in SEE and globally, are explained through mentalities 
that are unable to “do” capitalism “properly”, by temporal lags in which 
SEE and other world regions have to patiently wait in the ante-chamber 
of modernity, and by these regions’ supposedly inherent propensities to 
backwardness, depravity, corruption and violence. 
* Maese-Cohen (2010: 4) offers a useful summary of Lugones’ critique of Quijano’s concept of “coloniality of 
power”, which, as Lugones argued, was based on, and implicitly reproducing, problematic understandings of 
“biological dimorphism, heterosexualism, and patriarchy” that require historical deconstruction and practical 
undoing (Lugones 2007: 190). We agree with this critique and affirm that basic works in decolonial theory 
like those of Quijano or Mignolo have be read together with authors explicitly discussing the coloniality 
of race, gender and sexuality mentioned above and in the following. A good recent example of decolonial 
feminism is Gómez-Barris’ analysis of indigenous lifeworlds and protest movements through a “decolonial 
femme methodology” that seeks to uncover “submerged and emergent perspectives” and “the potential for 
forms of life that cannot be easily reduced, divided, or representationally conquered or evacuated” (2017: 
3-4). Although not developed explicitly, she indicates the problem that, due to its focus on the modern-
colonial system, decolonial scholarship may run the danger of getting “forever analytically imprisoned to 
reproducing a totalizing viewpoint that ignores life that is unbridled and finds forms of resisting and living 
alternative” (ibid.: 3).
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In short, Quijano traces the meeting of capitalism and racialization to 
explain not only how the world system functions with an assumption that 
Europeans are superior to everyone else but explains why this is seen as 
natural (Quijano, 2000: 541). He identifies “two principal founding myths” 
of the Eurocentric system: evolutionism and dualism. Evolutionism posits a 
“theory of history as a linear sequence of universally valid events” leading 
inexorably towards European or Western civilization (2000: 550-51). Dualism 
naturalises the different stages of this unidirectional history: differences 
between Europe and other locations/cultures become a matter of “natural 
(racial) difference” instead of “consequence[s] of a history of power” (2000: 
542). This view presents the hegemonic understanding of the whole globe 
(2000: 543) and thus offers a basis for how thinkers and practitioners can 
confront, resist, and possibility dismantle, the global modern-colonial system 
and its matrix of power. Further insight on the above-mentioned founding 
myths and epistemologies of the “colonial matrix of power” is provided 
in Manuela Boatcă’s analysis of modern citizenship and the Occidental 
epistemologies underlying it. Examining Max Weber’s writings on the “Polish 
question”, i.e. imperial Germany’s anxiety about lands in Eastern Prussia 
being increasingly settled by Poles, Boatcă exposes Weber’s anti-Polish 
rhetoric and the racializing and “unmistakable colonial logic” by which he 
declares German citizenship as the only way for this minority to be “turned 
… into human beings”. She further demonstrates the status of citizenship 
as an “entail of colonial property”, which is most poignantly captured in the 
contemporary trend of “citizenship by investment” programmes. These enable 
wealthy people across the globe to acquire certain countries’ citizenship 
in exchange for capital investments, while, the same remains unreachable 
for the wider global population and especially for migrants and refugees, 
whose attempts to find shelter and social mobility are barred through racial 
and ethnic policing. 
The practical or political dimension of the decolonial projectfollows from the 
critical epistemic positioning, as it propagates the necessity of learning from 
and advancing different ways of life that refuse to be subdued by modernity/
coloniality. 
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In the following, we outline the ways in which decolonial theory and 
practice, as they can be conceived in the epistemic and practical-political 
terms discussed above, foreground critical forms of knowledge and action 
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
Towards a decolonial perspective on postsocialist SEE
Although conversations and research on decoloniality have largely been 
centred on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, some work has 
been done in thinking about decoloniality in the former socialist part of the 
world, which spans the Eurasian landmass. Madina Tlostanova’s Gender 
Epistemologies and Eurasian Borderlands (2010), for instance, examined the 
Eurasian borderlands in the Caucasus and Central Asia and was engaged in a 
dialogue with decolonial thinking from Latin America (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 
2012). In her influential article in a special issue of the Journal of Postcolonial 
Writing, Tlostanova rejects the idea to simply “apply postcolonial theory to 
postsocialist spaces” or include East European perspectives into the debates 
on postcolonial theory (Tlostanova, 2012: 332). Instead, she asks how we 
might set in motion a different project: a project that would start “with the 
geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge growing out of the local histories, 
subjectivities and experiences of eastern and south-eastern Europe, central 
Asia, Caucasus or Russia?” (2012: 332). This, together with her analysis of 
practices and possibilities of resisting and deflecting imperial forms of domi-
nation (2012: 140; 2010: ch. 6), is arguably a key starting point for approaching 
and formulating a decolonial perspective on (South) East Europe and thus 
an important conceptual step Tlostanova’s work has provided. 
Tlostanova discusses the intersecting nature of Soviet coloniality with 
a critical decolonial perspective on the Soviet Union’s status as a “second 
class empire”, different from the “first class” empires of the Western British, 
French, or German. This, she argued, had led to “generating mutant forms 
of the main vices of modernity – secondary Eurocentrism, secondary 
orientalism, secondary racism” as “Russia has projected its own inferiority 
complexes onto its colonies” in the Caucasus and Central Asia (2012: 135). 
This critical stance has led her to largely dismiss the region’s socialist heritage 
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as entirely absorbed into the global matrix of “modernity-coloniality”, with 
little to nothing being left to be salvaged from this experience for building 
a decolonial alternative to it (Tlostanova, 2015). This rather categorical 
pessimism is further explored in this issue by Marina Gržinić, who argues 
that, while racializing and dehumanizing tendencies of socialist regimes 
deserve critical attention, the project of socialist modernity cannot be 
dismissed as it still offers important insights and inspiration for present 
struggles of resistance against ‘necro-’ and ‘turbo-neoliberal capitalism’. 
Elaborating her argument through a genealogy of conceptual relations 
between, respectively, capitalism, socialism, postsocialism, and post- and 
decolonial thought, Gržinić presents a pertinent argument that the present 
necropolitical capitalist regime can only be effectively tackled if trans-fem-
inist, LGBTQI, anti-fascist, anti-racist, Marxist-Black Studies, and migrant 
standpoints are linked in theoretical dialogue and activist struggles. 
Notwithstanding this ongoing debate on how to approach the heritage of 
socialism and its racializing and imperial undertones, both Tlostanova and 
scholars coming from a political economy perspective (like Böröcz, 2001; 
Boatcă, 2007; 2012) have developed important tools for critically examining 
the subjugated, dependent, and inferior positions of (South) Eastern Europe 
and other (semi-) peripheries. Most importantly for our purpose, Manuela 
Boatcă (2012) considers Eastern Europe as a space that never experienced 
formal colonization but was, and continues to be, profoundly shaped by 
unequal and exploitative relationships with geopolitical power centres like 
the European monarchies or the EU (see Boatcă 2007; 2008). She invites 
us to consider the work of imperial difference – “the less overtly racial, more 
pronounced ethnic, and distinct class hierarchies” which account for the 
relations between European empires and their former subjects (2007: 134). 
Boatcă thus places the Balkans in epigonal Europe, that is, in a semi-pe-
ripheral position to “Europe proper”. However, she emphasises that even in 
this semi-peripheral position, the region reproduces European modernity 
as it strives to become part of it. Such an analysis of the colonial character 
(both historical and contemporary) of the relations between semi-periph-
eries like (South) East Europe with core regions such as Western Europe/
the EU or others (e.g. Russia, and increasingly China) foregrounds a critical 
understanding of the status quo. Accordingly, it presents the first step for 
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thinking of ways to challenge it and work towards decolonial alternatives 
on individual and collective levels. 
However, as already indicated, a key idea that this special issue pursues 
is that the experience of socialism itself may provide new entry points and 
potentials for thinking and working towards decoloniality. As Karkov and 
Valiavicharska (2018) argue, we can see “the historical experience of state 
socialism as a way of collective co-existence (in the form of practices, social 
mores, institutional arrangements, alternative systems of value, etc.) [...] 
in significant tension with both Occidental reason and the logic of capitalist 
accumulation” (2018: 791). This affirms that, contrary to Tlostanova’s cate-
gorical writing off of this period, we should see the socialist experience as 
both implicated within the modern-colonial capitalist system, and simulta-
neously pointing to openings for challenging it through new understandings 
of personhood, society, and the future based on freedom, creativity, and 
solidarity (see Valiavicharska’s and Karkov’s contributions).
In a similar vein, Ovidiu Țichindeleau (2013: n.p.) has argued that “the 
weapons of decolonial thought and imagination are growing from memories 
and experiences of repression, resistance, and liberation”, which may go 
back to the socialist period or even further. Besides obvious examples like 
social justice, state provision of institutions and financial support for social 
reproduction, and hence more equal opportunities for women, the socialist 
sources of emancipatory and inclusive action also include autonomy, economic 
democracy in the form of self-management (e.g. in workers councils or col-
lectives, see Ramović, 2018), and solidarity across social groups, categories, 
and international borders. The key challenge such a political endeavour faces 
is the fact that contemporary regimes of truth in SEE and other postsocialist 
countries subject their societies to epistemic “self-colonization” through 
“instituting a normative history that asks people to take an absolute distance 
from their own past” (Țichindeleanu, 2013). A decolonial project would thus 
have to expose how “anticommunism was instrumentalized as the regional 
articulation of the coloniality of power in the former socialist bloc” and is 
at the heart of the “insidious repression and even fabrication of people’s 
relation to their own historical experience” (ibid.).
In working to recover the socialist legacy and its positive potentialities, 
Valiavicharska’s contribution to this issue focuses especially on anti-fascist/
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anti-racist campaigning, solidarity, and cooperation with Third World countries 
in socialist Bulgaria. At the same time, she makes clear that slogans of “people’s 
friendship” and solidarity with the Third World’s people of colour should not be 
romanticized and isolated from ethno-nationalist discourses and policies, as 
they most significantly manifested in campaigns of assimilation of ethnic and 
religious minorities. Likewise, Bozhin Traykov identifies the positive achievements 
of socialism in Bulgaria in terms of welfare and social justice and exposes their 
systematic erasure in the present-day public discourse. This erasure enables 
the construction of the hegemonic idea that neoliberal capitalism is the one 
and only mode of social organization. While not explicitly taking a decolonial 
approach, this analysis builds an important foundation for a decolonial project 
as it enunciates the Bulgarian iteration of the colonial matrix of power and the 
corresponding hegemonic narratives and policies.
The two key aspects discussed so far – a critical understanding of 
Southeast Europe’s position in the global modern-colonial-capitalist system, 
and the necessity of recovering the emancipatory potential of socialism –  
foreground a third aspect of decoloniality in the region. This third aspect 
relates to the possibilities of resistance towards and liberation from the 
neoliberal and imperial trajectory of transformation that the region has 
been subjected to for the past 30 years. In his works on decolonial aes-
thetics, Țichindeleanu (2013: n.p.) invites us to nurture such openings that 
go beyond “internal” critiques of liberalism and aim at “decolonizing the 
imaginary and rebuilding alliances, against the dissemination of cynicism, 
ethnocentric nationalism, and postcommunist racism”. We develop this 
third aspect in more depth in the following section, which also spells out 
how the critical knowledge and perspective of decolonial thinking feed into 
pathways towards decolonial praxis. 
It is within this complex territory, which links the particular and the 
universal in both theoretical understandings and in actions, that decolonial 
thought demonstrates its contributions. Decolonial theory offers a critical 
insight to understandings of domination, oppression, and exploitation in 
SEE: it places these regimes within the global system of modern-colonial 
capitalism and its matrix of power. This points to the complicity and parallels 
of socialism in SEE and beyond with racialized, gendered and classed forms 
of ordering. And at the same time, as we have sought to show, decolonial 
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theory can also aid more explicit articulations of the potentialities that the 
socialist experiences offer for ways to challenge these regimes and practices. 
We consider these possibilities and their links with the epistemic entry 
points of decolonial thoughts in turn.
Thinking decoloniality as coevalness,  
global solidarity, and joint struggle
In the foregoing sections, we have laid out primarily the theoretical and 
conceptual contribution we seek to make to perspectives on SEE. First, 
an understanding of the globally connected nature of the region’s (semi-)
peripherality in both its present and historicized guise. And second, the need 
to appreciate the socialist experience in terms of both emancipatory and liber-
atory potentials, but also as a source of regressive nationalist and identitarian 
thinking. In this section, we want to further elaborate the implications of this 
alternative approach and – via the concepts of coevalness and global solidarity –  
develop our third point on the need of engaging with specific struggles. 
Coevalness, understood as belonging to the same spatio-temporal con-
dition or “stage”, is a crucial concept for understanding the connections and 
parallels between trajectories of domination, coercion, violence and erasure 
that traverse centuries and locations. Johannes Fabian (1983) discussed 
the “denial of coevalness” in his critique of classical anthropology and its 
underlying linear conceptions of time. In this denial, non-Western societies 
are not only essentialized, but are seen as a “stage” through which the 
imperial centres have long passed. This expulsion from contemporaneity not 
only foregrounds teleological expectations of progress, but also shapes the 
interrelations and infrastructures constituting the history and the present 
of both the global South and the North. Especially after 1989, disciplines 
like area studies, political science, and anthropology accepted this linear 
and teleological conception of modernity – they embarked on a mission of 
explaining the way for SEE to “overcome” its civilizational deficiencies and 
helping it reach the stage of modern capitalism and democracy. In this way, 
coevalness has been continuously denied to postsocialist, postcommunist, 
and post-Soviet countries in SEE and beyond. 
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The reaction that we propose in light of this “denial of coevalness” is not an 
inclusion of SEE into the modern-capitalist structures – whether those of 
the EU or “the West” more generally. Thinking about the region as always 
coeval with both the colonizers and the colonized recovers the role that 
SEE played in the constitution of modernity, and simultaneously unearths 
peripheral connections not reliant on the Global North as their centre. This 
kind of thinking can help bring European peripheries and the Global South 
closer: both in thinking how they always made each other’s histories, and in 
thinking together about different futures. The logical consequence of such 
thinking is to see parallels, possibilities of solidarity, and lateral connection 
that travel horizontally through “sideway glances” (Shilliam, 2015b). Robbie 
Shilliam’s (2015a) The Black Pacific demonstrates this project by drawing 
out connections between African and Māori anti-colonial struggles to 
“support, renew and extend [...] a deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial 
connectivity” (2015a: 5). In turning his gaze away from the power centres, 
he calls upon us to “displace, rather than dwell upon the operation” of 
European power (2015a: 4).
From a historical perspective, the connections between SEE and the 
Global South are obvious in the socialist period. An example is found 
in Ljubica Spaskovska’s work that investigates how South-South labour 
mobility and large-scale Yugoslav investment projects in the developing 
world both resisted and participated in creating the new contours of the 
international division of labour in the Cold War (Spaskovska, 2018). Unex-
pected connections are highlighted by Catherine Baker (2018a: 148-151) 
when she talks about the Afro-Montenegrin/Afro-Albanian families in 
Ulcinj (Montenegro) – people whose histories are made in the connections 
between SEE and the Mediterranean slave trade, people erased by a 
fixation either on “Europe” or on the Balkans as “white”. In a similar vein, 
Zhivka Valiavicharska (this issue) analyses socialist Bulgaria’s solidarity with 
anti-colonial struggles and inequality both in the Third and First Worlds. On 
a more global scale, sources and practices of solidarity between socialist 
countries of the European peripheries and Global South countries (and 
their significance for decolonial thought) have been apparent in the Non-
Aligned Movement and its founding moment at the Bandung conference 
(see Pham and Shilliam, 2016).
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The complex historical entanglements that connect SEE to both the First 
and Third Worlds are the basis of Špela Drnovšek-Zorko’s piece in this issue, 
which draws on her research with Bosniak and Serb migrants in the UK to 
foreground the complexity of the encounter between SEE and coloniality. 
In navigating life as immigrants worthy of recognition in postcolonial Britain, 
her interlocutors attach themselves to whiteness and Europeanness. Using a 
racializing hierarchy allows them to distance themselves from “other” (non-
White) migrants and make claims as deserving subjects in a profoundly 
racialized host society. At the same time, however, these migrants invoke the 
non-aligned history of Yugoslavia – in making sense of their own exclusion 
from the majority, they are able to reach into the history of anti-colonial 
solidarity and narrate a critique of empire and colonialism. This kind of 
work that “deconstruct[s] postsocialist subjectivity so that it acknowledges 
its colonizing and colonized position – as well as its anti-colonial legacy”, 
shows both the rich openings of coeval thinking and offers a starting point 
for future projects of anti-racist and decolonial reconstructions.
The need for coevalness and solidarity is not confined to international 
or regional levels. Like the oppression, exclusion, and violence of the 
modern-colonial system, it also needs to be translated into a source of 
support and common struggle among people who are separated along 
racial, ethnic, class, or gender lines while inhabiting the same spatial 
confines. Decolonial authors have turned to global race formations and 
the way they have both shaped and were enacted in the Balkans. In the 
context of SEE, Catherine Baker (2018a; 2018b), Dušan Bjelić (2018) and 
Špela Drnovšek Zorko (2018) have put an end to “the racial exceptionalism” 
that had previously marked studies on the region. Vedran Vučetić and 
Jelena Subotić (2017) and Nikolay Karkov (2015) draw out how Yugoslav 
socialism was invested in global regimes of whiteness and racialization 
while pursuing its emancipatory agendas. 
A recent example of practical confrontations with racial regimes is the 
Bulgarian mobilization against governmental measures of displacement and 
segregation of Roma, as well as the political and public rhetoric calling for the 
restriction of minority rights. The anti-racist protests that took place both in 
Bulgaria and several European capitals have demonstrated the strong resonan-
ce of the issue across national borders and have invoked a vocabulary that –  
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through terms like “fascism” or “apartheid” – exhibits the parallels between 
local contemporary forms of ethnic exclusion and global histories of racism. 
Lastly, a decolonial approach proceeds with the assumption that “theory 
is doing and doing is “thinking” (Walsh and Mignolo, 2018: 7). Decolonial 
thought promotes a fundamental change in the vantage point for social 
inquiry and action: it propagates not only the analytical dissecting of global 
modernity-coloniality – something that postcolonial scholarship has suc-
cessfully engaged in, but it requires identifying and cultivating practices and 
spaces that seek to dismantle it. We share the sentiment that decolonial 
thinking should not and cannot be conceived as a merely intellectual or 
empirical pursuit but needs to be grounded in lived experiences and linked 
with and directed towards changing the world. While we acknowledge the 
general value of conceptualizing and dialoguing between different theoretical 
approaches, our key concern is to link critical inquiry with initiatives that 
seek to bring about radical change and transformation of societies.  
Political initiatives that open up different ways of understanding and 
acting already exist in different spaces of SEE. Some examples include the 
cooperation of Ljubljana Pride with Rudy Loewe on Decolonising Queer,* The 
Telciu Summer School that has been bringing together scholars, students, and 
activists together since 2012,** and the multitude of artists, activists, and political 
organizers around SEE and Eastern Europe more generally (see Țichindeleanu, 
2013). While these initiatives are particularly valuable for the explicit decolonial 
angle they embrace, the primary purpose of this issue is to turn attention to 
the potentials and sensibilities for anti-hegemonic, anti-racist, and possibly 
decolonial agendas in the region’s present struggles and movements. 
Recent years are marked by an increasing number of public mobilizations 
throughout SEE in which thousands take to the streets to voice their anger 
at the dehumanizing consequences of by now 30 years of neoliberal 
“transition”. Even though these protests are in many ways limited to liberal 
imaginaries of collective decision-making – as expressed in discourses of 
“anti-corruption”, cadre politics of individualized blame, or pro-EU narratives – 
they nevertheless raise important issues with the structural dysfunctionalities 
of markets, institutions, and political regimes. For example, “the system 
* More info on Decolonizing Queer in Ljubljana on this link.
** More info on the Telciu Summer School on this link.
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is killing us” (Sistemata ni ubiva), a slogan originally used by Bulgarian 
mothers of children with disabilities to demand political attention to their 
problems, sparked wide resonance with different social causes precisely 
because it captures the systematic dimensions of discontent in seemingly 
particular policy areas. Popular demands for the nationalization of important 
industries, protection of public spaces from private development projects, 
and against the marketization of public health articulate an even clearer 
rejection of neoliberal policies and their exclusionary effects.
Instances of such rejection can be observed throughout the region. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that experienced violent conflict and 
has been de facto governed by the Office of the High Representative, the 
discontent with the emerging neoliberal order and detached political elites 
has been loudly expressed. The 2014 plenums that happened across BiH 
captured both regional and global imaginations: they not only provided 
scathing critiques of neoliberal reforms that went hand in hand with 
internationally supported ethno-nationalist projects, but they experimented 
with new forms of democratic participation and served as both prefigurative 
and transformational politics (see Kurtović, 2015; Arsenijević, 2014; Kurtović 
and Hromadžić, 2017). In this issue, Danijela Majstorović examines recent 
waves of protest against privatization and restructuring in BiH, but also 
in reaction to wrongdoing of criminal justice authorities* – all against the 
background of the country’s peripherality and marginality. Her analysis 
shows how through collective mobilization ordinary people are able to put 
pressure both on enterprise owners and decision makers. In so doing, they 
draw on the positive potential of the Yugoslav socialist heritage, as expressed 
in the plenums and principles of workers’ self-management. While these 
examples point to the decolonial potential of socio-political struggles and 
protests in SEE, their short-lived nature, narrow scope, and silence on 
political issues that could complicate them also indicate the need to further 
connect and sensibilize these projects towards a decolonial vantage point. 
The examples from Bulgaria and BiH above, as well as the ongoing protests 
in Belgrade that are unfolding as we are finishing this piece, are what makes 
SEE a crucial space of investigation. While not adopting an explicitly decolonial 
* The “Justice for David” (Pravda za Davida) movement demands a proper investigation into a young man’s 
obscure death.
28
approach, these sites of struggle show the dissatisfaction with, and openings 
in, the system of modernity/coloniality as enacted in the region. Moreover, 
these struggles make obvious the need to reconsider what kind of critical 
work can be done from specific localities around the world to challenge the 
formations of race, class, and gender that operate globally.
Caveats and future research 
Perhaps unsurprisingly in a collection that seeks to start conversations rather 
than sum them up, there are several issues that are important in the dialoguing 
between postsocialism and decoloniality, but that remain unexplored in the 
following pages.  A key challenge to post- and decolonial theory and praxis 
in the region comes from the fact that the loudest rejection of European 
modernity comes from right-wing, nationalist, nativist, and violent politics. 
These narratives and movements remain subscribed to an ontology of dif-
ference that categorizes spaces and people according to frameworks of race 
and nation. Recent campaigns, public discourses, and perceptions about the 
need to curb the settling or even passing through of refugees are just one 
reminder of the significance and reified nature of identitarian thinking in SEE 
societies. Whether and how such thinking can be overcome is a question 
without an easy answer. Although we do not discuss this problem in detail 
in the special issue, it creates an imperative for decolonial approaches to 
delineate their endeavour from the ultimately exclusionary and dehumanizing 
logics of these self-proclaimed national emancipatory agendas.
Relatedly, it has to be acknowledged that in SEE there are no easily 
identifiable indigenous forms of life and knowledge that ground decolonial 
projects in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Without forgetting the need 
to further excavate silenced knowledge, we propose a turn to praxis – 
socialist as well as “postsocialist” – that stubbornly continues to seek 
“existence otherwise” even when we are told that there is no alternative 
to the march of time. Putting these efforts into conversations with forms 
of knowledge that have been over-, re- and unwritten by national and 
socialist projects is an endeavour that decolonial inquiry will have to 
undertake in SEE. The contribution of the special issue is, however, limited 
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to pointing to the potential of recovering knowledge and experience from 
the socialist period. 
The three topics that we discussed in Belgrade but remain outside of this 
special issue relate to the importance of Islam in the region, struggles around 
urban spaces, and gender and sexuality. Islam has profoundly shaped both the 
region’s identity and its place in structures of modernity. The work of Piro Rexhepi 
is instructive here: he shows how Islam played a crucial role in determining the 
borders of Europe and the Balkans as its periphery. Moreover, he emphasizes 
how the “Europeanising project” has been involved in constant attempts to 
separate Balkan Muslims from the rest of the Muslim world (Rexhepi, 2018). 
Rexhepi draws from “Islamic scholars and activists, particularly women and 
underprivileged minorities […] whose intellectual labour has traversed the East/
West, Ottoman/post-Ottoman, and Communist/post-Communist thresholds” 
to write a different story of Islam in the Balkans, one that contradicts the 
hegemonic anti-colonialist (anti-Ottoman) and postsocialist narratives (2018: 55). 
Breaking away from “linear, forward looking post-Ottoman and post-socialist 
temporalities” (2018: 55) of Muslim history in Eastern Europe as separated 
from the rest of the ummah [the entire Muslim community], Rexhepi uncovers 
the ceoavnelss of spaces which was silenced and erased by  colonialist and 
nationalist narratives that sought to place Balkan Muslims within “the historical 
timeline and space of Europe” (2018: 55). It is these connections that will have 
to be unearthed and followed if we are to write a different history of the region.
The second omission concerns the struggles around urban space and built 
environment in the region. As we sat in Belgrade in the warm days of Sep-
tember 2017, we witnessed the grand reimagining of the Sava river bank as 
the notorious Belgrade Waterfront project. In his talk at the conference, Miloš 
Jovanović reminded us that the same area has already been a site of violent 
modernization through erasure: Sava mahala used to be an area of poor 
shacks, a refuge for Roma and Gadje escapees from feudal estates. Sava 
mahala was burned to the ground by Prince Miloš in 1834 to make space 
for a new Christian administrative centre of the city that was supposed to 
serve as a counterpoint to the Ottoman development on the Danube banks. 
It is this history that is evoked when masked men displace refugees, Roma 
migrants, and those living in state-owned housing to make space for Belgrade 
Waterfront in today’s Savamala (Jovanović, 2016). The important lesson of
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Jovanović’s remarks is that contemporary struggles around what public space 
is, how to use it, and what it means to “develop” it, cannot be explained with-
out being historicized – “such projects rely on historical amnesia to weave 
their origin stories” (Jovanović, 2016; 2018).* It is this historical amnesia 
that can be challenged by thinking about buried connections and forgotten 
histories. And lastly, this special issue does not substantially address the 
issue of gender and how it has been produced at the intersection of mul-
tiple modernities and empires. Importantly, it was precisely feminism that 
connected socialist politics to both the Global North and the Global South 
during socialism. Kristin Ghodsee’s work, for example, excavates the leading 
role that feminists from the “Second World” had in the United Nations’ Dec-
ade of Women – the alliances of leftist women in Eastern Europe with their 
contemporaries in the Global South shed light on much of the development 
of early “global feminism” (Ghodsee, 2019). In highlighting the omission of 
feminism from this issue, we are fortunate to be able to point to the rich body 
of work that has already tackled the hierarchies of transnational formations 
of gender in the region (Blagojević, 2009; Mizielińska and Kulpa, 2011; Bak-
er 2016). Insightful feminist scholarship uncovered how gender discourses 
and practices played a crucial role in the post-1989 “transition” (Gal and  
Kligman, 2011) while also being subject to evolving “waves”, positionalities, 
and tensions between them (e.g. Majstorović, 2016). Scholars have situated 
issues of sexuality in imperial legacies and current aspirations to “become 
European” (Rexhepi, 2016; Slootmaeckers, Touquet, and Vermeersch, 2016), 
and there are those who are writing histories that were previously at risk 
of being forgotten (Ghodsee, 2019; Bilić and Radoman, 2019). It is from 
these experiences of particular struggles and by being acutely aware of 
the dangers of universals that we hope to continue building emancipatory 
thinking and practice in the region
Bibliography 
* For more on Belgrade Waterfront, see the documentary by KURS and Miloš Jovanović Waterfront: A post-
Ottoman post-socialist story.
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Image Description: 
President Tito meets Kenyans who have 
received their university education in 
Yugoslavia. Kenya, 1970. Source: Ana 
Sladojević (in Vučetić, R. and Betts, P. (2017) 
(eds.) Tito in Africa. Picturing Solidarity. 
Belgrade: Museum of Yugoslavia.
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T his text was originally commissioned in the wake of Dialoguing “between the Posts”: Post-socialist and Post-/Decolonial Perspec-tives on Domination, Hierarchy, and Resistance in Southeastern 
Europe, a 2017 conference on postsocialism and postcoloniality in Belgrade, 
Serbia. The conference’s original title was an explicit reference to Chari 
and Verdery’s well-known piece from the end of the preceding decade 
(2009). What this special issue is trying to bring about instead could eas-
ily be grouped under the rubric of “Dialoguing between the South and the 
East”. Such a reformulation strikes me as pertinent not only because the 
“dialogue” between at least the normative articulations of postcolonial and 
postsocialist theory is difficult to stage from the start, as Chari and Verdery 
readily acknowledged: one emerged in the 1980s in a somewhat belated 
response to earlier anti-colonial struggles, the other after the end of the 
Cold War in response to the collapse of socialism, leading to, among others, 
very different political agendas. But also, because the temporal framing 
of postcoloniality and postsocialism implies a critical relationship to what 
precedes both posts, whereas for many of the contributors to this special 
issue (myself included) colonialism and socialism are anything but equal-
ly or even comparably “oppressive”. Last but not least, the (Global) South 
and the (socialist and postsocialist) East as understood here challenge the 
idea that the two were completely discrete and disconnected entities, with 
radically divergent trajectories and political priorities. South-East dialogues 
capture this complex temporality  and its spatial articulations in a way that 
does not necessarily invoke the negative stigma implicit in, at least, post-
socialist intellectual production. The idea of South-East dialogues invites 
us both to consider important work done in the past and to try to take the 
conversation further, both theoretically and politically.
In this text I seek to make a minor contribution to such an expansion of 
the conversation, by attending to three aspects of this dialoguing between 
the South and the East as I see them. In the first part I discuss the “missed 
encounter” between postcolonial and (anti-capitalist) postsocialist theory 
in the region, as it unfolded especially after the mid-1990s. I suggest that, 
their crucial insights notwithstanding, it was the two posts’ mutual opacity 
and unintelligibility that set important limits to their theoretical and political 
potential. In the second part, I look at more recent developments that seek 
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to forge a rapprochement between the two sides, including those inspired 
by the decolonial turn in the human and social sciences. The decolonial 
framework, as it is being articulated by East European scholars, has the great 
advantage of accommodating both the anti-capitalist and the postcolonial 
discourses, as they pertain to the region. In the third part I explore the 
important bonus insights proffered by the decolonial-anti-capitalist critique 
in particular, for not only understanding better our present predicament, but 
also for facilitating more radical (because more nuanced) types of political 
action. And finally, in a brief conclusion I revisit the political urgency of 
(re)engaging in a robust South-East dialogue, as the combined forces of 
neoliberal austerity and persistent racial othering continue to wreak havoc 
in the region and around the world.  
Careful readers of the whole issue will probably notice significant 
overlaps but also some differences of emphasis between the Introduction 
and the present text.  Both of these are more than a perhaps predictable 
by-product of writing the two texts independently of one another and 
originally planning to use this writing as the issue’s afterword.. More 
importantly, they also testify to our intention to both foreground recent 
critical scholarship that, nonetheless, continues to find itself mostly on 
the margins of the academic and activist conversation, and highlight the 
heterogeneity of voices and perspectives that constitute its multiple 
trajectories. A certain “dialectical” spark shoots between the Introduction 
and this reading, and quite possibly through all of our included texts as 
well, as they converse with and mutually enrich one another without 
reduction. As we seek to introduce a set of new questions, problems, and 
methodologies to dVERSIA’s readership, we (the four co-organizers of 
the 2017 conference) decided that it is only right that we “bear the device” 
and attend to the full richness, complexity, and internal tensions of what 
I call below the second (and possibly even third) generation of radical 
post/decolonial anti-capitalist theorizing in the region. It will be up to our 
readers to determine how they want to position themselves with respect 
to the challenges of this new scholarship.
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The missed encounter of the 1990s
The 1990s were more than a period of major transformations in Eastern Europe 
that saw formerly centralized economies open up to market competition 
and foreign direct investment, while Communist Party-dominated political 
arrangements made room for pluralist democratic practices and electoral 
systems. It was also a time of great economic and political turbulence, as a 
hastily declared “end of history” was yielding to doctrines of a New World 
Order and even a “clash of civilizations”. During the first decade of the 
postsocialist transition this turbulence manifested itself in an explosive 
combination of endemic economic crises becoming the norm and rapidly 
intensifying interethnic and religious conflicts culminating in the Yugoslav 
wars of the 1990s. In this particular conjuncture, two critical master discourses 
sought to examine its deeper structural roots and to offer provisional 
solutions as well.
It was at this time that Eastern Europe produced its own local version of 
“postcolonial theory”. Stimulated by a sustained engagement with Edward 
Said’s work from almost two decades earlier, Eastern European intellectuals 
sought to repurpose Said’s conception of “orientalism” to a region that was 
somehow similar yet also strikingly different. Larry Wolff’s magisterial Invent-
ing Eastern Europe, for instance, traced the emergence of the category of 
“Eastern Europe” to the period of the West European Enlightenment, when an 
earlier intercontinental North-South antagonism was being displaced toward 
an East-West axis that conveniently lumped together Russia, Bohemia, and 
the Balkans. As part of this “intellectual project of demi-orientalization” of 
the region, as Wolff called it, Eastern Europe both helped define the West 
by contrast and served as a mediator and “bridge” between Europe proper 
and the Orient (Wolff, 1994: 13).* Bringing the debate closer to home (both 
spatially and temporally), Milica Bakić-Hayden coined the concept of “nesting 
orientalisms” to refer to patterns of inferiorization produced within Eastern 
Europe itself where the “Asia/the East” always began a little further east of 
one’s own borders (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 918). Identifying what she called 
* Ezekiel Abramovsky disagrees with Wolff‘s chronology, arguing instead that rather than being “born” during 
the 18th-century Enlightenment, the idea of “Eastern Europe” was more likely a product of the 19th century 
in places like France (2005).
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a (local) “gradation of ‘Orients’”, Bakić-Hayden’s argument spoke not only 
to Western constructions of the region, but also to how they traveled within 
and overdetermined regional relations as well, notably in former Yugoslavia.
Others took their distance from the conceptual vocabulary of Said’s 
analysis while still taking inspiration from his work. Most famously, Maria 
Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans argued against understanding of what she 
called “balkanism” as a sub-species of orientalism but as a rather different 
thing altogether. Tracing the language of “balkanization” to the Balkan wars 
of the early 20th century, Todorova understood it to refer to not only the 
parcelization and fragmentation of political units, but also to a “reversion to 
the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian” (2009: 3). The term’s 
frequent redeployment since then, especially in moments of political crisis, 
has always been directly correlated with the Ottoman legacy. Yet, unlike 
orientalism’s construction of an “imputed opposition” between Europe and 
its Oriental “Other”, the Balkans followed a logic of an “imputed ambiguity” 
(2009: 17) as the West’s “incomplete self” (2009: 18). Notably, to the list of 
Todorova, Bakić -Hayden, and Wolff’s analyses one should also add authors 
such as Vesna Goldsworthy, Nataša Kovačević, and others, as part of a the-
oretical intervention that profoundly changed the interpretative framework 
during this first decade of the postsocialist transition (Goldsworthy, 1998; 
Kovačević, 2008). No less importantly, these analyses sought to directly 
respond to the ready mobilizations of “ancient hatreds” and “Balkan powder 
keg” metaphors, by identifying long-standing patterns of inferiorization of 
the region against a perceived Western “civilizational” standard.
Politically, Eastern European “postcoloniality” was at least in part a 
response to the Yugoslav wars and their representation “under Western 
eyes” (its character as a theoretical response to uncritically complacent 
adaptations of postmodern theory in the region extends beyond the scope 
of this essay). Yet, it is only in this overdetermined context that one can 
fully appreciate the different path taken by the second critical discourse of 
the period, that of the anti-capitalist Left. To be sure, there were multiple 
reasons behind that difference. To begin with, unlike the local variation of 
postcolonial theory, literally a product of the postsocialist transition, the 
anti-capitalist critique in the region had important antecedents to look up 
to, extending even further back than the Cold War (Marxism and anarchism 
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had been a standard feature of regional debates well into the 19th century). 
Moreover, while postcolonial theorizing developed in an uneasy proximity 
to intensified fascination with all things Western, the leftist critique had 
to negotiate the no less complicated relationship with a now discredited 
socialist past. Yet perhaps even more importantly for my purposes here, 
the direct target of this leftist anti-capitalist discourse was not, or at least 
not primarily, the resurgence of ethnic and religious conflicts and the 
representational discourses that fueled them. Rather, as they zoned in 
on the New Enclosures, the renewed forms of primitive accumulation and 
the repositioning of Eastern Europe as a supplier of a cheap workforce 
and resources on the semi-periphery of global capitalism, the region’s 
anti-capitalist intellectuals foregrounded the conflict between labour and 
capital as both an interpretative grid of analysis and as a primary terrain of 
resistance. Capital, rather than “culture”, seemed to hold the key to both 
theoretical understanding and praxical action. 
Savoj Žižek, the region’s most well-known radical intellectual, provides 
a case in point. While he may have exposed Western constructions of the 
Balkans as the “unconscious of Europe” during the Yugoslav wars (2008; 
2006: 23-4), in a manner reminiscent of Bakić-Hayden’s “nesting oriental-
isms” thesis,* Slavoj Žižek’s real take on the “Balkan question” has been, for 
quite some time now, decoupled from the region’s own geography. Since 
at least the late 1990s and through the lens of his Lacanian Marxism, Žižek 
has proposed to read the proliferation of ethnic fundamentalisms (and also 
multicultural differences) after the Cold War as both an expression and a 
displacement of a more primordial social antagonism, that of Capital itself 
(Žižek, 2006: 27). Faced with the increasingly spectral nature of capitalist 
accumulation, both individual and collective subjects seek refuge in their 
communal identity, while also displacing the social antagonism onto an 
ethnic and cultural other (2006: 167). The only way out of this trap of 
false-universality-as-cultural-particularity, for Žižek, is for the subject to 
sever its link with its own culture and become kulturlos (i.e. cultureless, 
Žižek, 2007: 662), so that it can access the only liberatory position, that 
of empty universality (2007: 665).  For the philosopher, and presumably 
* Žižek’s work from that period has also been mired in significant political and theoretical controversy (see 
e.g. Bjelić, 2014).
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no less for the resistant political activist from the Balkans, “ethnic roots, 
national identity, and so on are simply not categories of truth” (2007: 664).
A similar logic underlies Gáspár Miklós Tamás’s otherwise highly useful 
concept of “post-fascism”. Defined as the reversal of “the Enlightenment 
tendency to assimilate citizenship to the universal condition” (reserved now 
only for the Westernized middle classes of the population), post-fascism 
breeds what Tamás calls “ethnicism”, i.e. ethnic and intercultural conflicts, 
which a (liberal) multicultural politics is too weak to confront and resolve 
(Tamás, 2013). The only effective opposition that Tamás envisions to the 
toxic cocktail of post-fascism and ethnicism are “truly egalitarian tenden-
cies – not to speak of truly communist currents – [which] will not aim at 
differentiation and diversity, although their starting point is exactly this. 
Class, race and cultural differences are those they must want to obliterate” 
(2013: 26).* And lest the reader may consider these to be isolated cases, 
note the class reductivism in the following passage from a recent radical 
text on former Yugoslavia: “The story is yet to be written of ‘ethnic conflicts’ 
initiated by the incorporation of Eastern Europe into a Western dominated 
capitalist economy that activated existing federal ethno-territorial institu-
tional arrangements and encouraged land grabbing as a type of primitive 
accumulation by the ethno-nationalist elites” (Horvat and Štiks, 2015: 22). 
In Horvat and Štiks’s rendition, it is Western capitalism that is solely (or at 
least mostly) responsible for the resurgence of “ethnic conflicts”, which 
presumably could be made irrelevant under different institutional arrange-
ments and absent resurgence of New Enclosures..
Certainly, the above is by no means an exhausting genealogy of either 
“postcolonial” or (especially) anti-capitalist theory in the region, but rather 
an effort to tease out some tendential argumentative trajectories. More 
importantly still, what I seek to foreground in this section is the mutual 
unintelligibility and opacity between these two critical master discourses 
of the early transition. This mutual opacity is not only a by-product of 
different disciplinary preferences (usually human versus social sciences), 
methodological choices (a critique of representational discourses versus 
a critique of the political economy), and even personal and professional 
* Or, as Tamás puts it elsewhere, reasserting the core principles of the period: “Enlightenment is still unfinished, 
let alone socialism” (2015).
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biographies (leftists in Eastern Europe to this day struggle to find secure 
academic positions). At a deeper theoretical level, the absence of dialogue, 
especially during this early phase of development of the postcolonial and 
anti-capitalist critiques, has everything to do with their divergent and 
even antithetical points of departure. For anti-capitalists such as Žižek 
and Tamás, as indicated above, the “false” universality of capitalism 
generates necessarily its own false particularity, by way of ethnicism and 
multicultural difference; and the only way of confronting it is via the “true” 
universality of liberation and its avatars (Communism, Christianity, the 
Enlightenment). In fact, there is only one true universality: that of equality, 
full citizenship, the “separation from one’s ethnic roots”, whereas the 
global (yet falsely universal) reach of capital is only a way of distributing 
particularities in a hierarchical way. For the likes of Wolff and Todorova, 
by contrast, it is that same “true” (Enlightenment) universality that has 
generated the “false” particularity of Eastern Europe/the Balkans, as a 
“demi-Orient” and “incomplete self” of the West respectively; and, if it is 
to be confronted at all, then this may only be done from the perspective of 
“historical specificity” and a strong sense of emplacement (what Todorova 
calls “the ontology of the Balkans”). The very Enlightenment that provides 
Žižek and Tamás with the resources for a radical turns out to also be the 
source of discourses of inferiorization and racialization, at least when 
viewed from a “postcolonial” angle. Apart from its liberatory and progressive 
agenda, the Enlightenment appears to have a “dark underside”, which is 
constitutive of its very essence.
Generation 2.0: from postcolonial to decolonial 
anti-capitalist critique
Over the past decade and a half, however, scholars from the two sides of 
the divide have made important inroads toward a rapprochement “between 
the posts”. This “second generation” of critical theorists from the region 
not only do not see the critiques of capitalism and of colonialism/racial 
inferiorization as mutually exclusive, but even insist on their imbrication 
and mutual presupposition. In a recent text on socialist and postsocialist 
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TV for instance, media scholar Anikó Imre claims that while admission 
into the EU may have brought a better life “to a small well-educated, or 
wealthy East European elite, the majority of the postsocialist populations 
have become the losers of capitalism” leading to a resurgence of “nativist 
nationalisms” (Imre 2014: 118). Part of the logic of these nationalisms entails 
“overidentifying with the host [West European] culture and outperforming 
its whiteness – at the expense of racialized others” (2014: 131, my italics). 
In another highly suggestive text, Polish anthropologist Michał Buchowski 
marks an important shift in the deployment of orientalist categories to 
Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. As postsocialist 
geopolitics scramble the spatial boundaries of the past, Buchowski traces 
how locally inferiorized populations of workers, peasants, and people 
with little education become targets of a “domestic orientalism”, in which 
“Otherness is dissected from an exotic context and brought home ... [and] 
the spatially exotic other has been resurrected as the socially stigmatized 
brother” (2006: 476).
But perhaps the most promising and suggestive line of development  
over the past decade or so has come from what has been called the 
“decolonial turn” in the human and social sciences. Also referred to as 
“decoloniality” or the “decolonial option”, the project draws on the pio-
neering work of Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano who at the turn of 
the 1990s coined the concept of “coloniality of power” to offer a longue 
durée perspective on global forms of domination. Quijano understands 
coloniality of power to be a constitutive axis of Western capitalist moder-
nity, and defines it as “the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification 
of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power... 
operat[ing] on every level, in every arena and dimension (both material 
and subjective) of everyday social existence” (2000: 342). First originating 
in the long 16th century of Western colonialism, the particular ending of 
the term (coloniality) is used to emphasize a structural logic of (economic, 
political, legal, cultural, epistemic, and other forms of) subordination that 
survives the end of formal colonial practices worldwide. While coloniality 
may have worked differently in different places (via extermination in the 
Americas, cultural subordination in Asia and the Middle East, and an 
intense cultural destruction in Africa), its lingering presence five hundred 
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years later necessitates that any project of liberation has an explicit 
decolonial dimension (2007: 169-170, 177).* 
Of particular interest here is the work of regional scholars who draw on 
(while also expanding and complicating) the resources of the decolonial 
turn. For example, Romanian sociologist Manuela Boatcă has suggested 
that the monolithic conception of Europe/the West that even post- and 
decolonial theory often posits fails to capture the complex dynamics of 
inferiorization operative within the European continent. Instead, Boatcă 
proposes a multiplication of the idea of Europe, to include what she calls 
decadent Europe (Spain and Portugal), heroic Europe (Germany, France, 
England), and epigonal Europe (the Balkan states).** While decadent Europe 
was an early founding participant in the project of Western Modernity and 
heroic Europe its effective core producer, the epigonal Balkans have taken 
on the role of reproducer of modernity (and thereby an accomplice to 
coloniality), marked by an attitude of aspirational Europeanness/whiteness 
(Boatcă, 2012: 136; I return to this claim of complicity below). For Boatcă, 
the European continent is thus crisscrossed by various internal divisions as 
by-products of Western coloniality, including an internal imperial difference 
(between decadent and heroic Europe, from the 17th and 18th centuries) and 
an external imperial difference (between East and West, sometime after 
the 18th century). It is Eastern Europe’s positioning on the external imperial 
difference that accounts both for its epigonal status and for its aspirationally 
white attitude (Boatcă, 2013). Importantly, this “in-between position [...] 
also entails an epistemic potential” (Boatcă, 2012: 139).
Similar to Boatcă’s invitation that we consider thinking from “world regions” 
rather than just a more or less homogeneous world-system (Boatcă, 2013: 133), 
philosopher and social critic Ovidiu Țichindeleanu zones  in on the epistemic 
potential of thinking from Eastern Europe. As he seeks to develop a “critical 
theory of the post-communist transition”, Țichindeleanu defines the latter 
*  More recent contributors to the decolonial turn include authors such as Walter Mignolo, Sylvia Wynter, 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, María Lugones, Xhercis Méndez, Arturo Escobar, Kelvin-Santiago-Valles, 
Catherine Walsh, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Gloria Wekker, and others. A series of compound nouns 
have emerged in conversation with Quijano‘s original concept, such as coloniality of knowledge, of being, of 
gender, of language, of migration, etc.
** More recently Boatcă (2017) has added a fourth “forgotten” Europe, that of Western Europe‘s former colonies, 
or the “unacknowledged borders in the Atlantic and the Caribbean Sea”.
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as the top-down integration of Eastern European societies “into the world 
system of capitalism and into the Western hierarchy of knowledge systems” 
(2010: 87). Țichindeleanu is particularly insistent that such a theory has to 
consider the dual origins of the region, positioned on the semi-periphery 
of both global capitalism and global coloniality. Consequently, any project 
with a liberatory agenda in Eastern Europe cannot just take anti-capitalism 
(or post-/decoloniality) as its point of departure, but has to actively combat 
the joined forces of “anti-communism, Eurocentrism, and capitalocentrism” 
(Tichindeleanu, 2010). An important part of the project of developing a critical 
liberatory imaginary includes resignifying the material culture of Eastern 
European socialism, as it partially departed from the logics of both capitalist 
accumulation and colonial subordination. Referring to this material culture 
as the “secular cosmologies” of socialism (including a different conception of 
time, for instance the five-year plans, an ability to turn objective poverty into 
subjective wealth, the kitchen as a site of pluri-discursive encounters, etc.), 
Țichindeleanu (2013) proposes the development of a radical methodology “at 
the intersection of historical materialism with the decolonial option”.
The important contributions of scholars such as József Böröcz, Piro 
Rexhepi, Marina Gržinić, and Tjaša Kancler merit a special mention here as 
well. While Böröcz has explored, for nearly two decades now, the complex 
intermeshings of a transition to a neoliberal economy and a retrenchment of 
colonial patterns of domination in Europe (see e.g. Böröcz, 2001; Böröcz and 
Sarkar, 2017), including reading the EU’s “eastern enlargement” as a colonial 
project (Böröcz, 2001: 25), Rexhepi (2018) has studied Muslim communities 
and their contributions to global, and not just local, anti-colonial struggles 
(what he calls the “Muslim International”). But perhaps one of the most sig-
nificant and pressing recent developments has been the still nascent corpus 
of decolonial feminist and queer/trans* theorizing in the region. Bringing 
together scholar-activists whose “archive” spans the gamut from performance 
art to queer theory and from a critique of neoliberalism to women-of-colour 
feminisms, this critical scholarship adds crucial ingredients to radical theory 
and praxis in Eastern Europe. Rexhepi himself has discussed the colonial 
logic behind EU-sponsored discourses of queer rights in Kosovo, as they 
isolate local queer formations from other oppressed communities and erase 
the intersectional demographic of queer Muslims altogether (Rexhepi, 2016). 
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Drawing on women-of-colour, transfeminist, and lesbian theory, Marina 
Gržinić has called for the development of “dissident feminisms” that “disrupt 
the monolithic history of a feminism that is heterosexual and white” (2014: 1); 
and Tjaša Kancler (2018) has asked, as she seeks to rethink “trans* politics and 
activism in relation to decoloniality”, what role Eastern Europeans can play in 
“the production of a trans* imaginary in opposition to the mainstream (also 
transgender) visual codes”. Both Gržinić and Kancler have drawn on important 
work by Maria Lugones and Madina Tlostanova discussing the “coloniality of 
gender” and the need to free this category from its Eurocentric bias (Lugones, 
2007; Tlostanova, 2010). If it is true that the postsocialist transition can also 
be viewed as a mode of “repatriarchalization” (Burcar, 2012), then Kancler’s 
(2018) appeal that “our feminist theorizing and practice should be articulated 
through the intensification of postsocialist and postcolonial dialogues in order 
to think about the new possibilities of building critical alliances transversally 
with a vision of pluriversal future” can be read as a programmatic statement 
of this type of intervention as well.
 It is to this list of a new generation of post-/decolonial anti-capitalist 
scholarship that we should add the contributions of the authors included 
in this special issue. Certainly, the generational differences invoked here 
are not a simple product of a chronological sequence either, whereby one 
generation simply succeeds and displaces another (Böröcz’s text for instance 
was published only a year after Tamás’s On Post-fascism), but rather a 
question of different methodologies, sites of intervention,  and even political 
agendas. In fact, especially with the decolonial feminist and trans* theory 
in the region, it might make sense to speak of a third generation already. 
Perhaps more importantly, the theoretical and methodological contributions 
of this new generation of scholars allow us to take the conversation further, 
beyond the pitfalls of the “missed encounter” of the 1990s. Categories such 
as domestic Orientalism and imperial difference, epigonal Europe and secular 
cosmologies, Muslim International and dissident feminisms, provide important 
conceptual advantages and bonus insights for not only understanding the 
past and present of Eastern Europe, but also for orienting political action 
in the labyrinth of the postsocialist transition. Especially given the current 
state of affairs in the region and beyond, they have become indispensable 
tools for critical thought and political activism.
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On some bonus insights, at the intersection of 
decoloniality and anti-capitalism
Yet what are these bonus insights and conceptual advantages afforded by 
the new theory? How does the second generation of scholars and activists 
in the region avoid the limits and dead-ends that haunted the work of their 
predecessors? And how is the “decolonial turn” among leftist scholars in the 
region a step forward in orienting theoretical analysis and political action?
I believe that we can identify at least four such bonus insights proffered by 
the decolonial anti-capitalist critique in particular (with the proviso that I 
do not hereby seek to dismiss postcolonial interventions at all, a gesture 
too frequent, unfortunately, among some of the Latin American decolonial 
theorists themselves) (see e.g. Mignolo 2011).  
The first bonus insight has to do with the very concept of coloniality 
and its corollary, decoloniality. One of the major reasons behind Maria 
Todorova’s reluctance to embrace the language of postcoloniality in relation 
to the Balkans has to do with the absence of a colonial legacy in the region 
(unlike, for example, in Southeast Asia). For Todorova, this absence, along 
with that of a civilizing mission, of hegemonic cultural residue, and colonial 
subjectivity, makes an uncritical importation of postcolonial categories 
not only undesirable, but also theoretically (and perhaps even politically) 
problematic (Todorova, 2009: 195). In short, to Anne McClintock’s critique 
of postcolonial theory as as a “singular, monolithic term, organized around 
a binary axis of time rather than power” (McClintock, 1992: 294, my italics), 
Todorova adds the weight of a spatial difference of a territory outside the 
purview of Western colonialism. Yet the very definitional content of the 
concept of coloniality resolves Todorova’s concern, by in fact bypassing it 
altogether. While Aníbal Quijano and his interlocutors are very clear that 
coloniality of power was born with historical Western colonialism in the 
Americas and the African slave trade, they are also adamant that the new 
social totality that it set in place has always exceeded its immediate geo-
graphical boundaries. Coloniality (of power, but also of being/knowledge/
gender/labour/etc.) not only survives the formal end of colonialism, but 
also transcends its territorial borders and direct sites of application. To 
the extent to which coloniality is a logic of political/economic/epistemic/
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ontological inferiorization, its totalizing reach leaves no place untouched 
and no stone unturned. Eastern Europe, while formally never colonized 
by the West, is no exception to coloniality’s logic of racial classification. 
Hence, while resisting coloniality’s imposition in the region may be 
more aptly called “de-Occidentalization” than “decolonization” (see e.g. 
Țichindeleanu, 2013), this work of resistance has to be part and parcel of 
any project of liberation in this context.
The second bonus insight has to do with the concept of imperial 
difference and its relationship with the colonial difference. As discussed 
extensively by various authors, the colonial difference is a product of 
the long 16th century, setting the ground for both a Europe-dominated 
capitalist world-system and for the discourses of Western modernity 
(Quijano, 2007; Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992; Mignolo, 2011). It is also 
what paves the way for the construction of various internal differentia-
tions within the European continent, by way of an internal (North-South) 
and external (East-West) imperial differences between the 17th and 19th 
centuries (Wolff, 1994: 5). It is within this broader decolonial framework 
that (what we call today) Eastern Europe obtains its dual status, as both 
a semi-periphery to the capitalist world-system and as an aspirationally 
white/civilized part of colonial Europe. This process of emergence accounts 
for, on the one hand, the underdevelopment of the region as conditional 
upon and also a partial requirement for the (over)development of the 
West: from its exploitation as an agricultural semi-periphery of the West 
(Boatcă, 2006) to what Bulgarian scholar Rossen Vassiliev would call the 
“Third-Worldization” of the former (socialist) Second World (Vassiliev, 
2010). On the other hand, it also provides a longue durée perspective 
for understanding representations of the region as refracted through 
discourses of “demi-Orientalization” and “Balkanism”. If part of the 
challenge with authors such as Wolff, Abramovsky, and Todorova has to 
do with the difficulty of locating in their writing the “invention of Eastern 
Europe/the Balkans” as part of a broader pattern of racialization and 
inferiorization, then a decolonial anti-capitalist approach to the region 
helps position those discourses as part of the larger framework of global 
coloniality and its various “inventions” (of “the Americas”, the “Orient”, 
“Asia”, “Eastern Europe”, etc.). As Argentine philosopher Enrique Dussel 
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(2013) puts it, before the Second Modernity of the Enlightenment and 
of Orientalism (and also Balkanism, we may add), there was the First 
Modernity of Columbus and coloniality.
The third bonus insight or conceptual advantage takes us back to the 
basic premises of Quijano’s coloniality of power (as well as to other, still 
underexplored, theories from the South such as Cedric Robinson’s “racial 
capitalism”, for instance). According to Quijano, coloniality constitutes 
one of the two structural axes of capitalism as a world-system, the other 
being Western modernity (Quijano, 200: 342). In fact, from a decolonial 
standpoint, different parts of the world can be seen as (also) including 
different configurations of those three basic terms: capitalism, modernity, 
and coloniality.* This tripartite structure allows us to revisit what I identified 
as the mutual unintelligibility between the discourses of anti-capitalism and 
postcoloniality above, and not only in Eastern Europe. As Neil Lazarus among 
others has noted, postcolonial studies worldwide (at least in their main-
stream incarnations) often display a “third world optic” whose sophisticated 
understanding of (post)colonialism shows little appreciation for dynamics 
of capitalist development (Lazarus, 2012: 120; see also Imre, 2014; Sinha, 
2017).** Within such an understanding, often too little is made of the fact 
that historical colonialism has also involved the imposition of a particular 
mode of production, specific regimes of accumulation and exploitation, the 
extraction of surplus value, etc. (Lazarus, 2012: 120). Analogously, if with a 
different emphasis, much of anti-capitalist theory (Marxism included) tends 
to be (often unabashedly) Eurocentric, privileging North Atlantic processes 
and practices as exemplary of both the logic of capitalism and the resist-
ance against it. Along the way, leftist/Marxist theory has also found itself 
positioned at the tense intersection between capitalism and modernity – 
where the rhetoric and formal logics of modernity are both undermined by 
*  I leave aside significant tensions here between decolonial thought and alternative meta-theoretical 
frameworks, such as Robinson‘s racial capitalism or the settler-colonialism model operative within indigenous 
scholarship in the United States, among other places. For more on the issue, see e.g. Robinson (2000), Wolfe 
(2006) and Tuck and Wayne Young (2012), among others.
** Notably, important authors in this tradition, such as Spivak, Hall, the Subaltern Studies collective, and 
others, refuse to separate the logics of capitalism and (post)colonialism. Yet the travels and reception of 
postcoloniality, certainly in the West/Global North, often “forget” about capitalism altogether. I owe this 
nuance to conversations with Zhivka Valiavicharska; see also Karkov and Valiavicharska (2018) on this point.
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capitalism and may also serve as a resource in its critique.* One unfortunate 
consequence of such methodological choices is that postcoloniality often 
ignores or downplays the role of capitalist accumulation under colonialism 
or in the “post-colony” (Mbembe, 2001), while the anti-capitalist/Marxist 
critique frequently sees (post)colonialism/coloniality as either a distraction 
from or a mere epiphenomenon of a more fundamental conflict. In short, the 
postcolonial theorists tend to overlook capitalism, while the leftist scholars 
mostly miss out on coloniality.
In Eastern Europe, as I have argued above, a similar configuration 
obtains, as radical leftist theorists often reduce interethnic and religious 
tensions to a displacement of a more primary logic of capitalist accumula-
tion and New Enclosures (the Commune v. multicultural differences), while 
local “postcolonial” scholars either dismiss the relevance of anti-capitalist 
critique altogether or choose to not get too deep into it.** It is this mutual 
“forgetfulness” of capitalism and coloniality that, to my mind, accounts 
for the missed encounter of the 1990s. By contrast, it is the ability of the 
second generation of critical scholarship in the region to overcome that 
forgetfulness (by restoring the interrelationship between all three terms) 
that constitutes one of that scholarship’s seminal contributions. What is 
more, this second generation harkens back to Quijano’s original insight that 
the struggle is against both capitalism and coloniality (not just one or the 
other), and that resisting both may require drawing the resources of not 
only (Western) modernity.
Finally, Eastern European socialisms, including and especially during the 
Cold War, pose another set of challenges to totalizing metanarratives of global 
oppression. Indeed, the erasure of the role and contributions of the former 
* Marx himself presents an early case in point. His famous quip about capitalist exchange being about 
“Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham” already points to a logic of utility (i.e. profit) as antithetical to 
the lofty rhetoric of modernity. On the other hand, the general outlines of Marx‘s vision of a postcapitalist 
future more often than not draw on a version of radicalized modernity/Enlightenment.
** Wolff and Todorova provide an example of each position. In what strikes me as an all-too-hasty dismissal of 
a whole theoretical framework, Wolff criticizes Wallerstein (and world-systems analysis) for suggesting that 
social and economic factors alone determined Western Europe‘s construction of the East and for using the 
case of Poland as a synecdoche for the whole region. In turn, Maria Todorova acknowledges “Marx‘s immense 
contribution to how we theorize about society” yet does not follow up on that comment in her discussion 
of Balkanism (Todorova, 2009: 7). For an important critique of deploying “postcolonial” categories to the 
context of former Yugoslavia without taking into account the socialist past, see Petrovič (2014).
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Second World are not only a hallmark of much postcolonial theorizing, but of 
the majority of decolonial theory as well. As Madina Tlostanova has noted, in 
a recent interview, “[m]odernity in the 20th century was implemented in two 
forms – the liberal/capitalist and the socialist/statist one. Each of them had its 
own kind of coloniality” (Tlostanova, 2013). Implicit within such a perspective 
is the idea that there weren’t any substantive differences between the two 
types of modernity/coloniality: the socialist and the capitalist one. Yet, the 
historical record points to a far messier and complex reality than that of two 
symmetrical colonial projects. Far from being just an epigonal reproducer of 
modernity and an accomplice to coloniality (Boatcă, 2013), Eastern European 
socialist societies played a far more ambiguous role with respect to both global 
capitalism and global coloniality. Their positioning on the semi-periphery of 
the modern-colonial capitalist world-system allowed them, at times, to at 
least partially depart from its logics.
The relationship between the former Second and Third Worlds has been 
a subject of numerous studies, but it is worth attending here to some of 
the complexities of this relationship. For instance, “Third-World” students 
coming to study in the “Socialist East” may have often been subject to 
discrimination, denied apartments, and may have even suffered racial abuse 
(Subotić and Vučetić, 2018), yet literally hundreds of thousands of them 
attended universities all across the socialist bloc, on full scholarships, as part 
of a framework of international solidarity with African and Latin American 
societies (see e.g. Kȋdrinova, 2018). While most of these students would 
later return to their countries of origin, they were not just passive recipients 
but rather “agents of change and modernization” for the duration of their 
studies, including in their temporary communities of residence (Popescu, 
2014: 94). There certainly was “the well-established academic discipline of 
‘orientalism’ in Communist countries” (Mark and Slobodian, 2018: 14-15), but 
there were also institutions such as “The Friendship University, also known 
as Lumumba University, an institution dedicated to serving the educational 
needs of young intellectuals in the third world”, along with “less structured 
yet functional [educational] agreements” in countries such as the GDR, 
Poland, Hungary, or Romania (Popescu, 2014: 95). Throughout the Cold 
War, socialist Eastern Europe also provided technical and material (and also 
military) aid, often at an economic loss, to help design local infrastructure 
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in various countries in Africa and the Middle East, from roads to hospitals, 
and from dams to national theaters (Mayer, 2016: 61). While by the 1980s 
much of that “aid” may have looked like a case of “instrumentalizing 
decolonization” (Mark and Slobodian, 2018: 10), only a decade and a half 
earlier collaborative discussions among the Non-Aligned Movement states 
(Yugoslavia included) had helped craft a notion of “collective self-reliance” 
as a long-term process that would redefine trade patterns “with economic 
co-operation between developing countries as a way of bolstering each 
other’s share in world trade” ((quoted in Spaskovska, 2018: 5)). The often 
highly impactful collaborations between women’s organizations in Africa 
and Eastern Europe is well-documented by contemporary scholars as well, 
as a rich archive of collective fights against multiple oppressions, including 
the patriarchy of the socialist state (Ghodsee, 2014; Popa, 2009); as have 
been various artistic projects such as the Tashkent Film Festival, bringing 
together African, Asian, and later Latin American filmmakers (Djagalov and 
Salaskina, 2016). And the list of course goes on and on.* 
I have purposefully organized the above examples as a sort of dia-
lectical “montage of opposites”, to foreground the now complicit, now 
resistant relationship of East European socialism to both capitalism and 
coloniality. While Eastern European socialisms and their institutions may 
not have gone far enough in challenging global white supremacy (Subotić 
and Vučetić, 2018), the spaces for collaboration and transformation that 
they helped open up often did not fall neatly within its purview either, but 
rather departed, at least in part, from some of its basic premises. What is 
more, just as projects such as the ones listed above were often, at least 
in their conception, state-sponsored, organized along a top-down chain 
of command, and couched in the condescending terms of aid rather than 
international solidarity,what the individual organizations, intellectuals 
and activists, or even local communities involved did as they unfolded 
was often quite a different story, as evidenced for example by women’s 
and Muslim community organizing in the regionsee e.g. Ghodsee, 2014; 
Rexhepi, 2018). Lastly, there is the no small matter of different historical 
periods and different socialist societies as well, putting to bed the fantasy 
* For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Karkov and Valiavicharska (2018). I owe this final bonus 
insight and much of its supporting bibliography to discussions with Zhivka Valiavicharska and Tanja Petrović.
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of a (totalitarian) socialism writ large. What was happening in Soviet Russia 
in the 1930s was by no means comparable to Yugoslavia in the 1970s, nor 
were the foreign relations of the last decade of state socialism taking place 
in even neighbouring Romania and Bulgaria for instance. All of this opens 
up important questions of periodization, historical location, and the overall 
heterogeneity of the socialist experience. 
But to return to the bigger point being made here, this fourth bonus 
insight not only informs a number of projects within the nascent literature 
of decolonial anti-capitalist scholarship in Eastern Europe (including this 
issue). Arguably, it also constitutes one of the most original contributions 
that the Eastern European scholars make to decolonial theory more broadly, 
by proposing historically existing socialism as an irreducible fourth term to 
the original tripartite structure of capitalism and its two constitutive axes: 
(Western) modernity and global coloniality. Just as Eastern European leftist 
intellectuals and activists may have much to learn from a robust engagement 
with the insights of post- and decolonial theory as repurposed in a regional 
context, part of the “epistemic potential” of thinking from Eastern Europe 
includes challenging the partial myopia of the (Latin American) decolonial 
scholarship on this crucial, yet often neglected, point. Not fitting easily 
into any totalizing account of the modern world, including from the Global 
South, Eastern European socialism poses anew the vexing question of the 
relationship between “local histories” and “global designs” (Mignolo, 2000), 
this time from the semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system.
 
To conclude – or, perhaps, to continue...
In an important gathering among activists of colour in London in 1990, West 
German participant Sheila Mysorkar had the following to say when reflecting 
upon the promises and perils of the fall of the Berlin Wall: “Because the 
borders will be opened between us it will be for one people only: we can see 
now between East Germany and West Germany, the borders are open for 
white people only. And I think we have to be aware altogether that Europe 
will really be shut off against African and Asia” (La Rose et al., 1991: 31). 
Nearly a generation after that famous “Fall” (pun intended), we can only 
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marvel at the insight and far-sightedness of activists such as Mysorkar, 
as they saw that what looked like liberation to some only promised the 
multiplication of borders for others. Eastern European societies and their 
members have been assigned their own particular role in the process: from 
policing the eastern-most frontiers of “Fortress Europe” to increasingly 
assuming themselves the role of the “racialized migrant” when moving West 
(Veliković, 2012: 170). Perhaps it is time we started listening – to those 
among whom it is high time we started looking for new (and also old) allies.
In what is soon to be the 30th anniversary of the counter-revolutions 
of 1989, East European societies are increasingly faced with the false 
choice between nativist and racist (if not outright fascist) nationalisms 
and the abstract universality of liberal democracy as a screen for capitalist 
accumulation and dispossession. In the exigency of the moment, a “simple” 
return to working-class politics, no matter how robust, may not do: class in 
Eastern Europe (as anywhere else) has always been “complicated” by the 
intermeshed logics of racialization, sexualization, gendering, etc., in ever 
new configurations of power. In a context where the workings of coloniality 
and capitalism continue to pose immense challenges to radical action, a 
(continued) sustained dialogue between radical theories from the South 
and our own traditions of anti-capitalist radicalism is as pressing as ever. 
Some 38 years ago Jürgen Habermas famously proclaimed modernity to 
be an unfinished project; to which the decolonial response has been that 
the process of decolonization, rather (Western) modernity, is the project in 
need of completion (Maldonado-Torres, 2011: 2). The epistemic potential 
of thinking from Eastern Europe suggests that it is the work of dialoguing 
between the South and the East, attempted and initiated at multiple times 
but far from completed, that continues to be one of the pressing tasks of 
the day. Much like the original Belgrade conference in 2017, it is this sense 
of pressing urgency that motivates the present special issue as well. 
Bibliography 
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А growing number of Western states currently scandalize the claims to residence and citizenship of people racialized as non-European, non-Western, or non-white.* Many such states increasingly 
de nounce or block illegalized migrant paths to residence and further restrict 
the rights and the duration of refugees’ presence on their territory. Such 
measures painfully reveal the rising importance of unequal citizenships for 
global mobility, and of unequal rights more generally. Yet, they (should) 
also alert us to the larger role that citizenship as an institution plays in 
constructing and maintaining the idea of a modern West, whose integrity 
allegedly needs preserving, protecting, and shielding from presumably 
unfathomable non-Western Others. Provincializing the epistemologies 
behind this understanding is therefore a necessary first step on a pathway 
towards decoloniality. In the following, I trace the dominant view of modern 
citizenship back to Occidental epistemologies championed by sociology’s 
classics, especially Max Weber, in order to show how it continues to shape 
the coloniality of citizenship within the privileged context of Europe today.
The starting point of such provincialization is realizing that we owe much 
of our understanding of citizenship to the canonized classics of the social 
sciences that upheld the notion of a uniquely innovative West that generated –  
and generalized – progressive institutions. Especially due to sociological 
conceptualizations, citizenship has for a long time been understood as an 
equalizing mechanism – an institution devised to counterbalance social 
inequalities by conferring universal rights to all individuals, regardless of 
particularities of birth such as ethnicity, class, or social origin. At the global 
level, the Western notion of citizenship has, however, been functioning as 
a selection mechanism on the basis of race, gender, literacy, and property 
status ever since its emergence in the context of the French Revolution 
(Boatcă, 2015). Its juxtaposition with religion more generally, and with 
Western Christianity in particular, has served as a hotbed of racist gestures 
and practices of exclusion even before citizenship crystallized as an institution: 
from the expulsion of both Jews and Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula 
after the conquest of Granada in 1492 and the use of the “Christianizing 
*  This article draws on the concept of coloniality of citizenship first developed in Boatcă (2016) and reproduces 
parts of the arguments on Max Weber’s theory of race and ethnicity, as well as on Occidentalism and unequal 
Europes developed in Boatcă (2013) and (2015), respectively.
57
mission” to justify European colonialism in the Americas, Asia, and Africa 
while denying rights to the natives; to the denial of citizenship rights to 
Jewish residents through most of Europe before 1848 and the Catholic-led 
initiative of inscribing the “Christian roots of Europe” into the European 
Union constitution in 2004; up to the exclusion of veiled Muslim women 
from naturalization ceremonies and citizenship in France in recent years, 
US President Donald Trump’s attempted ban on immigration from Muslim-
majority countries, and several Eastern European countries’ refusal to 
accept Muslim refugees and migrants under the European Union’s solidarity  
allocation system in 2017. 
In this context, revisiting the role that the classics of sociology have 
played in promoting a notion of Western modernity heavily linked to both 
Christianity and citizenship is especially revealing. In particular, Max Weber’s 
systematic focus on the uniqueness of the West, his definition of citizenship 
as a modern institution characteristic of Western Europe and anchored in 
Christianity, and what he viewed as the incompatibility of non-Western, 
non-Christian, and non-European peoples with such modern social patterns 
have left an enduring mark on sociology’s conceptualization of citizenship. 
The next sections thus first reconstruct central arguments made in the wake 
of Weber’s sociology with regard to the racialization of citizenships, both 
within and outside of Europe. Subsequently, arguments present in today’s 
debates about citizenship and migration in and from (South) Eastern Europe 
are discussed in light of the Occidental epistemology espoused in the 
dominant understanding of citizenship. Finally, global perspectives on the 
link between citizenship and growing worldwide inequalities are employed 
in order to reveal the character of inherited property that has recently 
turned citizenship into a commodity unequally, but fervently, employed by 
peripheral and semi-peripheral states in order to counterbalance inequality 
relations. The article ends with a reflection on the role of Southeastern 
Europe in the current renegotiations – both economic and epistemic - of 
European citizenship.
I trace the dominant view of modern citizenship back to Occidental 
epistemologies championed by sociology’s classics, especially Max Weber, 
in order to show how it continues to shape the coloniality of citizenship 
within the privileged context of Europe today.
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Uniqueness of the West: Writing non-Christian 
religions out of the history of modernity
Charges of Eurocentrism, evolutionary determinism, and ignorance of non-
Western contexts have repeatedly been directed at most of sociology’s 
classics. Yet, it was with reference to Max Weber’s thesis of the “uniqueness 
of the West” that the notion of a Western sociology actively producing 
absences was first coined.
To Max Weber, explaining the origin of the West’s uniqueness in bringing 
about modernity was central to excluding – or explaining away – any 
contributions of non-Western and/or non-Christian thought to what he 
considered to be modern achievements – in particular, scientific rationality. 
Similarly, only “rudimentary developments” of the state as a political 
institution operating on the basis of “a rationally enacted ‘constitution’ and 
rationally enacted laws” (Weber, 2005: 55) had crystallized outside the West, 
where these distinguishing features now characterized the modern state. 
The singularity of the West in all these regards could not be overstated, as 
Weber stressed in General Economic History:
Only the Occident knows the state in the modern sense, with a constitution, 
specialized officialdom, and the concept of citizenship. Beginnings of this 
institution in antiquity and in the Orient were never able to develop fully. Only 
the Occident knows rational law, made by jurists and rationally interpreted and 
planned, and only in the Occident is found the concept of citizen (civis romanus, 
citoyen, bourgeois) because only in the Occident does the city exist in the specific 
sense of the word (Weber, 1961: 232).
Weber offered a theory of Western exceptionalism based on what Johannes 
Fabian has called the “denial of coevalness”: “a discourse that consistently 
places those who are talked about in a time other than that of the one 
who talks” (Fabian, 2006: 143). The Other, in this case, is the entire non-
Western world. In stating that neither the modern state nor the concept 
of citizenship could have emerged elsewhere, Weber employs the typical 
Orientalist gesture involved in the denial of coevalness as a rationalization 
of the conspicuous absence of modern capitalist traits outside the West. 
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His analysis in The City uses the same Orientalist rhetoric of deficits 
grounded in non-Christian religions in order to explain that the Western 
concept of the citizen either never developed in the Orient or existed only 
in rudiments there (1978: 227). From among the five common features that 
he identified as characteristic of the European city,* many were present in 
India, China, Judea, and the Middle East, as Weber himself acknowledged. 
Yet, he considered that it had been the associational character of the 
Occidental city, modelled on and mediated by the Christian congregation, 
that had brought forth the modern concept of the citizen (see Isin, 2003; 
Domingues, 2000). Since full membership in the ecclesiastic community 
was the prerequisite for urban citizenship, the fully developed ancient and 
medieval city of the West was first and foremost a sworn confraternity of 
individual “burghers” (i.e., people enjoying a citizen-like status within a 
given town or city) (Weber, 1978: 1246). For Weber, the decisive thrust 
toward confraternization (i.e., the crossing of religious boundaries) into a city 
corporation had come from Christianity and its unique quality of dissolving 
clan ties by replacing the ritual character of religious affiliation with a 
voluntary principle: “[…] by its very nature, the Christian congregation was a 
religious association of individual believers, not a ritual association of clans” 
(Weber, 1978: 1247). Weber thus traced the key element accounting for the 
rise of the modern citizenry as far back as early Christianity’s overcoming 
of ritual taboos between members of different religious communities: “For, 
without commensalism – in Christian terms, without the Lord‘s Supper – 
no oathbound fraternity and no medieval urban citizenry would have been 
possible” (Weber, 1917: 37, quoted in Isin, 2003). 
Conversely, in the case of Judaism, the absence of commensalism, 
alongside the ritual exclusion of connubium, or religious intermarriage, had 
effectively prevented fraternization between Jews and non-Jews in the 
medieval cities, resulting in the exclusion of the former from the developing 
“burgher” associations. In his comparative studies, Weber acknowledged 
similarities between all other aspects of city formation in the West, on the 
one hand, and Chinese, Indian, Japanese, or Near Eastern urban settlements, 
on the other. Nevertheless, he repeatedly concluded that ritual obstacles 
*  I.e., fortification, market, autonomous justice, associative structure, and autocephaly.
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to confraternization – stronger in the case of the Indian castes than for the 
Chinese and Near Eastern sibs – had accounted for the divergence between 
East and West in the long run. 
Against competing explanations of the time that traced the emergence 
of capitalism to economic, technological, or demographic factors, or to an 
immanent process of social evolution, Weber argued that a work ethic based 
on ideas such as that of “a duty of the individual toward the increase of his 
capital, which is assumed as an end in itself” (Weber 1992: 17) and “[t]he 
earning of money [as] the result and the expression of virtue and proficiency 
in a calling” (Weber 1992: 19), was what lent Western European and US 
American capitalism its distinct rationality and what had been missing in 
earlier forms of capitalism. Weber traced the “ethically-oriented maxim for the 
organisation of life” back to the basic religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism, 
seen as constituting the very spirit of modern capitalism (Weber, 1992: 
48). He famously viewed the relationship between the Protestant ethic 
and the early capitalist institutions originating in the European cities as an 
“elective affinity” between a type of religious-ethically motivated conduct 
and a mode of production, rather than a direct cause (Weber, 1978: vol. 1; 
Schluchter, 2007: 82).  
The logic of “elective affinities” between the religious conduct of 
Western urban middle-classes and the emergence of capitalism thus 
offers a basis for writing non-Christian religions out of the history of 
modernity. While Christianity and Judaism had in common an origin 
as specifically bourgeois religions, Weber argues, Islam and all Asiatic 
denominations emerged as religions of the ruling stratum and as such 
lacked the middle-class, urban character of the Western capitalist ethos. 
In particular, the inner-worldly warrior ethic characteristic of Islam, 
upheld by a status-oriented military aristocracy, only promoted heroic 
self-sacrifice in times of war, but not the long-term vocational asceticism 
that had allowed Protestantism to overcome the spirit of traditionalism 
in the economic and political spheres (Schluchter, 2007: 80). In Weber’s 
view, if Judaism never transcended the economic ethic of early, “pariah 
capitalism”, Islam remained feudal, petty bourgeois, or booty capitalist 
at best. Once again, the Orientalist rhetoric of lack actively produced 
absences in societies defined as non-modern. Moreover, the elevation 
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of feudalism – a particular period in the history of some parts of Western 
Europe – to a universal stage in the history of world civilizations lent 
legitimacy to the search for structural absences outside the West and 
projected its postulated uniqueness further back in time.
The “Polish Question” and the racialization  
of European citizenships
The rise of imperial Germany rendered most of the concepts Weber coined 
for understanding inequality relations both within and across nations 
almost instantly obsolete (Wenger, 1980: 373). The medieval estates were 
disappearing; industrialization attracted large flows of labour migrants 
from the European East, while the local labour force was ever more 
proletarianized. European colonialism in Africa prompted an increased 
awareness of “the Other” that translated as the infamous anthropological 
distinction between European Kulturvölker (culture peoples) and colonized 
Naturvölker (nature peoples), in turn associated with different degrees 
of humanity. Growing anti-Semitism was reflected in allegedly scientific 
support of racial concepts of German national identity as distinct from a 
Jewish race (Zimmerman, 2001: 242). With Germany’s unification in 1871, 
existing anti-Catholic sentiments were institutionalized in Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf (culture struggle) policies, which meant to restrict the power 
of the Catholic Church and to define Germany as a secular state. As a 
result, the increasing presence of Catholic Poles in Eastern Germany 
was officially countered through the resettlement of German farmers in 
the region. The conservative Verein für Sozialpolitik (officially, German 
Economic Association; literally, Association for Social Policy), which Weber 
joined in 1888, had until then supported the Prussian state’s resettlement 
policies only on class terms, i.e., as a means of preventing the further 
proletarianization of German farmers and an impending social revolution. 
It was Max Weber whose work in the Verein first made ethnic and cultural 
explanations central to the discussions of the Prussian East and who 
warned of the “danger of assimilation” from the standpoint of “reason of 
state” rather than an economic one (Zimmerman, 2006: 61; 2010: 100).
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These views resonated in his further works in ways eerily similar to today’s 
migration debates. Central to Weber’s controversial* inaugural lecture at 
the University of Freiburg (1895), entitled “Nationality in Economic Policy”, 
was the question “What social strata are the repositories of Germanism 
(Deutschtum) and Polonism (Polentum) in the country districts?” (Weber, 
1980: 429). The systematic land purchase by the German state, the settle-
ment of German farmers on Polish-owned land, as well as the closing of 
the German frontier to Polish workers had been part of Bismarck’s official 
program of “Germanization” of the Eastern provinces up to 1890, in which 
suppressing “Polonism” was an explicit goal. Weber was therefore employing 
known terms in order to address a familiar problem: the decline of the 
German land-worker population in the face of Polish settlement on small 
farms and growing imports of cheap Polish labour on large estates. What 
was new, both with respect to the general discussion and to Weber’s earlier 
treatments of the issue, was the phrasing of these economic developments 
in ethnic and cultural terms derived from each of the groups’ religious 
affiliations. Since the census data available to him only differentiated 
by religion, not ethnicity, Weber interpreted the numbers indicating the 
decline of the Protestant population relative to the Catholic one to mean 
that it must be German day-labourers who are moving out of the estates 
on good soil, and that Polish peasants proliferating on low-quality land.** 
He traced this tendency back to “a lower expectation of living standards, 
in part physical, in part mental, which the Slav race either possesses as a 
gift from nature or has acquired through breeding in the course of its past 
history” (Weber, 1980: 432). 
 The Polish peasants, unlike the seasonal migrant workers, were German 
citizens at the time. Yet, Weber described the situation as an economic 
struggle “between nationalities” (1980: 428), ultimately decided through a 
selection process in favour of the nationality with the greater “ability to adapt” 
to given economic and social conditions. In his view, the Polish peasants 
*  Although Max Weber himself has later expressed misgivings about aspects of his lecture, they did not refer 
to his upholding of the German nation, which is the focus of the following summary (see Abraham, 1991: 47; 
Roth, 1993).
** Weber was of course aware of the methodological short-circuit inherent in using religion as a proxy for 
nationality, but decided that “only approximate accuracy” is good enough in the case of West Prussia, where 
religious affiliation “coincides within a few percent with nationality” (1980: 429).
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living off subsistence production, i.e., not affected by price fluctuations 
on the market, were better adapted than the economically “more gifted” 
German farmers:
The small Polish peasant in East Germany is a type far removed from the bustling 
peasant owner of a dwarf property, whom one may see here in the well-favored 
valley of the Rhine as he forges links with the towns via  greenhouse cultivation 
and market-gardening. The small Polish peasant in East Germany gains more land 
because he, as it were, eats the very grass from off of it, he gains not despite but 
on account of the low level of his physical and intellectual habits of life“ (Weber, 
1980: 434). 
Weber thus used the social Darwinist terminology of “adaptation”, “selection 
process”, and “race breeding” popular at the time in order to explain that a 
group’s economic advance did not necessarily correlate with the “political 
maturity” needed in order to build up “the nation’s power”. Thus, Polish 
settlement and labour migration led to the rise of “unviable Slav hunger 
colonies” (Weber, 1980: 435) and drove out German agricultural labourers, 
instead of steering in the direction of the emergence of a strong proletariat 
on the model of England. The wish to protect “the German character of the 
East” (ibid.: 437) from such tendencies in turn led Weber to formulate his 
policy demands “from the standpoint of Germanism” and uphold “a German 
standard of value” against the international standards of social justice that 
he saw political economy as promoting:
The science of political economy is a political science. It is a servant of politics, 
not the day-to-day politics of the individuals and classes who happen to be ruling 
at a particular time, but the lasting power-political interests of the nation. And 
for us the national state is not, as some people believe, an indeterminate entity 
[...], but the temporal power-organization of the nation, and in this national 
state the ultimate standard of value for economic policy is “reason of state”. 
(Weber, 1980: 438)
Speaking at the close of the 19th century as a German economic theorist, 
a member of the bourgeois classes, and a son of a National Liberal member 
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of the Prussian Diet,* Weber considered the “reason of state” in the case 
of German economic policy to be “the amount of elbow room” conquered 
for the economic well-being of “the race of the future” (Weber, 1994: 16). 
He therefore called for the renewed closing of the Eastern frontier to Polish 
migrants, as under Bismarck, and for a state policy of systematic colonization 
by German peasants on suitable land, as a means of preserving German 
culture – echoed today in calls for a Leitkultur.  
 This culturally racializing logic was not restricted to the European East. 
Tellingly for its roots in global coloniality, it also underlay Weber’s 1894 article 
on Argentina’s rising cereal exports after the devaluation of the Argentine 
peso in 1889/90. In arguing both against the free trade doctrine and the 
“entirely unrealistic assumption of the international equality of cultures” 
(MWG, 1993: 302), Weber insisted that Argentina’s low production costs 
could to a great extent be traced back to the very low wages and cheap food 
that planters offered the “nomadic barbarians” that they hired for seasonal 
work. According to their “low living standard”, these workers “appear when 
the time for demand comes and disappear afterwards or after having drunk 
away their wages”, while “in terms of housing [they] only know clay huts” 
(MWG, 1993: 292). Economic competition with colonial economies such as 
the Argentinean one would therefore require lowering the level of German 
social organization and culture in order to match that of Argentina’s “half-
savage trash” (MWG, 1993: 129), a phenomenon Weber saw as occurring 
with the Polish immigration in East Elbia (the name given until World War 
II to the parts of the German Reich that lay east of the river Elbe):
Should we be able and willing to work just as “cheaply”, our rural workers would 
have to approach this type as well, and we can indeed find the first manifestations 
of this change if we observe the itinerant workforce and the import of Poles in the 
East. Briefly, the fact is that we are an old sedentary civilized people (Kulturvolk) 
on densely populated land with an old, highly distinctive and therefore sensitive 
social organization and typical national cultural necessities, which make it 
impossible for us to compete with these economies (MWG, 1993: 298). 
*  For an assessment of the significance of Weber’s family history for a broader understanding of his intellectual 
and political concerns, see Guenther Roth‘s 1993 review of volume 4 of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 
(Roth, 1993).
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Inherent in Weber’s defense of the “standpoint of Germanism” is therefore a 
colonial stance linking ethnicity to different cultural levels and the attitudes 
toward work of distinct “nationalities” that goes beyond the colonial 
discourse of his time. In arguing this position, Weber even turned against 
close collaborators: at the 1896 founding meeting of the National Social 
Party, Weber cautioned its founder, Friedrich Naumann, that the new party’s 
political platform required adopting a national stance with respect to the 
Polish question. On such occasions, his anti-Polish rhetoric acquired clear 
racist traits and an unmistakable colonial logic: “It has been said that we have 
degraded the Poles to second-class German citizens. The opposite is the 
case: We have turned them into human beings in the first place” (MWG, I/4: 
622). Clearly, Weber used the distinction between Kulturvölker as civilized 
humanity and Naturvölker as barbaric humanity that he had explicitly 
mobilized in reference to the German versus the Argentinean economies 
(and that was commonly used in 19th century German anthropology to 
refer to European and colonized peoples, respectively) in order to deny 
full humanity to populations within Europe. The modern, the civilized, and 
the rational are thereby confined to an even more exclusive space within 
the European continent, which the imperial imaginary conceives as ending 
at Germany’s eastern border. Elsewhere, I have labeled this self-defined 
Western space “heroic Europe” and contrasted it to its internal Other, 
“epigonal Europe” in the (South)East of the continent. The latter is defined 
in Occidentalist terms via its alleged lack of the former’s achievements and 
hence as a mere re-producer of the stages covered by the heroic Europe 
(Boatcă, 2010; 2013; 2015; see Karkov in this issue).
Occidentalist epistemology as the rhetoric of failure
This type of argument focused on a positively connoted Western uniqueness 
still dominates sociological scholarship on the emergence of modern patterns 
of social stratification, citizenship rights, and democratic ideals in the West. 
In particular, Weber’s interpretation of citizenship as a distinctly Western 
institution has been viewed as inaugurating “a social science tradition 
where the origins of ‘city’, ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’ are etymologically 
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traced to the ‘Greek’, ‘Roman’ and ‘medieval’ cities and affinities between 
‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ practices are established and juxtaposed against 
oriental ones – Indian, Chinese and Islamic – as societies that failed to 
develop citizenship and hence indigenous capitalism” (Isin, 2013: 117). 
Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber into English and explicitly drew on 
his work, famously referred to the institutionalization of the basic rights 
of citizenship as an egalitarian tendency of modern societies, in which 
universalistic norms gradually replace earlier particularistic solidarities 
of ethnicity, religion, and regional origin. In Parson’s view, this tendency 
stood for a shift from traditional societies governed by criteria ascribed 
at birth, such as gender, race or family background, to modern societies 
characterized by achievement criteria such as educational or professional 
qualification. The decisive thrust for the implementation of this shift had 
come from the French Revolution (Parsons, 1971). At the same time, Parsons 
echoed Weber’s emphasis on confraternization as a basis for claims to 
equality when stressing that the French Revolution’s slogan “embodied 
the new conception of community. Liberté and Egalité symbolised the two 
foci of dissatisfaction, political authoritarianism and privilege; Fraternité 
referred primarily to the broader context of belonging, ‘brotherhood’ being 
a primordial symbol of community” (Parsons, 1971: 80). Again, both these 
accomplishments and the disparities that they addressed were presented 
as internal to a minimally defined West.
At the end of the 20th century, Bryan Turner, too, viewed citizenship as 
“an essentially modern institution which reflects the profound changes which 
have occurred in western societies following the democratic revolutions in 
France and America and as a consequence of broader, more general social 
changes associated with the industrial revolution, such as urbanisation and 
secularisation” (Turner and Hamilton, 1994: n.p.). He therefore envisaged an 
ideal-typical historical trajectory, whereby citizenship “evolves through the 
establishment of autonomous cities, develops through the emergence of the 
nation-state in the 18th and the 19th centuries, and finds its full blossoming 
in the welfare states of the 20th century” (Turner and Hamilton, 1994: n.p.).
Besides cementing the Orientalist construction of a binary opposition 
between East and West, such Weberian analyses of citizenship amount to 
inventing a unified and coherent tradition for each space: 
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a superior way of being political as “simple and pure citizen” and an inferior 
tradition that never sorted out the contractual state or the citizen. For much of 
Occidental social science as well as political and public discourse, such images 
are now such ways of seeing: that democracy was invented in the Greek polis; 
that the Roman republican tradition bequeathed its legacy to Europe and that 
Europe Christianized and civilized these traditions (Isin, 2013: 117). 
Inevitably, such a procedure systematically encounters incomplete 
assignments and rudimentary developments everywhere outside the 
West, where a whole different set of socio-political, economic, and cultural 
elements was at play. 
Ultimately, a Weberian conceptualization of citizenship, focused on 
Western Europe’s pioneering role in forging a community of equal members, 
channels attention to processes internal to that community and the features 
that make it unique in comparison to its counterparts elsewhere. Such a focus 
however prevents both an understanding of the interrelations – including 
relations of power such as colonial conquest, imperial rule, or religious and 
racial exclusion, which made the singularity of the original context possible –  
and precludes a global perspective on citizenship more generally. In the 
process, an inward-looking and self-sufficient West that needs to protect 
its borders from non-Western Others is being reproduced as legitimate, 
while religiously-motivated and racially-charged exclusion is disguised as 
universal epistemology.
Citizenship as entail of colonial property
In turn, global perspectives reveal the ascribed characteristic of citizenship 
to be as important for worldwide stratification as class, and hence a crucial 
driver of international migration and worldwide social mobility (Korzeniewicz 
and Moran, 2009). In her 2009 book The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship 
and Global Inequality, legal scholar Ayelet Shachar has traced the Western 
institution of citizenship back to the feudal entail, a legal mechanism of 
restricting future succession of property to the descendants of a designated 
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estate-owner, which was widely used in medieval England. The entail of 
property offered a tool to preserve land in the hands of dynastic families 
by entrenching birthright succession and forbidding future generations 
to alter the estate inherited from their predecessors. It was this feudal 
institution that, according to Shachar’s analysis, shaped the modern 
principle of citizenship allocation of Western European states in both 
jus soli and jus sanguinis arrangements. The entail of citizenship helped 
preserve the state’s wealth in the hands of designated “heirs of membership 
titles” – the state’s citizens – by allocating political membership at birth in 
dramatically different opportunity structures and excluding non-citizens 
from the same opportunities (Shachar, 2009: 38). The very modernity 
that Parsons associated with a shift away from ascribed characteristics 
is thereby revealed to rely on the ascription of citizenship at birth, thus 
providing (at least in principle) equal rights within the national territory, 
but creating stark inequalities for those remaining outside the territory 
to which these rights apply.
This reconceptualization sheds new light on the global workings of the 
institution of modern citizenship from its very emergence in the context of 
the French Revolution: on the one hand, the gradual extension of citizenship 
rights from propertied white males to all white males and to white women 
accounted for a decrease in inequality within continental France as of the 
18th century. On the other hand, the categorical exclusion of the French 
colonies’ non-white population from French citizenship, irrespective of 
their property status, ensured the maintenance of high inequality between 
France and Saint-Domingue/Haiti, as well as between other Western 
colonial powers and their colonial possessions more generally. It thus 
becomes clear that the entail of property that Shachar used as an analogy 
to the entail of citizenship was a colonial entail. Both the entail of property 
and the colonial entail of citizenship helped preserve inherited property: 
in the form of material goods proper and of rights to goods, state support, 
social services, and infrastructure in the hands of the (racially, ethnically, 
and geopolitically) designated heirs to the Western colonial enterprise for 
several centuries. Today, 
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for individuals without birthright privilege in an affluent democracy, immigration 
provides a possible way to attain the precious and globally scarce good of 
citizenship in a stable and well-off polity. It thus opens the gate that typically 
remains sealed by birthright entails (Shachar, 2009: 83).
At the same time, upper class membership comes with the significant 
benefit of being able to sidestep both ascription of citizenship at birth and 
actual migration. Resorting to market mechanisms in order to elude this 
ascription is therefore an increasingly visible, yet rare option available only 
to the wealthy few, who are however rarely described as migrants and more 
often as “global investors”, “expats”, or “foreign residents for tax purposes”. 
The growing commodification of citizenship rights across the world in recent 
years, i.e., the possibility of literally purchasing residence and citizenship 
in certain countries makes the similarity between citizenship and the entail 
of property particularly salient. It also prompts the realization that the 
ascription of citizenship represents no exception to a modern trend away 
from ascriptive mechanisms (Brubaker, 1992; Korzeniewicz and Moran, 
2009; Shachar, 2009), but a core principle of global stratification in the 
capitalist world-economy.
Conferring citizenship to investors, provided they take up residence 
in a country’s territory, has been common practice in a number of states, 
including the UK, the US, Canada, Belgium, and Australia. A less common, 
but recently growing practice consists of extending citizenship status to 
investors without a residence requirement, i.e., they neither have to move 
to the country of their new citizenship, nor reside there for a given amount 
of time. Firmly implemented in Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Commonwealth 
of Dominica since 1984 and 1993 respectively, such so-called citizenship by 
investment (or “economic citizenship”) programmes have recently proliferated 
throughout Southern and Eastern Europe (for a recent overview see Carrera, 
2014; Dzankic, 2015).
As a type of a naturalization procedure, citizenship by investment 
programmes have a clearly economic rationale and stand in close connection 
to the logic of coloniality. On the one hand, states employ them as an 
alternative development strategy or as a means of coping with the global 
financial crisis. For their very first promoters, the programmes were meant to 
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bridge the transition from the export monoculture of the colonial economy 
to the more diversified production after independence: Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
a federation of two islands in the Caribbean, established its programme one 
year after the islands gained independence from the United Kingdom in 
1983. Initially, investment required to obtain citizenship was limited to a real 
estate option of 400,000 US dollars. After the islands’ sugar industry was 
closed under the pressures from the European Union and the World Trade 
Organization, a second option was introduced in the form of a donation 
to the Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation (SIDF), a charity aimed 
at conducting research into the development of alternative industries to 
replace the sugar industry (Dzankic, 2012). Under the headline Passports... 
for a Price, Reuters pithily summarized the colonial logic behind the move 
towards investment citizenship by noting: “For decades, the two-island 
nation of Saint Kitts and Nevis exported sugarcane to keep its economy 
afloat. When sugar prices fell, Saint Kitts began to sell an even sweeter 
commodity: its citizenship” (Abrahamian, 2012).
Similarly, the Commonwealth of Dominica, which gained independence 
from the United Kingdom in 1978, has established an investor citizenship 
programme after adverse weather conditions and the decrease in the world 
prices of bananas, the country’s primary crop, that had seriously damaged 
its economy (Dzankic, 2012). On the other hand, for the targeted investors, 
the economic rationale resides in the fact that, due to their conditions of 
former British colonies, both Saint Kitts and Nevis and Dominica are part of 
the Commonwealth of Nations. Their citizens can travel without a visa to more 
than half of the world’s countries, including Canada and all of Europe. They pay 
no personal income taxes and can take up residence in any of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) member countries at any time and indefinitely.
Within Southern and Eastern Europe, citizenship and residency program-
mes have taken hold especially as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and the 
austerity measures imposed by the EU, the European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The programmes’ economic rationale 
has therefore largely lain in providing a type of austerity management by 
refinancing debt through the sale of South Eastern European countries’ own 
inherited property, citizenship. Hungary adopted an amendment to the 
immigration law introducing an investment citizenship option in December 
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2012, shortly after the implementation of further austerity measures had 
been demanded by the EU and the IMF and approved by the government. 
Under the new law, foreigners who bought at least 300,000 euros in special 
government residency bonds with a five-year maturity date were offered 
preferential immigration treatment and a fast track to Hungarian citizenship 
without additional requirements of residence or real estate purchases (Varga, 
2012). Between 2013 and 2017, when it closed the programme, Hungary had 
thereby granted more than 10,000 so-called “golden visas” to investors. 
Nowadays, Latvia and Greece boast the lowest amounts required of investors 
in Europe for residency – a still sizeable 250,000 euros. Yet a real estate 
investment of up to 650,000 euros also buys foreigners residency rights, and 
in some cases full European citizenship, in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Cyprus, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Malta, whose investment programmes 
have all been implemented since 2012 in the context of tightening austerity 
measures (Harrison, 2013; Peter, 2013). Visa-free travel to core countries, 
citizenship of a Schengen zone state, or even the right to work in the EU 
thereby become available to the (moderately or very) wealthy. This time 
around, access to citizenship is restricted “only” by income, apparently 
breaking the historical logic of ascribing citizenship at birth. However, the 
commodification of citizenship does not follow an alternative, non-ascriptive 
logic – the investors already possess an ascribed citizenship, and the newly 
acquired one can be passed onto future generations by descent. It also does 
not represent a viable option for most of the world’s population. Instead, 
it is either an option purposely designed for a very select few or – more 
frequently – is scandalized, stigmatized and, ultimately, criminalized, when 
it threatens to become available to a wider number of people.
In most cases, the declared goal of economic citizenship programmes is 
to attract wealthy investors, especially from China, but also, and increasingly, 
from Russia and the Middle East. Both the Hungarian and the Greek 
governments actively promoted the launch of their investment citizenship 
programmes in China. Cyprus, interested in preserving financial relations 
with Russia, initially tried to cut down the amount required for investment 
citizenship in order to compensate for the losses of the Russian business 
community in the recent Cypriot bank crisis (Focus Online, 2013). In the 
meantime, resident Cypriot citizens faced restrictions on the use of debit and 
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credit cards, check cashing and daily withdrawals from their bank accounts, 
as well as a ban on premature termination and compulsory renewal of all-
time saving deposits. Similar austerity measures were imposed on resident 
Greek citizens during the 2015 debt crisis and bailout negotiations. Although 
closed banks and cash-strapped ATMs made any form of payment difficult 
in Greece, money transfer and cash withdrawal restrictions did not apply 
to investor citizens and Western nationals.
For wealthy individuals of non-Western countries, investment citizenship 
clearly represents a means of global social mobility that eludes both 
ascription and migration, and at the same time trumps race. In this regard, 
it is a globalized instance of what, in the context of racial inequalities in 
Brazil, has been referred to as “whitening with money” (Hasenbalg, 2005) –  
a capital-facilitated symbolic move up the racial ladder. Such monetary – 
and momentary – disconnect from the racialized body through possession 
of a European Union passport is, however, no reason for celebrating a 
post-racial order. On the one hand, it belies the experience of the great 
majority of transnational labour migrants, for whom border-crossing 
awarding upward economic mobility simultaneously entails the opposite 
risk – being reclassified as non-white and thus experiencing downward 
racial mobility. On the other hand, such racial reclassification poses very 
different degrees of difficulty depending on the colonial and imperial 
history of the context where one’s racial identity is being negotiated, thus 
reinforcing the hierarchies underlying the constructed racial continuum. In 
the context of Eastern Europe, it involves a “race to the bottom” similar to 
the one concerning Eastern European migrant labour in Western Europe 
or semi-skilled or unskilled labor in the region that ends up reproducing 
inner-European hierarchies and power relations.
Thus, sharp criticism of economic citizenship programmes as “an abuse 
of European Union membership” (Daily Mail, 2012) in the case of Hungary 
or, in the case of Malta, as “cheapening citizenship” (Passino, 2013; Shachar, 
2014) has been instrumental in reasserting EU core countries’ leverage on 
Southern and Eastern European semi-peripheries. The austerity measures 
and other sanctions imposed on Cyprus and Malta, which had already 
implemented their investment citizenship programmes, and Montenegro, 
which was planning to do so, are illustrative in this regard. Thus, in the 
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context of the debate on the EU bailout of Cyprus’s banks, the head of 
the German Christian Social Union (CSU) in the EU Parliament asked for 
a reform of Cyprus’ citizenship law that would ensure that “not everyone 
who has a lot of money receives a Cypriot passport” (Gammelin and 
Hulverscheidt, 2013). It was also the German CSU that announced that it 
might request the reinstatement of visas for the citizens of Montenegro if 
its government implemented a citizenship by investment programme in the 
country, implying that this decision might affect the previous “progress” 
Montenegro had made “in the area of border management and immigration 
control” (Vijesti, 2010, quoted in Dzankic, 2012). In the wake of such 
reactions, the Montenegrin government had put the implementation of its 
citizenship by investment programme on hold until 2018, when it opened 
a limited three-year programme capped at 2000 investors. In turn, Malta’s 
citizenship scheme, with an initial investment threshold of 650,000 euros, 
has been heavily disputed on a number of counts, including the European 
Commission’s concerns that it would naturalize persons born and residing 
abroad without “genuine links to the country” (The Independent, 2014). 
As a result, the Maltese government has amended the scheme to include 
a more severe residence requirement and further investment in real estate 
and government bonds, raising the contribution to a total of 1,150,000 
euros. It thereby hoped to raise up to one billion euro yearly, around one-
eighth of Malta’s GNP, but ended up raising the – still notable – sum of 718 
million euros since the programme started (Die Zeit, 2015; Transparency 
International, 2018).
The increase in the commodification of European citizenship in the context 
of tightening austerity regimes not only reflects, but also reinforces the 
ongoing widening of the worldwide inequality gap. The most recent Oxfam 
report, Reward Work, Not Wealth, alerted the world to the fact that the year 
2017 had seen the biggest increase of billionaires in history – at the incredible 
pace of one more every two days (Oxfam, 2018). In one year, the very 
wealthy saw their fortunes grow by 762 billion US dollars. This amount itself –  
how much richer the very rich became in those twelve months – is seven 
times higher than the one needed to end extreme poverty worldwide. The 
current gap between the rich and the poor at the global level – maybe more 
appropriately termed an abyss – makes today’s world more unequal than 
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it has been at any previous time in history (Reid-Henry, 2015). Against this 
background, the emergence of investor citizenship programmes and the 
increasing migration and refugee flows into Europe can both be understood 
as strategies of eluding the ascription of citizenship and the unequal transfer 
of property underlying it – yet the availability of such strategies across 
social strata is as unequal as the worldwide distribution of wealth. While 
regulations and sanctions from supra-state and financial institutions ensure 
that investor visas remain unaffordable for most or are not introduced at all 
in financially strained states, austerity measures turn more state assets into 
commodities benefitting Western banks, creditors, and core states: Greece 
had to auction off several of its islands, nature preserves, and even ancient 
ruins under the terms of the most recent bailout in 2015 – a possibility 
interpreted as a “selling of history” by advisers to the Greek Ministry of 
Labor, Social Security and Social Solidarity (Shuster, 2015). Also as part 
of the bailout deal, strategic state assets such as dozens of Greek airports 
were transferred to the property of a single private company whose major 
stakeholder is the German state (N-tv, 2015). 
At the same time, the racial and ethnic policing of non-Western migrants 
and refugees underlines the immutability of the ascription of citizenship for 
the wider population, and ultimately the denial of equal opportunities for 
upward social mobility at the global level. According to the former French 
EU affairs minister Pierre Lalouche, one of the reasons France spoke out 
against Romanian efforts to join the EU’s passport-free Schengen zone 
in 2010 was a concern with “the distribution of Romanian passports” to 
Moldovans. The territory of Moldova was part of the Romanian Principality 
of Moldavia from the mid-14th through the mid-19th century and part of 
Greater Romania 1918–1940 and 1941–1945.* Since many Moldovans are 
ethnically and linguistically Romanian and to almost 95 per cent Romanian 
Orthodox Christians, Bucharest adopted a law granting foreign nationals 
of Romanian descent the right to become citizens of the country as soon 
as Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union. Since then, 
* Formerly known as Bessarabia, the region was annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II and became 
an independent republic in 1991. According to Romanian officials, many Moldovans regard the Romanian 
passport as the key to the EU and try to acquire Romanian citizenship as fast as possible using both official 
and unofficial channels (Călugăreanu and Mogos, 2012). 
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Romania has processed an estimated 225,000 citizenship applications 
from Moldovans (Iordachi, 2012). 
The widely read German magazine Der Spiegel illustrated the typical threat 
scenario mobilized in anti-immigration arguments with the words: “[T]he EU, 
which is already suffering from enlargement fatigue, is stealthily being expanded 
from the east – without a referendum or any agreements from Brussels, Berlin 
or Paris. The Moldovans are voting with their feet and marching into the EU’s 
economic paradise – through the back door” (Bidder, 2010).
As illicit intermediaries can even generate proof of Romanian ancestry 
where none exists, thereby spurring illegal trade of Romanian passports, 
EU fears of “creeping expansion from the East” have fed on exaggerated 
prognoses of the “stream of Moldovan migration” into Western Europe. 
Evidence has, however, shown that Romania’s naturalization programme 
has created proportionately fewer EU citizens than similar efforts in France 
and the UK (Călugăreanu and Mogos, 2012) and that Western European 
states grant far more new citizenships per 1,000 residents than states in 
any other part of Europe (Milmo, 2014). Nevertheless, France’s concern 
with Moldovan migrants was the first in a line of Western European states’ 
arguments against Romania and Bulgaria joining the Schengen zone. 
In 2013, the then German minister of the interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, 
announced that “the attempt [to join] will fail because of a German veto” 
and he urged both countries to take further steps “to prevent migrants 
abusing the system” (The Economist, 2013). At the same time, leading 
EU officials have repeatedly expressed concern that the expansion of the 
Schengen zone to Romania and Bulgaria would trigger an influx of North 
African refugees from Greece, which currently has no land connection to 
the rest of the Schengen space (Brady, 2012). As a result, Romania and 
Bulgaria’s access to the Schengen zone is currently postponed indefinitely, 
and the two countries consequently rank lowest among all EU countries 
in Henley&Partners’ visa restriction index, which measures the amount of 
mobility granted by passports worldwide (Henley&Partners, 2017). In 2018, 
Moldova – not a EU member – introduced its own citizenship by investment 
programme, thus entering the race to the bottom by boasting that it is “ten 
times cheaper than Malta and also cheaper than St. Kitts and Grenada CBI 
passports” (Corpocrat, 2018).
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Despite many of the arguments exchanged by critics and promoters alike, 
at stake in such debates is not the abstract worth of citizenship, nor the 
amount of cultural and social ties of members with the national community. 
Instead, financially strained semi-peripheral states are interested in how the 
commodification of citizenship facilitates the management of austerity. At 
the same time, wealthy core states are concerned about the consequences 
of the commodification of citizenship for migration and about the rights of 
potential migrants in core regions of the world-economy. From different 
directions, both are trying to capitalize on the very coloniality that makes 
the citizenship of certain states a highly valuable commodity.
It is therefore important to note that, while any state’s citizenship 
could theoretically be commodified by becoming the object of investor 
programmes, it is only the citizenship of few states that lends itself to 
being commodified by virtue of being a scarce good awarding (relatively) 
rare benefits. From this point of view, states whose citizenship includes 
the advantage of the above-mentioned visa-free travel to core countries 
or even the right to legal employment in them, offer what could be referred 
to as “premium citizenship” that is attractive to investors. States that are 
not part of the core, may, as in the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis, use the 
residual benefits of having been a British colony and a current member of 
the Commonwealth of Nations and its visa-free travel area. This, however, 
hardly compares to the rights accruing from EU citizenship, which include 
free movement, residence and less discrimination within the EU, the right 
to vote for and stand as a candidate in European Parliament and municipal 
elections, diplomatic protection outside the EU, etc. Citizenship for sale is 
not only unavailable to the majority of the world’s population, but would not 
prove a viable economic strategy in any but “premium citizenship” states, 
among which EU member states rank highest. The EU is home to eight out 
of the ten countries worldwide whose citizens enjoy the most freedom of 
visa-free travel (Johansen, 2013). At the same time, the EU is the historic 
heir to Western colonial states whose possessions covered almost half of 
the inhabited surface of the non-European world as late as the 1930s and 
which today control 28 out of the remaining 58 colonial possessions (Böröcz 
and Sarkar, 2005; Dependencies and Territories of the World, 2013). The 
Henley&Partners Passport Index, produced in cooperation with the trade 
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association for the world’s airlines, IATA, ranks Western countries among the 
the top 10 in terms of visa-free travel. Most passport holders in Africa, the 
Middle East, and South Asia rank far lower. This explains why EU residence 
permits are extremely attractive to Chinese investors, and much more so 
than for Hong Kong investors, who hold a “Special Administrative Region of 
China” passport – another reminder of residual colonial advantage. Tellingly, 
territories “dependent” on the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the 
USA, the Netherlands, and France are not considered separate nationalities, 
but “destinations” (Henley&Partners, 2017) and thus do not get their own 
scores. The colonial entail of property thereby helps perpetuate the colonial 
entail of premium citizenship for Western states.
Citizenship is thus not only a core mechanism for the maintenance of 
global inequalities in a world capitalist system, but also one on the basis of 
which their reproduction in the postcolonial present, i.e., their coloniality, is 
being enacted. It is in the context of global capitalism and its corresponding 
logic of colonial accumulation that the institution of citizenship emerged; 
the economic and political interests of the Western European colonial 
powers that pioneered it were essential in defining its central features, 
and are decisive in maintaining premium citizenships restricted today. 
The commodification of citizenship to the benefit of non-Western wealthy 
investors one the one hand, and its policing and restriction for labor migrants 
on the other, currently signal an economic and epistemic renegotiation of 
citizenship, respectively. Southeastern Europe’s role in these negotiations, 
as often in its history, is one of a geopolitical and epistemic buffer zone that 
often withstands pressure from the Western core by passing it on to non-
European others and thus reproducing Occidentalist premises. Revealing 
the coloniality inherent in the institution of citizenship as a type of inherited 
property is a reminder that pathways to decoloniality emerge through a 
rejection of Occidentalism, racism, and constructed national identities. 
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Image Description: 
Fig.1. Bratska Mogila as of July 2018, with the 
scene Robstvo in the centre. 
Photo by the Author.
Zhivka Valiavicharska
ethno-nationalism and the global orientations 
of Bulgarian socialism during the 1960s and 1970s
Post-Stalinism’s 
uncanny symbioses:
Е
80
O n September 17, 1972 Angela Davis landed at the airport in Sofia to a show of welcome and support. Only a few months prior to her arrival, Bulgarian society followed the fate of the American political 
activist in great suspense: her capture and her prolonged and arduous public 
trial were covered extensively in the Bulgarian press, and Narodna Mladezh, 
a popular socialist youth newspaper, organized a massive letter-writing 
campaign in support of her liberation.* In the following decades, in her 
political and public work, Davis has never missed to make the point that 
she owes her freedom and her life to the people – it was only thanks to 
the relentless mobilizations against her capture and against the political 
persecutions of Black radicals and communist activists fighting for racial and 
social justice that she was released from the repressive grind of the justice 
system and escaped prison and possibly death. In her autobiography, she 
wrote that the international campaign in support of her freedom, along 
with the freedom of all political prisoners in the United States, “had not 
only exerted serious pressure on the government, it had also stimulated 
the further growth of the mass movement at home” (Davis, 1974: 398). At 
the center of this international movement, she continued, was “the socialist 
community of nations”. “In those countries rallies were attended by more 
people than I had ever before seen assembled in one place – hundreds of 
thousands, for example in the GDR, and close to three quarters of a million 
in Cuba” (Davis, 1974: 398-99).
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, Bulgarian society was drawn into 
a swirl of international events as the socialist public sphere was activated 
by the global echoes and alignments of struggles for social, economic, 
and racial justice across borders and continents. These struggles opened 
possibilities for forging political alternatives across geopolitical and regional 
confines, to which the socialist countries had distinct contributions to 
offer. The Bulgarian press covered the international news in collaboration 
with reporters from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries strate-
gically located in cities such as New York, London, Havana, and Cairo. In 
* Parts of this research have been published in an earlier version, in Nikolay Karkov and Zhivka Valiavicharska, 
“Rethinking East-European Socialism: Notes Toward a Decolonial, Anti-Capitalist Methodology,” Interventions: 
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 20, 5 (2018): 785-813. I thank Polina Manolova, Philipp Lottholz, Neda 
Genova and Jana Tsoneva  for their feedback and crucial suggestions in developing some moments in this paper.  
I also thank Momchil Hristov for introducing me to the work of Matthieu Renault.
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the early 1970s, Narodna Mladezh followed a dizzying range of political 
developments from around the world, from the war in Vietnam and the 
anti-war protests in the United States, to teacher strikes in Philadelphia, 
to Israel’s attack on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, to the last 
throes of Portuguese colonial rule in 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
Papua New Guinea, and Angola. The 
newspaper ran regular stories on the 
economic and social transformation 
of Chilean society under the short-
lived socialist government of Salva-
dor Allende, the right-wing backlash 
and military coup that took over the 
Chilean state, and the violence,re-
pression, death, and exile of masses 
of people that devastated Chilean 
society in the following years – some 
of which ended up finding refuge in 
socialist Bulgaria, mostly in Sofia, 
forming a small but strong diasporic 
community which energized the rad-
ical cultures of the city. 
Fig.2. Welcome, Angela!, Source: Narodna Mladezh, 18 September, 1972.  
Photo by the Author.
Fig 3. Ivan Stoychev, political cartoon as a commentary 
on the capture of Angela Davis; Source: Komsomolska 
Iskra, 11 January 1971. Photo by the author.
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In the weeks, months and years following the assassination of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. in April 1968, Bulgarian society had become closely acquainted 
with the social conditions of Black people in the United States, the realities of 
racism and legal segregation, the history of the civil rights and Black radical 
movements, the brutality and racism of the police, the structural role of prisons 
in class and racial inequalities, and more. Narodna Mladezh began the rubric 
Black and White, which ran through most of 1972 – it explored intersections 
between racism, capitalist exploitation, the criminal system and criminalized 
populations, and the political persecutions of communists and Black radicals. 
It published coverage of the Attica prison rebellions in New York State, the 
war in Vietnam and the anti-war protests, and the persecution of a number of 
radical political organizers, including members of the Black Panthers – Bobby 
Seale, Erica Haggins, and Huey Newton; the Soledad Brothers; the “Chicago 
Seven”; the “Seattle Six”; and others.
It was then not surprising that, after she was acquitted, Davis visited 
a number of socialist countries to honor the people who supported her, 
including the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the 
GDR, Cuba, and Chile. During and after her trip she shared some of her 
impressions from the socialist countries, including the housing developments 
in the Soviet Union, the reconstruction of Tashkent after the earthquake in 
April 1966 that devastated much of the city’s built environment, the women’s 
Fig 4. Letter from a Chilean Woman;  
Source:Otechestven Glas, Plovdiv, 8 March 1974. Photo by the author.
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Fig. 5. The Storm of Black Protest; Source: Narodna Mladezh, April 11, 1968, covering the unrest 
on the streets in the U.S. after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.  
Photo by the Author. 
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organizations, and “the happy way children live” (Narodna Mladezh, 1972). 
She told reporters in Moscow that “when we return to the United States, we 
will speak of the true equality of all peoples in the USSR, the rapid progress 
of all nations and nationalities living on the territory of [this] country. We 
will speak about the Soviet people’s remarkable accomplishments in the 
spheres of economy and culture” (Narodna Mladezh, 1972).
Davis spent a total of four days in Bulgaria. She was accompanied by 
Kendra Alexander, her sister and a veteran of the civil rights and anti-war 
movements in the United States and who, together with Franklin Alexander 
(also with them), co-founded and co-chaired the committee of the inter-
national Free Angela and All Political Prisoners campaign. The guests met 
with the country’s political leadership and with representatives of youth and 
women’s organizations – among them was Elena Lagadinova, a high-ranking 
politician and chair of the Committee of the Bulgarian Women’s Movement 
for many years. Her relentless work and organizing throughout the 1970s 
helped build extensive infrastructures of care, leisure, and social reproduction 
that changed the social and material lives of many women and opened the 
material and social conditions for reorganizing gender and social relations 
in unprecedented ways (Ghodsee, 2012; 2014; 2015). 
The coverage of the events of September 1972 suggests that the guests 
were treated like official visitors of highest honor and their experience was 
mediated by official programs and their contact with the political elites. It is 
unclear to what extent they were able to escape the elaborate state rituals 
and curated encounters with the “people” to experience everyday life on 
their own. However, Davis left a lasting memory in the collective experience 
of an entire generation of young people and was an inspiration for young 
Bulgarian women in particular, who still remember being captivated by her 
strength and dignity, her public presence, and her political spirit.
The guests were taken to Varna, a major city on the Black Sea coast, where 
they visited factories and toured the Black Sea resort Zlatni Piasatsi. They 
also visited the town of Septemvri near Plovdiv, where agricultural workers 
showed them their land cooperatives, their orchards and vineyards. Davis 
received a painting of women rose-gatherers working in the rose valleys, 
as the socialist state had developed the rose oil industry and exported its 
products on the international markets as part of the symbolic repertoire of 
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Bulgarian nationalism. The party leadership gave her the prestigious award 
for political activism “Georgi Dimitrov”. Local newspapers compared Davis’ 
indictment and trial to the experience of Dimitrov, Bulgarian-born communist 
and Comintern leader, who was framed together with other communist and 
anti-fascist activists in the infamous Leipzig trial – a spectacular public show 
of terror and repression during the first months of the Nazi government. As 
for Davis, she took the recognition as an honor and used it as an opportunity 
to stress the importance of international solidarity among people in struggle. 
From Dimitrov, she said, we’ve learned a lot – “not only how to win in court, 
but like him, we realized that this is not enough. […] The only way to win until 
the end is to unify the progressive forces of our people, and of the entire 
world” (Narodna Mladezh, 20 September 1972). And further, she stressed, 
the road towards the elimination of colonialism and racial oppression was 
the full abolition of capitalism and “the building of a socialist culture” and a 
“socialist way of life.” “What we learned”, she shared, was that “only socialist 
society will give people the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor, and 
that building socialism is the only road towards building a new human and a 
new society” (Narodna Mladezh, 18 September 1972).
A number of African and African-American intellectuals shared this 
idea – that racism and colonialism cannot be uprooted unless capitalism is 
abolished – and that there is a structural juncture between the anti-cap-
italist and anti-colonial struggles, a juncture that was rather obvious to 
many at the time, both in the formerly colonized world as well as in the 
East. These bridges became a way of uprooting the colonial legacy in the 
newly independent countries and tools for resisting the various structures 
that reproduced colonial power. They opened new terrains of alliances and 
tensions and forged transcontinental forms of resistance against capitalist 
development in the North and the West, imperialism, and the reproduction 
of colonial power in the postcolonial contexts. All these were efforts in 
reordering the geographies of power and the circulation of knowledge away 
from the Euro-American capitalist world. 
At the same time, many tensions structure and fracture these political 
landscapes, leaving a conflicting legacy both in the formerly colonized 
countries and in the socialist “East”. The historical experiences of socialism 
during the post-Stalinist period remains strained by the tensions of these 
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contradictions in many ways. This essay offers an observation on these 
discrepant moments as they unfolded in the context of post-Stalinist socialist 
Bulgaria. As I have been studying the discourses and politics of Bulgarian 
ethno-nationalism from the post-Stalinist period, I have noticed its perplex-
ing symbioses with anti-colonial and anti-racist politics, and with national 
liberation movements in the Global South in particular. Paradoxically, the 
country’s global reorientation and realignment with the Third nations from 
the period converged with the politics of repression, erasure, and assimila-
tion of its own minorities. This is embedded in the specific political logics of 
Bulgarian nationalism from the post-Stalinist period. With its subaltern and 
revolutionary elements, its global-humanist orientations, and its commitment 
to socialist modernization and social progress, the nationalist imaginaries of 
the post-Stalinist period constructed historical analogies and political links 
with the anticolonial national liberation movements and their nation-state 
projects in the post-independence contexts. These were often discursive 
metaphorical formations that stretched incompatible historical realities. They 
made Bulgarian post-Stalinist nationalism a manifold environment where 
Fig. 6. The Heath of the South: International Day of Struggle against Colonialism;  
Source: Narodna Mladezh, 21 February 1972. Photo by the Author.
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subaltern and decolonial elements cohabitated with its quasi-colonial and 
Eurocentric logics, an environment that opened grounds for different and 
conflicting political agendas.
Socialist and global: Cold War frameworks  
and alternative methodologies
The anti-colonial and anti-racist politics of the socialist countries during the 
1960s and 1970s have usually been examined through research methodologies 
informed by Cold War political agendas and frameworks, and are often 
discounted as state ideology and blanket anti-American or anti-Western 
propaganda. Generations of scholarship have seen the relations between 
the socialist countries and the postcolonial world through a Cold War political 
framework, emphasizing economic interest and gain, spheres of influence, 
geopolitical competition, and imperialist expansion. Much of it rendered 
the socialist world, and the Soviet Union in particular, as another form of 
imperial power that accumulates, although according to a different political 
logic, economic resources and political influence (Chari and Verdery, 2009; 
for further discussion see Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018). Postcolonial 
and decolonial critiques have similarly neglected the counterhegemonic 
axes of solidarity at the crossroads between the socialist and postcolonial 
worlds. Focused exclusively on First-World/Third-World, South-North, 
and even South-South axes of mobility, they have accepted some of the 
anti-communist premises of Cold War scholarship on socialism and have 
left many unexplored questions around the role of the socialist countries 
in the anti-colonial liberation movements and in forging distinct economic, 
social, and cultural worlds alternative to global capitalist development and 
resistant to Western hegemonies.
A recent body of work in Russian and East European studies positioned 
at the intersection of socialist and postcolonial studies has returned to these 
histories to forcefully challenge existing narratives, opening yet wider horizons 
for decolonizing the historiographies of radical political movements during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Studying the relations between the Second and Third 
Worlds from the late 1950s to the end of the 1980s, this new generation of 
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research theorizes the political dynamics between the socialist world and 
the formerly colonized countries against dominant tropes such as Cold War, 
First World/Third World, or center-periphery binaries, opening yet wider 
horizons for historical revision away from Eurocentric historiographies of 
the global context of the period. 
Displacing East-West and South-North axes of analysis, researchers are 
recovering alternative routes and locations where decolonial politics with 
anti-capitalist visions emerged and thrived. Probing into what she calls 
the blind spots in Black Atlantic and postcolonial studies, Monica Popescu 
expands on Paul Gilroy’s famous study of the transatlantic contours of the 
African diasporic experience and the way it reshaped concepts and cultures 
of modernity (Popescu, 2014). “Black solidarities and cultural alliances were 
not woven only between the African continent, the Americas, and Western 
Europe,” Popescu observes, arguing for a “more capacious understanding 
of the black Atlantic during the 1970s and 80s” (Popescu, 2014: 92-93). 
She joins the collective effort of a growing body of scholarship that traces 
the lost or forgotten journeys of African, Caribbean, and African-American 
intellectuals, political and cultural activists, students, and workers to the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, 
restoring the visibility of these marginalized diasporic cross-continental 
mobilities and their unanticipated openings and challenges (Matusevich, 
2008, 2009a, 2009b; Quist-Adade, 2005; Popescu, 2010, 2014; Engerman, 
2011; Djagalov and Salazkina, 2016; Baldwin, 2002).
Further, David Engerman has argued that the relations between the for-
merly colonized countries and the socialist world, although deeply entangled 
in Cold War politics, cannot easily be explained through the main tropes of 
Cold War political rationality – economic interest and gain, spheres of political 
and economic influence, imperial expansion, and geopolitical competition 
(2011). These relations were not unidirectional but multifaceted, marked by 
a “multipolarity” of interactions and dynamics (Engerman, 2011: 197). In line 
with these inquiries, Djagalov and Salazkina follow the lost footprints of the 
cultural and intellectual convergences of writers, filmmakers, and activists 
from the Global South in the Soviet Union between the 1950 and the 1980s, 
which, they argue, opened terrains for the emergence of a shared discourse 
of Third World film, literature, and culture. They see these convergences as 
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situated at the intersection of multiple hegemonies, as destabilizing fixed 
dynamics and opening new possibilities (Djagalov and Salazkina, 2016: 181-82). 
Dominant frameworks have also seen the newly independent countries, 
from Africa in particular, as passive recipients of aid, expertise, education, 
and various forms of support delivered by the socialist countries in patronizing 
ways, folding the formerly colonized countries into the developmentalist 
frameworks of the socialist governments. But scholars have challenged 
these accounts as well, changing the historical genealogies of dissent in the 
socialist countries (Matusevich, 2008, 2009a; Popescu, 2014; Mark and 
Slobodian, 2018). They show that, on the contrary, students and workers 
of color who came to the socialist countries during and after independence 
became harbingers of modernity and a door to the world for the socialist 
youth in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Matusevich, 2008). Afri-
can students in particular taught the socialist youth much about racism, 
anti-racism, and resistance, generating cultures of non-conformity and 
inspiring protest and various forms of social discontent during the 1960s and 
1970s. In other words, these alternative mobilities brought political energy 
and inspired social radicalism in the socialist East, energizing the socialist 
youth in unpredictable ways, fueling social engagement and political activity 
(Mark and Slobodian, 2018). Through frameworks of socialist solidarity, 
social justice, and duty to the people in struggle around the world against 
racism and colonial rule, against imperialist expansionism, war and milita-
rism, and global inequality – the international vocabulary of the 1960s and 
1970s – the socialist countries forged new global alliances, solidarities, and 
political imaginaries that transcended Cold War and other geopolitical divides 
(Apostolova, 2017). In the socialist countries, these imaginaries shaped a 
new kind of worldliness and a sense of global interconnectedness that was 
both alternative and resistant to capitalist and Western hegemonies. Even 
as they now have been left behind, in the words of David Scott, as the old 
utopias of “past futures” driven into dead-ends by the tragic unfolding of 
their limits, of their national and revolutionary teleologies, their ruptural 
and transformative energies hold the possibility to “reanimate this present 
and even engender in it new and unexpected horizons” (Scott, 2004: 1).
Many tensions structure and fracture this legacy, leaving an incoherent 
and contradictory history both in the formerly colonized countries and in 
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the socialist “East.” For example, scholars have pointed out the unwelcome 
and counteractive effects of the socialist countries’ involvement in the newly 
independent postcolonial nations, their race-blind approaches and the  
failu res of the socialist governments to challenge racism in their own socie ties 
as they opened to the rest of the world (Mark and Slobodian, 2018; Law, 2012; 
Matusevich, 2009a; 2009b; Charles Quist-Adade, 2005; Baldwin, 2002). 
In addition, recent debates have explored some of the tensions present in 
socialist visions of modernity and their global ambitions and travels. On 
the one hand, these modernities were organized around distinctly socialist 
concepts of equality, community, leisure, public access, and social mobility, 
and woven around legacies of anti-capitalist, anti-fascist, anti-colonial, and 
national liberation movements. At the same time, they were committed to 
social progress, modernization, and industrial and infrastructural development 
with their own teleologies and universals, often converging with Eurocentric 
and colonial social and political orders. At times they aligned with Western 
modernity projects while at others departed starkly from them, forging 
social and material contexts that were discontinuous and incompatible, 
while simultaneously retaining uneasy and ghastly continuities (Karkov and 
Valiavicharska, 2018). These moments can be seen as the manifold faces 
of what Michael David-Fox has defined as “multiple” modernities and their 
transcontinental “entanglements,” which the socialist worlds have been 
enmeshed in and have set in motion (David-Fox, 2016).*
Anti-colonial national liberation and Bulgarian 
ethno-nationalism
The international context of the 1960s and 1970s changed socialist Bulgaria’s 
orientation in the global sphere. Unlike the Soviet Union or neighboring 
Yugoslavia, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria was a small socialist country, 
which didn’t have the political and economic resources to exert much 
influence on the international arena on its own. Similar to other socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe, the 1960s and 1970s in Bulgaria were decades 
* In Crossing Borders David-Fox, offers an informative synthesis of the debates on modernity in the last 
thirty years of scholarship in the field of Soviet and socialist history.
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marked by a strong revival of nationalist politics. Bulgarian ethno-nationalism 
from the period propelled ethnic and religious assimilation campaigns 
that reached unfathomable proportions in the 1980s. In the span of three 
decades, the state launched a mass-scale systematic campaign to rename 
minorities who bore Turko-Arabic names, and to suppress their religion, 
languages, and histories. A coercive state-orchestrated effort, the ethno-
national assimilation campaigns were developed in the context of a socialist 
modernization project built on humanist foundations, and from within a 
kind of “progressive” Marxist-humanist socialist discourse.* 
The ethnic assimilations become even more perplexing in the context 
of the strong anti-colonial and anti-racist rhetoric in the socialist public 
sphere from the time, pointing to inconsistencies that raise well-founded 
questions. Paradoxically, Bulgarian socialist politics in support of the 
anti-colonial liberation struggles, the political solidarities and alignments 
with the formerly colonized countries drawn in the public sphere, became 
entangled in the ethno-nationalist politics of the period, converging with 
the assimilation of ethnic and religious minorities within the country. 
How do we explain this paradoxical convergence? Many have been quick to 
attribute these contradictions to the discrepancies between “official ideology” 
and everyday life or the realities of “actually existing socialism”, lamenting the 
hypocrisies of the socialist governments. But these seeming paradoxes were 
already present in the political discourses and their public spheres, in their 
polemical and discursive range. Some of them can be found in the specific 
political logics of Bulgarian nationalism from the post-Stalinist period. 
Nationalism from the 1970s was not the same as the nationalisms from 
the pre-socialist period. National history, in order to be a socialist history, 
had to be rewritten as a people’s history and a revolutionary history, one 
grounded in the stories of oppression and collective struggle. It had to be 
very different from the nationalisms of the pre-socialist, interwar period. 
These “old” nationalisms, which post-Stalinist Marxists called “bourgeois 
chauvinism”, often aligned with the fascist and irredentist agendas of the 
monarchic and pro-authoritarian governments between the two world wars. 
* This is further developed in my forthcoming work on the humanist turn and its relationship to ethno-
nationalism in socialist Bulgaria. For a preliminary elaboration in a comparative study of Bulgarian and 
Yugoslavian ethno-nationalism, see Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018.
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Calling itself “socialist patriotism”, post-Stalinist nationalism changed the 
national narrative to purge it of its “bourgeois” content and its historical 
links to interwar nationalist and fascist movements. It constructed a conti-
nuity of endurance, suffering, and struggle of the ordinary people and the 
oppressed that culminated in the socialist present – a present that had no 
precedent in history because it brought liberation, democracy, and material 
and cultural wealth to the ordinary people (Zhivkova 1982: 519). 
Further, the rise of post-Stalinist nationalism emerged as a kind of cultural 
emancipation from Soviet hegemony. In some sense, nationalist discourse 
from the period was embedded in a politics of resistance both against Stalin-
ism and against Soviet cultural and political influence. It gave post-Stalinist 
humanists the opportunity to displace Soviet-centric histories of the socialist 
revolution as a world-historical phenomenon and to trace an internal geneal-
ogy of revolutionary traditions in the struggles of its own people. It staged a 
competing revolutionary narrative that bypassed the February and October 
Revolutions – after all, the Bulgarian people had their own revolutionary 
traditions. In this sense some aspects of post-Stalinist Bulgarian nationalism 
contained a subaltern element that exhibits some of the complexities and 
contradictions of anti- and postcolonial nationalisms from the period. This 
is particularly legible in the work of Lyudmila Zhivkova, a leading figure who 
shaped the cultural politics of the country in the 1970s. Her writings contain 
a certain kind of awareness of the Bulgarian people as a “minor nation” and 
a “minor people”, and Zhivkova’s work in the sphere of culture was crucial in 
reimagining and reconfiguring the small socialist country in alliance with the 
countries from the Global South, and in exploring links with non-Western 
cultural histories and traditions, especially from Southeast Asia.
But Zhivkova’s work also contains a problematic universalism and a 
commitment to national and patriotic ideals that bear an uneasy rela-
tionship to the ethno-nationalist politics of the period. The post-Sta-
linist nationalist imaginary and its modernizing logics constructed the 
Ottoman past as backward and frozen in time, as the historical agent of 
patriarchal relations, “cultural traditionalism”, and “religious fanaticism.” 
Seen through this lens, Muslims and ethnic minorities and their cultures 
became a remnant of the past, a kind of social and cultural anachronism 
which socialist modernization was to overcome (Neuburger, 2004). In this 
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sense, discourses of socialist modernization, progress, and development 
became a central element in the emerging doctrine of ethno-nationalism.
In this already complex discursive formation, Bulgarian national inde-
pendence (from the Ottoman empire) became the framework that aligned 
post-Stalinist notions of Bulgarian peoplehood with the anti-colonial liberation 
movements and with the oppressed and subjugated people globally. Consid-
ering the hegemonic role of the national idea in anti-colonial revolutionary 
thought, it is not surprising that Lenin’s writings on the national question 
circulated among anti-colonial revolutionaries in Africa during the 1950s and 
1960s. Matthieu Renault’s work brings out the decolonial and anti-imperi-
alist elements in Lenin’s work on national self-determination. Attuned to 
the different political content and contextual meanings of nationalism, the 
difference between “oppressor” and “oppressed” nations, Lenin recognized 
the rebellious anti-imperialist potentials of national self-determination 
movements in the peripheries of the Russian empire – to him, they were 
articulated both against the extractivist and exploitative logic of Russian 
imperialism and against the ethnic and racial supremacy of Russian imperial 
nationalism. As Renault has put it, by recognizing and foregrounding these 
peripheral forces, Lenin “decentered the revolution”. They were heterogeneous 
revolutionary formations which moved according to their own temporalities 
and disrupted Eurocentric linearity and stagism (Renault, 2018). 
But although Lenin’s “right of nations” principle contained anti-impe-
rialist content, it was a product of a different historical context and was 
quite inarticulate when it comes to European colonial racism. Therefore, 
anti-colonial intellectuals and revolutionaries used Lenin alongside the 
work of figures such as Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, and Amilcar Cabral to 
articulate the intersections of racism, colonialism, capitalist accumulation, 
and class power. Similarly, in the context of the socialist 1960s and 1970s, 
the framework of national self-determination and national autonomy did 
not provide appropriate language against the everyday racisms towards 
students and workers of colour who came from the African continent, 
Vietnam, and other parts of the Global South. 
Further, postcolonial critics of the nation have spoken out about the  
pitfalls and paradoxes of national consciousness as it organized the anti- 
colonial imaginaries during the period of decolonization, of the dead-
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ends and disastrous political consequences of the nation-state both as 
an anti-colonial vision of political sovereignty and as a political and social 
organization of postcolonial societies. These analyses have relevance for the 
Bulgarian post-Stalinist context. This is not to brush over, in an ahistorical 
fashion, the specificities of these two historical realities and their distinct 
political logics, as Maria Todorova has carefully warned us (Todorova, 2010). 
They are important precisely because some part of Bulgarian nationalism 
from the 1970s somewhat incongruently recognized itself in the national 
independence projects in the postcolonial world. The work of Partha Chat-
terjee and Arif Dirlik, among others, reminds us that the national form in 
the postcolonial contexts, even as it mobilized much of the anti-colonial 
imaginary, was a European colonial paradigm both empirically, as it imposed 
uniform political administrations and homogeneous national cultures, and 
ideologically, as nations replicated the cultural and political imaginaries of 
the colonizers which were utterly unfitted for the social and cultural realities 
of the former colonies (Dirlik, 2002; Chatterjee, 1984). Postcolonial nations 
too experienced the violence of homogenization and erasure, of ethnic and 
religious partitioning while constructing their national cultures and histories, 
all in the name of independence, modernization, social justice, and democracy. 
As Dirlik observes: 
The tragedy of anticolonial revolutionary nationalism has been that it was 
condemned almost from the beginning to replicate the practices of the colonialists 
in their very efforts at nation building… The colonialism of nation building is most 
starkly obvious, as the very idea of the nation, and the way it was imagined, was 
already stamped with the legacy of the very colonialism it sought to overthrow 
(Dirlik, 2011: 437).
Chatterjee has cautioned against seeing anti- and postcolonial nationalisms 
as simple derivatives of European models – such a move takes away, once 
again, the political agency and imagination from the colonized. He reads In -
dian nationalism as the hegemonic project of the middle classes among the 
local populations which occupied an ambivalent position – “of subordination  
in one relation and… of dominance in another”. “The construction of 
hegemonic ideologies”, Chatterjee continues, “typically involves the cultural 
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efforts of classes placed precisely in such situations” (Chatterjee, 1993: 36). 
But as Dirlik has also pointed out, the political alternatives to capitalism 
in the postcolonial worlds, ideas of economic and social justice, democracy, 
material and social equality, and social mobility, for the most part also 
succumbed to the political form of national self-determination and national 
sovereignty (Dirlik, 2011: 438). Left-reformist and “revisionist” ideas and move-
ments in socialist countries such as Bulgaria similarly embraced nationalism, 
particularly during the years of post-Stalinism, resonating with subaltern 
nationalist trends in the postcolonial world. It is interesting to consider that 
to some activists, in particular to those situated in the United States at the 
time, the anti-Stalinist movements in Eastern Europe and the anti-colonial 
revolutions in the South were part of the same world-historical upheaval 
threaded by a certain kind of humanism (Valiavicharska, 2017; Scott, 2004: 
29). In Bulgaria, the merger of socialist humanism, socialist modernization, 
and the national idea with its quasi-subaltern elements had another side: it 
propelled ethnic assimilations, mass renamings, departures, expulsions, and 
caused large-scale displacement to ethnic and religious minorities. It has 
led to state-driven erasures of minority histories, lineages and languages –  
all in the name of socialist modernization, equality, humanism, and social 
progress. It could be that post-Stalinist nationalism was consolidated as 
the hegemonic narrative of the country’s political, cultural, and intellectual 
elites, while the internal tensions of its content wеre a reflection of their 
ambivalent, twofold position in the social and geopolitical hierarchies within 
the country and in the global sphere.
These historical and contemporary revolutionary imaginaries converged 
in post-Stalinist socialist Bulgaria on the basis of a shared nationalism. 
They allowed for the construction of symbolic, political, and historical 
continuities between national independence movements in the Balkans 
from the 19th century and the anti-colonial national liberation struggles 
in Africa from the second half of the 20th. Bulgarian political discourse 
during the period, anchored in a narrative of centuries-long oppression 
under Ottoman rule and a history of national liberation struggles from 
the mid- to late 19th century, constructed a shared historical experience 
with the people in struggle from the Third World, and opened possibilities 
for political self-identifications with the colonized people and their own 
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“natsionalno-osvoboditelni borbi” (national liberation movements). In this 
context, the political uses of anti-racist and anti-colonial discourses in Bulgaria 
were recycled within an ethno-nationalist framework to form a symbiosis 
specific to the ethno-national narrative of post-Stalinist socialism. This is 
evident in the way terms such as robstvo or igo (slavery/yoke) forcefully 
reappeared in constructions of the Ottoman period in literature, public 
discourse, and even in scholarship during the post-Stalinist period. Those 
familiar with the historical and cultural reincarnations of nationalist tropes 
in Bulgaria know that, while part of the lexicon of the 1970s, they draw on 
historical and literary narratives from the 18th and 19th centuries that had a 
central role in shaping Bulgarian national consciousness. It is no coincidence 
that this language was picked up and amplified in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
stories, news, and voices of the anti-colonial liberation struggles echoed 
in the Bulgarian public sphere. 
These symbolic, political, and historical connections couldn’t be made 
more direct in a speech party leader Todor Zhivkov gave in 1969, when a 
delegation of Bulgarian politicians visited India to discuss economic and 
cultural collaboration between the two countries.
Please allow me to assure you that the Bulgarian people feel the same kind of 
sympathies and respect for the great multi-million Indian people. Centuries of 
struggles against foreign domination developed in our people not only a deep 
empathy towards the people in struggle for their freedom and independence, but 
a clearly expressed, actual solidarity with them. The Bulgarian people followed 
the oscillations of your struggle. It is familiar with and honors the activists in 
your national independence movement. This year Bulgaria will celebrate the 
centennial anniversary of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi, the great leader of 
India in its struggle against colonial yoke. Our people remember also the great 
statesperson and political leader, one of the followers and tireless activists against 
the colonial system, fighter for national independence and social progress, for 
peace and solidarity among the peoples – Djawaharlal Nehru. […] The emergence 
of independent India was one of the greatest events in our times… The once mighty 
global colonial system is now falling apart. The day is coming when the fires of 
national liberation struggles will burn the last flags of shameful colonialism. But 
both we, and you, and everyone who has waged a costly struggle for their national 
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Todor Zhivkov and Bulgarian delegation on an official visit to India;  
Source: Narodna Mladezh, January 24, 1969. Photo by the author.
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and social liberation, we know: that in 
this world we will not get anything for 
free, that everything has to be fought 
for and defended (Narodna Mladezh 
1969: 1, 4).
These political analogies have found 
multiple expressions in the visual and 
monumental arts from the period – 
just one striking example is the 
sculptural composition Robstvo 
[Yoke/Slavery] from the Bratska 
Mogila in Plovdiv, depicting the 
suffering of the Bulgarian people 
under Ottoman rule (Fig. 8). The 
scene is part of a remarkable archi-
tectural ensemble from 1974, which 
narrates, in a sequence of nineteen 
monumental sculptural compositions, 
the revolutionary history of the Bul-
garian people as constructed from the 
perspective of the 1970s: a nationalist 
history reimagined and rewritten 
through the socialist present. The sculptural compositions, nested in the 
base of a lotus-like concrete structure, organize a circular motion and an 
experience that is at once a ritual movement, an act of commemoration, 
an inauguration into a historical narrative, and an orchestrated affective 
journey. The monument is now abandoned, and although it is currently in the 
“custody” of Plovdiv’s History Museum and receives minimal protection and 
maintenance, much of it had been destroyed or plundered earlier. Yet all the 
damage, abuse, and neglect that the monument has suffered throughout the 
years, all the graffiti and litter that perpetually cover it, cannot suppress the 
wondrous otherworldliness of the place and the sacred and spiritual energy 
it summons. It is, after all, a temple, a tomb built to harbour the memory of 
young communist and anti-fascist partisans killed in the battlefields near 
Fig. 8. Lyubomir Dalchev, Ana Dalcheva, and Petar 
Atanasov, the scene Robstvo [Yoke/Slavery], in 
its original state, from the architectural-sculptural 
ensemble Bratska Mogila, Plovdiv, 1974; Source: 
Veneta Ivanova, Bulgarska Monumentalna Skulptura: 
Razvitie i Problemi (Sofia: Bulgarski Hudozhnik, 1978); 
Photo by Mihail Enev.
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Plovdiv during WWII. It is a place where their spirits hover and some of their 
remains lie, in a wall of metal urns in the back of the interior.  
Plovdiv’s Bratska Mogila deserves a detailed, careful study and interpreta-
tion, not to mention careful reconstruction. It has captured post-Stalinist  
visions of socialism, nationhood, and their global entanglements in remarkable 
ways – the forms, the symbolic and narrative content of this syncretic structure 
have arrested the conflicting political logics of the post-Stalinist era and its 
worldly entanglements in all their monumentality and tension. The subaltern 
and revolutionary elements of Bulgarian post-Stalinist nationalism played a 
crucial role in repositioning socialist Bulgaria in political solidarity with the 
newly independent nations from the global South, while also shaping the 
socialist people’s political self-identifications with the Third world. However, 
the faith in development and modernization, the teleologies of revolution 
and social progress contained in the nationalist and humanist imaginaries 
of the post-Stalinist era colluded with West-European colonial frameworks. 
They converged with Eurocentric colonial hegemonies and ethnocentric 
visions of peoplehood, and were open to political uses with Eurocentric and 
ethno-centric agendas. These contradictory moments echo discordantly 
the dead-ends of some postcolonial nation-state projects and their socialist 
designs. Yet they also present a picture unique to the historical context 
of post-Stalinist socialism, capturing the spectrum of political forces that 
contained and refracted the tensions of the era.
Bibliography 
Fig. 9. Bratska Mogila as of July 2018, with the scene Robstvo in the back. Photo by the Author. 
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Image Description: 
Return of the militaristic monument built in 1934, during the 
authoritarian military regime of Kimon Georgiev. The shield 
that the lion holds shows the map of San Stefano Bulgaria – 
an imaginary construction of “all Bulgarian lands” that has 
mobilized irredentist nationalist projects during all state wars 
between 1912 and 1944; Source
Bozhin Traykov
ideological crusaders of the 
Bulgarian passive revolution 
versus socio-economic reality
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T he crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. (Gramsci, 1971: 276)
Almost three decades after Francis Fukuyama announced the “end of 
history” with the Soviet demise, in a recent interview he reneged on 
his own optimism stating that “socialism ought to come back” (Eaton, 
2018).* Why is one of the biggest advocates of neoliberalism having 
second thoughts about this form of late capitalism? The shock therapy 
of price liberalization, privatization and deregulation of the economy 
that was prescribed as a remedy to East European countries in their 
transformation from socialism** to neoliberal capitalism has in some 
cases led to a repetition of history rather than its end. Sociologist Vassil 
Prodanov claims that in Bulgaria’s case the country’s socio-economic 
conditions came to resemble the 19th rather than 21st century (1999). 
Deregulation, privatization, liberalization of prices and governments’ cutting 
of social welfare programmes brought drastic inflation and poverty to the 
majority of citizens (Tsanov et al., 2013). Bulgaria’s years of neoliberal 
transformation have been more devastating than the two Balkan Wars 
and World War I put together (Prodanov, 2007). 
 Bulgaria, a former loyal satellite of the Soviet Union, is a member of 
NATO since 2004 and of the EU since 2007. At the same time, it is the 
poorest member of the EU with а poverty level far exceeding that of other 
member states (Atanasov, 2018; Kurtev, 2018). According to Leo Panitch 
and Sam Gindin, in the global dominance of capitalism, the US play the 
role of an “informal empire, which integrates all the capitalist powers 
into an effective system of coordination” (2004: 9). In this system the 
decision makers of the EU are part of the global net of capitalism with its 
headquarters in the US. The current social, political and economic situa-
tion in Bulgaria, therefore, is a direct result of the New World Order – an 
* I would like to thank Petar Bankov, Philipp Lottholz and Polina Manolova for their valuable help with this paper.
** In accordance with scholars in the field such as Katherine Verdery and Caroline Humphry I use the term 
“socialism” instead of “Communism”. As emphasized by Verdery, the Soviet bloc countries “were governed by 
Communist parties but identified themselves as socialist republics on the path to true Communism” (1996: 
235) When Communism is used in the context of the ideological narrative of the self-identified Bulgarian 
anti-communist intellectuals, I use that word.
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attempt for American global capitalist domination, achieved by installing 
neoliberal regimes of governance (Robinson, 2003; Harvey, 2005). 
This paper is concerned with the questions as to why and how was the 
dominance of neoliberalism, characterized by extreme social inequality, 
achieved and sustained in a society that only until recently was fairly 
egalitarian? Furthermore, what are the larger political consequences of this 
dominance? How was the position of Bulgaria as a peripheral state in the 
Global North sustained and how did this position contribute to the dominance 
of the neoliberal regime? By employing the concepts of hegemony, “passive 
revolution” and “coloniality of power” I am tracing the role of the Bulgarian 
intellectual elites in the process of transformation of state and society. My 
focus on elites becomes clear when I discuss Antonio Gramsci’s understanding 
of the function of intellectuals in society. In addition to policies of neolib-
eral regimes, the paper traces mechanisms of establishing and sustaining 
peripherality through the production of particular ideological discourses, 
such as the “return to Europe” and anti-communism. As I will show, the 
decolonial analytical framework proposed by Anibal Quijano (2000) and 
captured in the term “coloniality of power” presents a useful extension of 
Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony theory and Marxist critique of capitalism. This 
is because Quijano develops a clear perspective on the colonial origin and 
the sustained colonial logic of the global capitalist system. He emphasizes 
how the latter uses instruments of domination that work through violence 
and exclusion and are based on class, race, ethnicity and gender. He is also 
concerned with the justification that the global capitalist system provides 
for its imperial and colonial aspiration through the usage of an Eurocentric 
epistemological and ontological knowledge. I discuss the three concepts and 
their interrelatedness before turning to the analysis of the Bulgarian context. 
Hegemony and passive revolution
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony was an attempt to understand why after 
World War I the working class in the West failed to overcome the capitalist 
system through revolution, and instead swayed towards fascism. In Grasmci’s 
analysis society is made of many groups – social classes. The process of 
104
hegemony occurs when a dominant class emerges and contests the old order. 
The hegemony of the dominant class always requires the building of alliances 
with subordinate groups to create a “homogenous politico-economic historical 
bloc” (Gramsci, 1971: 168). Hegemony depends on “[t]he ‘spontaneous’ 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (ibid: 12). In an 
ideal type hegemony consent is achieved when all classes accept an ideology, 
or a shared system of ideas and beliefs, which serve to justify the rule of 
the dominant class, so that its power remains unchallenged. This ideology 
becomes the “natural order of things” and is perceived as common sense 
by all. His classic example of hegemony is that of the Jacobins in France as 
a revolutionary party that mobilized all classes against the old elite and to 
a great extent included them in the political process. The role of assuring 
consent is reserved for civil society. These are institutions and organizations 
such as churches, schools, the press, trade unions, and all the rest “which 
created in people certain modes of behavior and expectations consistent 
with the hegemonic social order” (Cox, 1983: 164). 
 The concept of hegemony is in a dialectical relationship to that of 
the passive revolution. Passive revolution pertains to concrete historical 
instances in which aspects of the social relations of capitalist development 
are either instituted or expanded (Morton, 2010: 315). Gramsci borrows the 
term passive revolution from Vincenzo Cuoco who uses it to describe the 
Italian revolution. He expands this concept by applying it to other countries 
where state modernization occurs without radical Jacobin-type revolution. 
In Gramsci’s work passive revolution is an elitist top-down process, which 
does not bring about revolutionary change in class relations. The mobilization 
of popular support, or what Gramsci terms “the great popular masses” is 
used but then the majority of people is not included in the political process 
and their demands are ignored (Gramsci, 1971). As he points out, passive 
revolutions are incapable of sustaining hegemony for a longer duration, 
because of the lack of mass social support; the ruling elite rules through 
the state in a top-down manner, excluding democratic participation of all 
social classes. That renders the hegemony of the ruling elite fragile, because 
it cannot rely on a strong socio-economic base. Gramsci writes that the 
“State replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle of renewal” 
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(1971: 105-106). In this case, the use of other mechanisms of control, such 
as political clientelism is necessitated. Gramsi’s concept of transformism 
analyzes a particular form of political clientelism – a process of co-option 
of the opposition. In his work, transformism is the convergence of the 
programmes of the Italian political parties after the Risorgimento* to the 
point of lack of any difference between left and right. Hence, according to 
Gramsci, the two main parties disintegrate into cliques and factions and 
this process continues until the rise of fascism (Gramsci, 1971: 58).
Another aspect of passive revolutions is what Gramsci terms Caesa-
rism** – the rule of a dictator-like figures that unites the political process 
to advance certain policies. Crucial for the understanding of the difference 
between radical Jacobin-style revolution and passive revolution, is the 
process of party formation. Whereas the Jacobins дrepresent a mass party 
that incorporates all social classes in the political process, the Caesarist 
figures rule on behalf of the upper class (Gramsci, 1971). Passive revolutions 
rely on mass participation for transformation of state and society but then 
exclude the majority from the decision-making process.
 Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony requires intellectual and  
moral leadership that establishes social consent. The struggle for hegem-
ony of a ruling class happens in the realm of culture and politics in 
civil society and is exercised by those who have the status and social 
function of intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971). Adam David Morton points 
out that particular importance should be given to the material aspects 
of ideology: publishing houses, media, libraries, museums, theaters, 
galleries and even street names (2007: 92). In the next sections, I will 
go into a detailed analysis of the role that Bulgarian intellectuals and 
the material aspects of ideology played in the hegemonic project of the 
neoliberal politico-economic model imposed in the country. Gramsci’s 
notion of hegemony should be understood as dynamic, rather than a 
static process: social alliances that attempt to construct, maintain and 
defend their hegemony can face resistance and contestation by other 
*  An ideological and literary movement that resulted in the national unification of Italy.
** According to Gramsci there can be a progressive and a regressive Caeserism. The progressive Caesarism 
advances the progressive forces, examples are Caesar and Napoleon I, while the regressive one advances 
the regressive forces, example is Napoleon III and Bismarck (1971: 219-221).
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social forces. In the struggle for hegemony intellectuals are at the center 
both as participants in hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles.
 However, the concept of hegemony should not be reduced just to the 
realm of ideology. Morton emphasizes the international aspect in Gramsci’s 
understanding of hegemony; the politico-economic aspect related to the 
system of global capitalism with the expansion on a world scale of a particular 
mode of production. In the historic conjunction of neoliberalism this is the 
mode of flexible accumulation (Harvey, 2005). In that sense, the process 
of deindustrialization of the Bulgarian planned economy that manifested 
itself in the so-called transition towards free market economy should be 
examined as the relationship between core and periphery, characterized 
by uneven development (Morton, 2007). Thus, passive revolution can be 
understood as a project of local elites attempting to secure the hegemony 
of the global politico-economic model (the discourse of experts) and an 
attempt for imposing the ideological hegemony of this model within the 
civil society of the peripheral Bulgarian state.  
The coloniality of power
According to Anibal Quijano, “coloniality of power” is a global model of 
power through which Western Europe and later the United States have 
sustained their hegemony on a global scale (Quijano, 2000). Coloniality 
of power is driven by the rationality of Eurocentrism. Western European 
knowledge production bases its ontological and epistemological fundament 
on the belief in the superiority of the European race. In a very selective 
manner, this race is understood as constituted only by the Northern colonial 
powers and their ideological vanguard – the United States. This model is 
characterized by capitalist social relations and mechanisms of control over 
labour, gender, race and subjectivity (Quijano, 2000; 2007).  
 The control of labour entails categorizing on the basis of race or ethnicity. 
As Quijano writes, Europeans associated unpaid or non-waged labor with 
the dominated races because they were considered “inferior” (2000: 538). 
The hierarchy of peoples with those with Western European roots on top 
helps us understand the lower wages that non-whites, or in the Bulgarian 
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case, non-Western European whites continue to receive for one and same 
labour. The control of subjectivity also impinges on the educational pro-
cess – it requires an education that imposes Western Europe as the creator 
of modernity and rationality, while the rest of the world is relegated to a 
pre-modern stage (2000: 542). Quijano emphasizes that the Eurocentric 
rationality is not exclusive just to Europeans, but can be acquired or at 
least lived up to by all “those educated under its hegemony” (2000: 540). 
Quijano uses the term hegemony in the Gramscian sense discussed earlier, 
arguing that intellectual elites educated in the Global North (Western Europe 
and the US) adapt the “cognitive perspective” of Europeans: “European 
culture was made seductive: it gave access to power” (Quijano, 2007: 169-
170). The rationality of Eurocentrism codifies intersubjective and cultural 
relations between Western Europe and the rest of the world in categories 
that function as binary oppositions: East-West, primitive-civilized, mythic/
magic-scientific, irrational-rational, traditional-modern. In his analysis of 
the Southern question, Gramsci explains how the Italian intellectual strata 
justified the position of South Italy as inherently poor and underdeveloped 
(2000). The reasons used were not the socio-economic conditions of 
capitalism and the North’s domination/power over the South, but nature –  
Southerners were deemed “biologically inferior” and “lazy, criminal and 
barbaric” (Gramsci, 2000: 173). Such explanations fall under the Eurocentric 
discourse of coloniality of power put forward by Quijano. Further below 
in the text, I show how such mechanisms of domination operate in the 
Bulgarian context by focusing on the discourse of “catching up” on the road 
to modernity that has been amongst the most successful strategies of the 
Bulgarian intellectual and political elite.*
I find Quijano’s work on coloniality of power complementary to the critical 
analysis of hegemony, passive revolution and quasi-fascism in Bulgaria. 
The seductive aspect of the power of Eurocentrism that Quijano discusses 
takes its particular form among Bulgarian political and intellectual elites 
who present themselves as leaders and educators of irrational/uncivilized/
undemocratic people. My analysis presents an extension of Quijano’s 
*  The adoption of the need to “catch up” is not only characteristic of the ideological climate after 1989, but 
was prominent ideological postulate during the Sovietization process. An example is Georgi Dimitrov’s famous 
proclamation to do in ten years what capitalism has achieved in one hundred.
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coloniality of power via Gramsci. This becomes apparent when discussing 
Bulgaria’s current entanglement with the US’ military alliances and war 
agendas and similarly in regards to Bulgaria’s alliance with Nazi Germany 
in the past and the denial thereof.
Bulgarian passive revolution
I propose to read the transformation of Bulgaria, known to Bulgarian society 
with the ideological term transition, as a form of passive revolution. David 
Morton writes that passive revolutions can be viewed as mechanisms that 
transform the state, so as to impose capitalist social relations (Morton, 
2010). Rick Simon examines the Russian case of neoliberal transformation,  
employing Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution. He argues that the con-
cept of passive revolution gives insight to the expansion of capitalism from the 
core to the periphery (Simon, 2010: 446). Despite the political establishment’s 
reliance on mass mobilization the transformation of the state is instituted 
in a top-down manner. Reforms are implemented by a small political elite, 
rather than by the “masses”: in the case of the French revolution discussed 
by Gramsci, this happens with the decisive engagement of the radical left 
(sans-culottes) (Thomas, 2009: 147). Thus, passive revolution is an “elite 
engineered social and political reform” that “usually relies on foreign capital 
and associated ideas, while lacking national support” (Morton, 2010: 317). The 
Bulgarian passive revolution is a capitalist restructuring of state and society 
that integrates the country into the Global North as a peripheral state. In 
the context of the former Eastern bloc, the nomenklatura (party elite), did 
not constitute a class, because in a planned economy its members could 
not individually acquire private property or accumulate money as capital 
(ibid: 434). This process was analogous in Bulgaria. The passive revolution 
came in the form of perestroika-style reforms that enabled the formation 
of a ruling capitalist class, formed by parts of the nomenklatura and the 
leaders of organized crime. This class took ownership over the means of 
production while simultaneously enabling the penetration of foreign capital. 
 In the context of (post)socialist Bulgaria, we can identify two periods 
in this process of passive revolution. The first one comprises the ousting 
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of the dictator Todor Zhivkov and the coming of Gorbachev-style political 
figures to the front, such as Andrey Lukanov and Petar Mladenov, from 
within the Politburo (Executive Committee) of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party (BKP) (renamed into Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in 1990). This 
period prepares the conditions for the massive privatization that takes 
place in the second stage. In its predatory execution this privatization takes 
the form of violent primitive accumulation of public and state assets (see 
Traykov, 2018). The first period lasts approximately from the end of 1989 
until the winter of 1997. In the winter of 1997 mass unrest erupts, prompted 
by hyperinflation and the unwillingness or inability of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) to quell the rise of organized crime.* The second stage of 
the Bulgarian passive revolution brings about the Caesarist figure of Ivan 
Kostov and is characterized by neoliberal reforms of a shock therapy type. 
While in the first years the transformation had the euphoric support of 
the majority,** its consequences, mostly felt in the second period – violent 
primitive accumulation and class polarization, rendered the sustainment 
of the hegemony of the neoliberal model quite arduous. Since the early 
2000s, subsequent governments implemented even more severe neo-
liberal policies that were hard to push through in the core of the Global 
North. Shock therapy was followed by a shift from progressive taxation to 
flat tax (2008), pension privatization (2002) and ongoing dismantling of 
universal healthcare, all of which did not occur as a result of public debate, 
but on the contrary, were imposed in a top-down fashion with the help of 
* BSP was instrumental during the first period in ensuring that the reforms would be introduced and will be 
of benefit for its elite. During the 1990s a split within the party took place between the nostalgic preservers 
of the party left-wing ideals (“red grannies”) and its rising business-oriented leadership (“red cell phones”), 
(Asenov & Rudnikova, 1995) that indicated the emergence of a capitalist class from the old nomenklatura.
** When 1989 saw an end to Zhivkov’s authoritarian rule, a massive democratization movement emerged in 
Bulgaria that was similar to the ones in Latin America and Central Europe. The rise of social movements that 
confronted the authoritarian regimes in East Europe were presented in US media (e.g. New York Times) as a 
triumph of Western, particularly American values over communist orthodoxy (Carregee, 2003: 300). The media 
completely ignored the various elements that characterized the movements of Eastern Europe. Both Sparks 
(2005) and Carregee (2003) document strong commitment to participatory democracy and social democratic 
sentiments that characterized Poland’s Solidarity movement, as well as its equivalents in Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany. As Sparks and Carregee point out the participants in the social movements strived for 
a political and economic transformation and a path to democracy that differed largely from the neoliberal 
shock therapy programs. In 1991 polls revealed that 62% of Bulgarians were in favour of social-democratic 
system based on the Swedish model, while only 12.3% favoured US-style free market capitalism (cited in 
Vassilev, 2003: 102).
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a complacent media. The Bulgarian state became characterized by high 
levels of distrust towards the political elite and parliamentary politics. A 
public opinion poll by the European Commision shows that in 2007, when 
Bulgaria entered the EU, only 7% trusted political parties, while 78% of the 
population tended to doubt their integrity. In 2017 the situation was not 
much different, 13% tended to trust the parties (this rise of 6% could be 
explained with the increased tendencies of clientelism within the ruling 
political party, GERB and its allies in parliament), while 77% continue to 
mistrust them.* We can argue that after the initial confrontation between 
BSP and ODS (United Democratic Forces)** during the first stage, with the 
formation of NDSV (National Movement Simeon the Second) a process of 
what Gramsci defines as transformism began during the second stage. In 
this sense, the initial ideological confrontation between BSP and ODS in 
the 1990s was followed by transformism. BSP, the supposedly socialist 
Bulgarian party, moved away from its internal conflict and carried out some 
of the most damaging neoliberal reforms during the mid-2000s, such as 
the imposition of the flat tax and pension privatization, mentioned above.
To summarize, one of the major consequences of the restructuring from 
planned to market economy in Bulgaria was the brutal process of deindus-
trialization that came about as a result of the dismantling of horizontally and 
vertically integrated state enterprises (Chalаkov et al., 2010). That process 
should be analyzed as a mechanism of the coloniality of power, due to the 
instrumental role of foreign expertise that the political and intellectual elite 
took for granted. The devastating process of deindustrialization coupled 
with hyperinflation brought about economic and political crisis by the mid-
1990s. In 1997 Bulgaria accepted an IMF currency board, making Bulgaria’s 
financial system dependent on foreign institutions. Under the guidance of 
the IMF and the World Bank, the country implemented structural adjustment 
programmes that brought about drastic class disparity, one that continues 
to characterize Bulgarian society to the present day.
* http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/18/groupKy/85
?fbclid=IwAR2V3AKWPoNCpUhEI6GGdCTtL_dGWrRqbzlDaUWynouhTekln8X6MC_5KlA
**  These were the two major political opponents, known as the ex-communists and the democrats, or the 
“red” and the “blue”. They dominated the parliament in the first years after 1989, along with the Movement 
of Rights and Freedoms (DPS), also known as the Turkish Party.
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Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, but as the poorest 
member in the EU, lacking strong economic base, its membership in those 
supranational structures further embedded its peripherality within the Global 
North. Bulgaria’s subordinate position required convincing the majority of 
a new common sense, i.e. accepting the new postsocialist realities: class 
polarization, poverty, and deindustrialization, foreign exploitation of human 
and natural resources, etc. Yet, an ideological framework that permitted the 
implementation of such policies already existed. The next section offers a 
distinctive perspective for reading the formation of this new common sense 
while searching for its Eurocentric roots. Bulgarian liberal intellectuals were 
pivotal in this respect, as in the tradition of Eastern Europe they took up 
the teleological position of protectors of democracy and the free market. 
Demonizing the past to justify the present
The transition in Bulgaria required ideological persuasion and was more of a 
political than an economic process. In other words, society had to be persuaded 
to accept certain models and ideas that were developed in the core of the 
Global North.  Since November 1989, the newly formed Bulgarian liberal elite 
became the main producer of intellectual knowledge; self-proclaimed leaders 
of civil society in academia, NGOs, think thanks and media, stood next to 
former ideologues of the Bulgarian Communist Party, or those linked to it, in 
one way or another (Lavergne, 2010)*. An important corollary here is Gramsci’s 
understanding of intellectuals as “the entire social stratum which exercises an 
organizational function in the wide sense – whether in the field of production, 
culture, or in that of political administration” (1971: 97).  Anthropologist 
Kate Krehan writes that Gramsci was not morally assessing intellectuals as 
*In the current context key aspects of Bulgarian civil society, as understood by Gramsci, would be media, 
NGOs, think tanks, academic and cultural institutions, where intellectual work is produced. Some prominent 
liberal intellectuals include: in academia the circle around Todor Zhivkov’s daughter Lyudmila, the historian 
Alexander Kiossev, cultural studies professor Ivaylo Ditchev, the political scientist Evgeniy Dainov, the 
professor of literature Miglena Nikolchina; the founders of prominent think tanks –  Ivaylo Znepolski from 
the influential anti-communist Institute for Research of the Recent Past (IRRP), Ivan Krastev from the Center 
for Liberal Strategies (CLS), Krassen Stanchev from the Institute for Market Economy (IME), and Ognyan 
Minchev from Institute for Regional and International Research (IRIR).
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social stratum with a specific function, because he saw them in their specific 
historical context, in a specific time and place. Therefore, we should see 
them not as ‘the entire social stratum…’ but as “specific intellectuals…located 
within specific knowledge-producing institutions and practices” and we 
should explore “the links those institutions and practices have to particular 
classes” (Krehan 2016: 35). The postsocialist Bulgarian intellectual elite has 
formed and functioned as a gatekeeper of the common sense carved out by 
the neoliberal reformers of state and society. In that aspect, its explanatory 
narratives of the recent past should be read in relation to their function as 
gatekeepers of that common sense. Or, in their own ideological language, 
as democracy and free market agents (used interchangeably, as if one does 
not contradict the other).
 The so-called transition to free market and democracy was the core 
project of the newly established intellectual elite in both Bulgaria and other 
Central and East European Countries (CEECs). The narrative of transition as a 
system of knowledge (Verdery, 1996) has to be interrelated to the Thatcherite 
common sense that “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) to neoliberalism. TINA 
became a hegemonic discourse in the West and, after the Soviet demise, 
rapidly spread throughout Eastern Europe. The euphoria after the fall of 
state socialism, and the popular enthusiasm for markets and democracy 
in CEECs, combined with the apparent victory of neoliberal capitalism in 
the West during the belle époque of US dominance in the 1990s (Arrighi, 
1994), turned the neoliberal discourse of transition into the new common 
sense in the former Eastern bloc. How this occurred in the case of Bulgaria 
will be discussed in the following sections.
 To further justify the present so-called transition to free market and 
democracy, the socialist past had to be demonized. To do this, and to 
delegitimize the victory of the Communist party that came to power in 1944, 
historians of postsocialism needed to expose the socialist period as tyran-
nical. Therefore, one of the key aspects of the attack on the recent past was 
that of denial of the history of class struggle in the country. Todor Hristov 
points out how the postsocialist historiography had to narrate a story of 
the secret war of a tyrannical minority (communists) against its own nation, 
a war that aimed to capture with violence and lies power over its existence 
(2013: 458). The revisionist interpretation of socialism in Bulgarian historio-
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graphy presents a quite romantic image of the past before the so-called 
Communist coup of 1944. This romantic image downplays the authoritarian 
way in which the country was ruled almost throughout the whole period 
between the two World Wars. For example, in a recent interview historian 
Georgi Markov describes Boris III, the Bulgarian king of the interwar period, 
as “an extraordinary diplomat” and the statesman that achieved “national 
unification” and “saved Bulgaria’s Jews” (Markov, 2018)*. Stefan Groueff’s 
book Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III popularized the image of 
the monarch, shortly before his son, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, arrived 
in the Bulgarian political scene in 2000. Groueff, a political refugee, whose 
father was Chief of the Cabinet of King Boris III, paints a rather sympathetic, 
somewhat tragic image of the king. On the other hand, the repressions and 
violence of the Bulgarian right-wing dictatorships, brought about by military 
coups, the harsh socio-economic conditions, the antagonistic cultural and 
political climate during the authoritarian monarchist regime of the interwar 
period are not taken into account. 
 This romanticization of the Bulgarian monarchy plays with nostalgic feelings, 
but also functions as part of the discourse of a return to Europe, typical of the 
countries of Central Europe and imported from there by the Bulgarian liberal 
elite. In the years of late socialism dissident intellectuals from East Central 
Europe mobilized the discourse as a strategy to cut ties with the Soviet Union, 
by playing on the binary opposition of West versus East (Falk, 2003: 412). 
The demonization of the Bulgarian socialist regime required its interpretation 
as a standstill period that had deviated the country from its historical path 
to modernity. The “return to Europe” discourse was particularly pronounced 
during the presidency of Petar Stoyanov and Ivan Kostov’s government from 
1997-2001, when Bulgaria was making strenuous efforts to become a member 
of the NATO military alliance and the EU. The ODS government of Ivan Kostov 
is known for launching shock therapy reforms, characterized by rapid and 
equally corrupt privatization (Traykov, 2018). Mitchell Orenstein and Hilary 
* Presenting the occupation of parts of Yugoslavia and Greece, claimed by nationalists as Bulgarian, as 
national unification, is a trope in Bulgarian historiography since 1989. The narrative of the saving of the 
Bulgarian Jews is only partially true. About 50,000 Jewish people inside the Third Bulgarian Kingdom were 
not sent to concentration camps, due to the pressure of Bulgarian civil society and political opposition to 
the pro-German government of PM Bogdan Filov. However, the Jews from the occupied territories were all 
transported to the Nazi camps.
114
Apple write that “the enticement of full membership” was the carrot with which 
the EU forced neoliberal reforms on reluctant governments in countries like 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (2018: 24).
 By directly drawing on the return to Europe discourse, President Stoy-
anov introduced the narrative of the civilizational choice that Bulgaria had 
to make. This trope continued to emerge in media and public discourse 
long after Stoyanov’s presidency. In an interview for TV Evropa in 2011, 
sociologist Mira Radeva stated that during Stoyanov’s presidency “Bulgaria 
made an enormous, historical, revolutionary civilizational choice”.* At the 
core of the civilizational choice narrative is the dichotomy between West/
Europe, that signifies civilization, modernity, progress and the future, and 
East/Russia that signifies the backwardness of the communist past. This 
dichotomy further leads to the opposition between other ideological terms –  
individualism/open society/modern versus communism/closed society/
non-modern. Stoyanov’s rhetorical strategy used interchangeably the need 
for membership in NATO and EU as guarantee that the proper civilizational 
choice will be made. Those who questioned the need for membership in 
a supranational military organization under the control of the US were 
dismissed as belonging to the totalitarian past. As was mentioned above, 
many who were discontented with the neoliberal policies and the geopolitical 
orientation of the state were mocked and ridiculed as “red grannies”, to 
signify their belonging to the past. We can look at Stoyanov’s civilizational 
choice, i.e. the choice to follow the so-called Euro-Atlantic values, as a 
variant of Thatcher’s TINA. The consequences of the choice materialized 
in the following events: the bombing of Yugoslavia during the late 1990s 
and the subsequent participation of Bulgarian soldiers in the US wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the establishment of US military bases on 
Bulgarian soil since the early 2000s. The bombing of Yugoslavia continued 
for 78 days in 1999. According to Human Rights Watch there were between 
428 and 529 civilian casualties, while the Serbian government claims that 
at least 2500 were killed.** From 2003 to 2008 Bulgaria sent 500 Bulgar-
* http://www.petarstoyanov.com/bg/petar-stoyanov-v-mediite/petyr-stoqnov-naj-populqrnata-lichnost-
na-prehoda
** https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/
serbia-remembers-nato-bombing-victims-03-24-2016
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ian soldiers to Iraq, 13 of whom died. Currently, Bulgaria has around 600 
soldiers in Afghanistan. As a member of NATO Bulgaria is also expected to 
participate in a potential conflict between the US and Russia by virtue of 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
 Two key aspects and the interrelation between them need to be taken 
into account when discussing the way in which anti-communism operates 
as public discourse and as an interpretative scheme: the presentation of 
the whole period of socialism (1944-1989) as totalitarian and, secondly, 
the reluctance to recognize the regime between the two World Wars as 
fascist. The demonization of the socialist state and the Communist party, 
before and after its coming to power in 1944, as well as the downplaying 
or denial of fascism serve as mechanisms for establishing the common 
sense of peripheral capitalism in Bulgaria. Left-wing positions, such as 
concerns for social and economic inequality, social justice, etc. are com-
monly associated with the repression of totalitarianism, while the refusal 
to treat Bulgaria’s fascist past in the same manner, makes extreme right 
ideas permissible in society. 
Criminalizing communism 
There have been several attempts to criminalize assessments of the past 
that do not follow the strict anti-communist cannon. On 26th of April 
2000 the parliament passed a law that declared the communist regime 
criminal. This law was supported by the ruling United Democratic Forces 
(ODS) (Kostov’s center-right coalition), as well as by the liberal Movement 
of Rights and Freedoms (DPS). Тhe law has had only symbolic significance 
and has functioned as a declaration. According to it, the communist regime 
has “destroyed the traditional values of European civilization” and has led 
to “a national catastrophe” (cited in Baeva and Kalinova, 2011: 222). On 9th 
of September 2004 the parliament passed a declaration marking “the 60th 
anniversary of the establishment of the Communist regime in the country” 
(ibid). The text claimed that with the establishment of communism “the 
European path chosen by the builders of modern Bulgaria [italics mine] 
was interrupted, which lagged our progress for decades” (ibid: 224)
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These declarations work as ideological exercises on three levels. On a first level, 
the narrative insists that there was a destruction of something defined as the 
values of universal European civilization. However, the historical reality of Europe 
from the 1920s to 1940s is that of the rise of various authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes and the suppression of those fighting them, such as anti-fascists and 
partisans. In 1938, 16 out of 27 European states had authoritarian or totalitarian 
dictatorships (Poppetrov, 2008: 5) and Bulgaria is not an exception. Despite the 
debates over the existence of fascism, the country was an ally of Nazi Germany 
and no self-respecting historian denies the existence of political movements 
and organizations with ideologies sympathetic to Nazism and fascism in that 
period. Claims to the opposite mask the enormous socio-economic and political 
turmoil interrelated with class antagonisms in Europe between the two World 
Wars. They also diminish the role of anti-fascist forces. The phrase “Builders of 
Modern Bulgaria” comes as a direct usage from Simeon Radev’s book with the 
same title. Radev was a diplomat in the Third Bulgarian Kingdom (1878-1944) 
and a publicist whose book documents the political process in the first decade 
of the nation-state. The use of this particular title exemplifies the Eurocentric 
notion that the political elite of the 19th century had to be European builders 
who followed some universal European civilizational model. Such a claim in 
an official political document shows how the discourse of coloniality of power 
operates in a region peripheral to European powers such as the Balkans. 
On a second level, in order to affirm the “return to Europe” narrative, the 
political establishment had to negate the notion of socialism as a project of 
modernity by employing the binary opposition East versus West. There-
fore, the statement that communism led to “decades of lagging behind” 
denies the Soviet model as a project of modernity. While the violence on 
a massive scale and the repressions of the Stalinist era (1945-56) should 
not be neglected, the results of the socialist modernization are evident. 
The industrialization that Bulgaria underwent from the 1950s onwards was 
followed by a process of rapid decrease of inequality, illiteracy and provision 
of universal healthcare. By 1988, a year before the end of Zhivkov’s regime 
Bulgaria’s Gini index was 22 (Tsanov et al., 2013), closer to the one of EU 
countries. In comparison, by 2017 the Gini coefficient rose to 40.2 (Atanasov, 
2018), which made Bulgaria the only country in the EU with a Gini index 
above 40, thus bringing it closer to the Third rather than the First World.
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On a third level, the criminalization of the past is directly related to the “return 
to Europe” discourse associated with the “civilizational choice” of membership 
in NATO and the EU. A recent manifestation of this effort was a declaration 
by five non-parliamentary represented parties demanding the persecution 
of “those who deny the criminal character of the communist regime” and 
which at the same time insists that Bulgaria should be “a proud member 
of NATO”.* Here, it becomes apparent how the attempts to demonize the 
past of the socialist state go hand in hand with the justification of Bulgaria’s 
participation in a military alliance, as part of which Bulgaria was involved in 
the bombing of a neighbouring country (Yugoslavia) twenty years ago. It is 
important to keep in mind that this declaration has been produced amidst 
the ongoing hostilities between the US and Russia. In December 2010 the 
foreign ministers of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary 
and Romania made an attempt to pass a law throughout EU member 
states that criminalizes communism in the same way as Nazism.** Perhaps, 
sensing the danger that the criminalization of communism can bring about 
a denial of the role of the USSR in defeating fascism and Nazism, as well as 
diminishing of the history of anti-fascist struggles in Europe, the attempt 
faced the opposition of West European countries. 
We see that so far efforts to criminalize the past have been unsuccessful. 
Their symbolic significance as part of ideological war of position, however, 
should not be underestimated. As I demonstrate later in the text with the 
example of the monument of the victims of communism, the revisionist 
approach to the history of the socialist past has opened the gates to the 
rehabilitation of figures that have committed criminal acts against civilians 
during Bulgaria’s alignment with Nazi Germany. The demand to prosecute 
people holding “wrong” conceptions of Bulgarian socialist history in fact 
presents a totalitarian impulse on behalf of the transition’s politicians and 
intellectuals. The criminalization of communism can be interpreted as an 
attempt to impose a one-sided view on history that negates the context 
in which anti-fascist struggles led by communist parties all over Europe 
* https://www.actualno.com/politics/pet-partii-poiskaha-kriminalizirane-na-otrichaneto-na-prestypnija-
harakter-na-komunizma-news_657472.html
** https://dariknews.bg/novini/sviat/ek-otkaza-da-se-kriminalizira-otrichaneto-na-prestypleniqta-na-
komunizma-641767
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emerged. In sum, it is an attempt to criminalize history revealing the deep 
contradictions of capitalism and the attempt to resolve them with the rise 
of fascism. It is also an attempt to erase a hundred years old tradition of 
left-wing intellectualism in Bulgaria.
 The criminalization of history should be viewed in relation to the attempts 
to change collective memory. The campaign for the renaming of cities, vil-
lages, streets, administrative and institutional buildings (Baeva and Kalinova, 
2011: 64-86) should be situated as part of this ideological war of positions 
over the past. The process has started with the change of the name of the 
country, on 15th November 1990, when the Republic of Bulgaria replaced 
the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. One prominent exception is the retaining 
of the name of Bulgarian People’s Bank, which appears cynical in light of 
the imposed currency board from 1997. Old clerical and monarchic names 
of places and streets are reinstated. Baeva and Kalinova (2011) point out 
that not only the names of partisans and communist political figures are 
removed but also the ones of any left-wing political figures, including agrarian 
leaders. The names of international left-wing leaders and intellectuals, such 
as Salvador Allende, Patrice Lumumba, Henry Barbusse, also gradually 
disappear. Streets carrying the word “revolution” are also renamed. All of 
these changes have significant political implications that combine with the 
ongoing process of history rewriting and the demonization of left ideals. 
 A very significant aspect of this rewriting of history concerns the years of 
King Boris III and his collaboration with Adolf Hitler. Contemporary Bulgarian 
historiography is at best ambiguous in its assessment of his regime and its 
alliance with Nazi Germany. Roumen Daskalov, who has mapped the various 
tendencies in modern Bulgarian historiography, sides with those denying 
the existence of fascism in Bulgaria and summarizes their position with the 
question: “If there was no German occupation (and relatively independent 
regime) and fascism was not in power, who were the partisans fighting 
against?” (2011: 276). This question is quite revealing of the inability or 
the unwillingness of producers of current Bulgarian history to grasp the 
social antagonisms within the capitalist system. Their premises rest on the 
existence of some kind of external threat that disrupts the harmony of a 
system of class oppression. Daskalov further claims that the delegitimation 
of the communist regime as totalitarian partially legitimized the old regime 
119
of the monarch that he, along with current Bulgarian historiography, insists 
is not fascist. Yet, the more important issue here is not whether the regime 
itself was fascist or not, but the fact that by diminishing the significance of 
fascism and the monarch’s collaboration with Nazi Germany and by instead 
presenting it as a strategic move to fulfil the “national unification”, Bulgarian 
revisionists are (perhaps indirectly) responsible for the fascination with 
fascism in the present.* 
Sofia Platform Foundation
An example of the search outside of the Bulgarian peripheral capitalist 
system for an explanation of  its disastrous consequences is a recent 
*  The rise of nationalism among young people becomes very clear in Adela Peeva’s documentary, Long Live 
Bulgaria. Peeva documents a rise of fascination with ethnic nationalism, xenophobia and irredentism among 
young people in major cities in Bulgaria.   
The memorial of the victims of Communism in Sofia; Source: Wikipedia
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report of Sofia Platform foundation (SP). The foundation itself is a typical 
representative of the numerous think tanks operating in Bulgaria, producing 
explanatory narratives for the failed transition to democracy that exhibits 
the paternalistic Eurocentric attitude of liberal intellectuals. In a recent 
article entitled The Generation of the Transition is a Ticking Time Bomb, 
SP director, Luiza Slavkova accuses Bulgarians of having a “twisted and 
irrational idea of democracy”.* Concerned with the rise of undemocratic 
attitudes among young people, Slavkova fails to search for an explanation 
within the very structure of postsocialist peripheral capitalism and instead 
puts the blame on corruption, as something removed from the logic of the 
system. Another key culprit is the culture of the past – here the explanatory 
mechanism functions as follows: young people have irrational ideas about 
democracy because of the legacy of Communism. In a neoliberal cultural 
environment that promotes consumerism as the highest value of democracy 
(recall George Bush’s plea to keep shopping after 9/11), the authors of the 
report are reprimanding young people (the generation of the transition) for 
their understanding of democracy as “the ability to buy everything” (ibid). 
Yet, the explanation is once again casted in the past – the perception of 
democracy as the ability to consume is a compensatory mechanism, due 
to the economy of scarcity of the socialist past.
Such explanatory narratives come close to what Gramsci examines in 
the Southern question – it is the culture of the people that makes them 
lazy, irrational and barbaric, or in the Bulgarian case, prone to corruption, 
which in turn explains Bulgaria’s peripheral status, not the politico-economic 
and geopolitical realities of late capitalism. Therefore, the narrative follows 
the binary oppositions mentioned above – where the West is rational and 
Bulgarians are irrational. As the above example suggests, the Bulgarian 
experts have clearly distanced themselves from the rest of the “people”; 
they have adopted the elitist position of top-down knowledge producers and 
the role of educators. Educators who provide a very narrow understanding 
of the past and the present, who fail to see the irresolvable contradictions 
between democracy and the free market.
 The socialist past is also to blame for young people’s claim that “edu-
* https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2018/11/10/3343329_pokolenieto_na_prehoda_e_bomba_s_chasovnikov_
mehanizum
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cation and healthcare should be free” (ibid). Luiza Slavkova’s explanation 
for this is symptomatic of the anti-communists’ disdain for everything 
socialist: “attitudes and beliefs are transferred to the younger generations 
from their parents” and have to do with unrealistic expectations of the state 
(ibid). The expectation of a welfare state that administers a minimum level 
of socio-economic rights, such as the right to education and healthcare is 
deemed unrealistic. The conclusion once again emphasises the need for 
proper education about the socialist past. 
Sofia Platform has worked on several projects in this direction. The 
organization has created a manual for students and teachers with a series 
of lessons, entitled What Happened before 1989: Historical Collection 
about Communism in Bulgaria. The authors of this manual, such as Evelina 
Kelbecheva, Ivan Elenkov, Ivaylo Znepolski, Alexander Kiossev, Momchil 
Metodiev, are well-known representatives of the Bulgarian anti-communist 
intellectual circle. In Ivan Elenkov’s lesson entitled Everyday Life as a 
Mirror of the Regime, we read that the period of communism destroyed 
“the historically established hierarchy of society or the naturally formed … 
positions and relations between social groups” (2017: 11, italics mine). He 
continues by claiming that this has required “the eradication of the elites – 
politicians, industrialists, bankers, big landowners…” (ibid). Thus, the class 
antagonisms, especially intensified after the disastrous consequences of 
World War I that brought about poverty, debt and demographic crisis, are 
normalized as something natural. That way the events of 1944 and the 
formation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria are presented as an unjus-
tified act of a few, imposed on the Bulgarian people by a foreign power 
(the Soviet Union). Later in the text, labour unions are described as being 
a mechanism for control and exploitation of the worker, while the social 
benefits that the unions provided are said to have been used for “social 
discrimination” (ibid: 16). Comparing this narrative to the current conditions 
of non-unionized labour, where blatant disregard not only for workers, but 
also for basic human rights is the norm (Medarov et al., 2018), comes to 
show the outcome of such one-sided ideological renderings. 
All of the manual’s lessons end with questions and exercises. For exam-
ple, the question at the end of Elenkov’s lesson asks students to list all the 
activities in their everyday life that would be considered illegal during the 
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“communist regime” (Elenkov, 2017: 23). The lack of nuances in such an 
ideologically-loaded question situates the functions of the manual more 
in the realm of propaganda than education. Based on this logic, and using 
the language of the liberal elite, today we should ask the question: How 
many Bulgarian citizens enjoying the freedom of democracy and free market 
economy are capable of paying their water, electricity or gas bills, and what 
percentage can do so without undergoing serious strain on their personal 
budget? Ivan Elenkov paints a picture of everyday life in the period of state 
socialism without colours other than grey and black. In this picture socialist 
citizens are deprived of agency. Elenkov’s text has to be analyzed as being 
a part of the dominant ideological constellation of anti-communism.
The memorial of the victims of communism
The case of the memorial of the victims of communism is particularly 
interesting due to the choice of place. The memorial was erected in 1999 
during the presidency of Petar Stoyanov and the ODS government of Ivan 
Kostov. It consists of a chapel and a black wall resembling the Vietnam 
War Memorial in Washington. It is close to the National Palace of Culture, 
which is symbolically one of the great achievements of socialism associated 
with the name of Lyudmila Zhivkova. In fact, the People’s Palace of Culture 
“Lyudmila Zhivkova”, as it was known before 1990, was built in 1980 at 
Zhivkova’s insistence. There is a clear contrast between the National Palace 
of Culture and the presence of this memorial. Zhivkova’s efforts in the late 
1970s to promote peaceful cultural interaction still have a material presence. 
For example, Kambanite Monument (The Bells) was inaugurated in 1979 
when the first Children’s Peace Assembly was held under the patronage 
of UNESCO with the motto “Unity, Creativity, Beauty”. By 1989, four such 
assemblies were held in Sofia with a total of 3,900 children from 138 countries 
and 14,000 children from Bulgaria participating in them.
The sinister memorial of the victims of Communism, which has about 
7,000 names, is in striking contrast to the symbolic representation of the 
Children’s Assembly and the National Palace of Culture. The monument 
compels us to “Bow down!” because “The suffering of our people is built in 
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this wall”. Inside the chapel we can see the words “To all Bulgarian martyrs”. 
But who are the actual victims of communist terror, whose suffering we should 
worship? Central to the monument are the names of those sentenced to 
death by the People’s Court (delegitimized by the words “so-called”). These 
are the politicians of the governments responsible for the alliance with Nazi 
Germany and for Bulgaria’s involvement in World War II. Among the names 
of the victims, we also see that of General Hristo Lukov, leader of the fascist 
Union of Bulgarian National Legionnaires. But particularly stark is the case of 
Konstantin Yordanov, an officer who in 1943 ordered the murder of eighteen 
people in the village of Yastrebino, six of them children. Yordanov, one of 
the most sinister teachers (this is his profession) in Bulgarian history, now 
has the status of a victim of communist terror, which makes him a martyr 
of democracy. Thus, in the immediate vicinity of a building associated with 
the founder of the Children’s Assembly for Peace is a monument that has 
proclaimed a child murderer for a martyr.
 To summarize, the building of monuments as this one tries to impose 
a one-sided perspective about the recent past, while failing to reflect on 
present tendencies that are equally problematic, such as attempts to 
criminalize the past both on national and supranational level; renaming of 
places, streets, etc.
Patriots and other morbid symptoms
In contrast to Elenkov’s argument, when analyzing socialist-era mass gathe-
rings, parades, manifestations, and rituals at work and home environments, 
Alexei Yurchak argues that not the crude propagandistic elements of ideology 
are at work but the subtle moments of friendship and camaraderie that 
form in such ideological spaces (Yurchak, 2006). This might explain what 
he calls the “paradox of late socialism” (ibid; Boyer and Yurchak, 2010): the 
Soviet citizen did not wholeheartedly participate in the crude ideological 
rituals that the Communist party enforced and was at times indifferent, at 
times cynical about the state’s crude ideology. But oftentimes, real humane 
values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities were opened up in such 
practices and spaces, even if they may have contradicted the state’s official 
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goals and policies. It is these “unintended” experiences that underwrite the 
phenomenon of post-Soviet nostalgia: the values and ideals of socialism –  
altruism, selflessness, equality, community, ethical relations and that exist 
outside the party state’s structures. I argue that it is precisely those openings 
that the process of decommunization has closed down. It has also made 
the nuanced processing of, and debate on, the past impossible through 
the classification of all things socialist as totalitarian, inhumane and violent. 
The vacuum left by this amnesia was then filled by the rise of nationalism 
with fascistic tendencies. The ideals of socialism were discarded and substi-
tuted by the values of neoliberal capitalism. What are the new values? The 
entrepreneurial homo oeconomicus subject of neoliberalism blurs the ethical 
lines between virtuous and evil, right and wrong, true and false. The mind view 
of homo oeconomicus operates “in a two-dimensional existence between 
profit and loss” (Feldner and Vighi, 2014: 22). In a neoliberal ideological climate 
such values as friendship, cooperation, and responsibility for the vulnerable 
are often deemed irrelevant. Fascism’s notion of the common good is directed 
only to those belonging to the national body, a body that becomes narrower 
and narrower through a process of exclusion of various groups.
 In recent years we are witnessing numerous examples of forms of populist 
mobilizations in Bulgaria that can be characterized as fascist. The waves of 
right-wing extremism that are flooding Europe have become stronger after 
the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent onslaught of austerity programs 
in the EU. Bulgarians’ anger provoked by the outcomes of the country’s 
transformation to a capitalist socio-economic, political and cultural system, 
often finds its misplaced target in minorities and other “threats” to the 
nationalist fantasy. In 2011 violence erupted in the village of Katunitsa that 
spread into nationwide protests in the major cities. The events were labeled 
in Bulgarian and Western media as “anti-Roma riots” and were condemned 
by the UN.* The case of Katunitsa needs to be analyzed in the context of 
the increased intolerance towards Roma people and the growing popularity 
of nationalist projects, such as Attack (Ataka). Being at the center of the 
Katunitsa riots, Atака capitalized on the fear of the powerful and influential 
Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS), known as the Turkish and Roma 
*  https://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/prava_v_es/2011/10/04/1168522_oon_osudi_antiromskite_demonstracii_v_
bulgariia/
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Party, and gained major electoral success in 2013. The most recent case 
of violent anti-Roma outbursts happened at the end of 2018 at the village 
of Voyvodinovo, where attacks on the Roma community were encouraged 
by military officials and the Minister of Defense himself (Draganov, 2019). 
This was followed by a process of systematic destruction of Roma houses, 
under the pretext of their “illegal building”.  
 During social unrests in the winter of 2013, provoked by high electric-
ity and gas bills, Ataka and other nationalist projects relied on populist 
(nationalization of monopolistic foreign energy companies) and anti-Roma/
anti-Turkish/anti-refugee rhetoric to mobilize support.* The trend towards 
growing nationalist sentiments resulted in the formation of the current 
government – a coalition between the conservative Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria (GERB) and United Patriots (Obedineni Patrioti, 
OP) – a nationalist alliance consisting of Ataka, Inner Macedonian Rev-
olutionary Organization (VMRO) and National Front for the Salvation of 
Bulgaria (NFSB). The current coalition of nationalist parties in the Bulgarian 
parliament constitutes an interesting concoction of interests. 
 Ataka has articulated a rhetoric very close to that of Bulgarian fascist 
movements from the interwar period. Even the name of the party itself is 
equivalent to the newspaper of the short-lived National Socialist Bulgarian 
Worker’s Party that was modeled after Hitler’s NSDAP. Ataka’s political and 
media discourse combines various aspects of the narratives of xenophobic 
nationalist organizations of 1920s and 30s, more or less influenced by and 
sympathetic to Italian Fascism and German Nazism. Characteristic are the 
strong anti-communist and anti-Roma sentiments, combined with calls for 
the nationalization of resource extraction and utility sectors. The leader, Volen 
Siderov uses an anti-colonial rhetoric mixed with conspiratorial narratives, 
with pronounced anti-Semitic tones, as evident in Ataka’s 2013 election 
manifesto, the “Siderov plan”. In the early 2000s when Atака emerged 
on the political scene, it was the only major political party to demand the 
nationalization of privatized public and state resources and enterprises and 
the annulation of concessions to foreign resource extraction companies. 
* Roma are depicted in media and political discourse as those living on the back of tax-paying Bulgarians. 
See for example Vania Grigorova’s research on the mechanisms of instigating confrontation between the 
lower classes based on ethnic stereotypes (2016).
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Nevertheless, once in power as part of the coalition, all of these demands 
were quickly forgotten.
The recently resigned, after more than half a year of protests, Vice 
Prime Minister, Valeri Simeonov, formerly from Ataka, is the founder of the 
National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB). Prior to this, Simenov (with 
two other businessmen) founded SKAT cable network, which functioned 
as Ataka’s official media channel until 2009. SKAT’s programs have been 
a combination of racist, xenophobic, anti-Roma, anti-Muslim, and anti-
communist narratives, popularizing the theory of neo-Ottomanism, as 
well as various other conspiracy theories. In 2017 Simeonov, who is openly 
racist and xenophobic (Draganov, 2017), took the position of head of the 
Bulgarian Council of Ethnic Minority Integration. 
 Since its formation in 1990 VMRO, as the successor of a terrorist organi zation 
with the same name, has remained a right-wing nationalist party. During the 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, it led a virulent anti-Serbian campaign 
in support of the then Prime Minister Ivan Kostov’s decision to give NATO 
permission to use Bulgaria’s airspace. In addition to being personally respon-
sible for inciting anti-Roma hatred and encouraging violence in Voyvodinovo, 
the current Minister of Defense, VMRO’s leader Krassimir Karakachanov, was 
recently accused of being part of a scheme trading with Bulgarian passports. 
As a member of the European Parliament, VMRO’s Angel Dzhambazki voted 
against the criminalization of fascist and neo-Nazi parties. Similarly to Ataka, 
VMRO employs strong anti-communist and anti-Roma rhetoric.
 While United Patriots have continued to position themselves as catering 
to the national interest, they have become one of the key players in the 
ongoing implementation of neoliberal policies, such as the privatization of 
public and natural resources. The nationalists’ disdain for social programs 
that ameliorate the conditions of those vulnerable and in need was recently 
demonstrated by Valeri Simeonov. Simeonov showed his contempt for the 
mothers of children with disabilities, calling them “a few shrivelled women, 
whose children are probably not sick”.* 
In fact, the surge to positions of power of nationalist parties, not only in 
Bulgaria but throughout Europe shows that while presenting themselves as 
* https://www.dnes.bg/stranata/2018/10/22/kreslivi-jeni-a-decata-im-uj-bolni-kolko-mogat-da-ponesat-
maikite.391196
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alternative to neoliberalism, they are ready to implement neoliberal policies 
even more fiercely than centrist governments. Alfredo Saad Filho and Ben 
Fine (2018) argue that the rise to power of various nationalist formations 
marks the shift towards authoritarian neoliberalism, characterized by dis-
regard for keeping its democratic façade and the increased implementation 
of coercive mechanisms of control. A recent example is the so-called “slave 
law” in Hungary under the nationalist regime of Victor Orban. The law 
increased the overtime labour employers can demand from their workers 
from 250 to 400 hours a year.* The case of OP’s neoliberal agenda (while 
posturing as patriots defending the nation-state) also serves as an example 
of this shift. Here, I have shown the emergence and consolidation of fascist 
tendencies in recent dynamics in Bulgarian political movements and key 
politicians and their establishment and promotion into governmental or 
otherwise powerful positions.
 
Conclusion
The rise of right-wing populism in Bulgaria is a form of misrecognized class 
anger interrelated to the dissonance between the official hegemonic liberal 
anti-communist framework and people’s discontent with their existence 
in a peripheral capitalist state. Anti-communism dominates civil society 
institutions and organizations, demonizes left politics and ideals, but cannot 
quell the anger and discontent of many over their everyday existence. 
Bulgaria seems to be caught in the trap where the “old” that declares itself 
“new” refuses to die producing various morbid symptoms. Not surprisingly 
for Gramsci fascism is the passive revolution of the 20th century and in 
its objective was not too different from that of liberalism – he interpreted 
both as political strategies for modernization of ruling elites, implemented 
to avoid revolution and mass participation of the people in a struggle that 
changes social relations. Besides exposing how this passive revolution has 
played out in the context of postsocialist Bulgaria, this contribution has also 
pointed towards a more global perspective, following Quijano, on the ‘colonial’ 
* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46651428
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nature of neoliberal capitalism and Western-dominated geopolitics, as they 
made their way into the country. In a state that has become peripheral to 
the global capitalist order the anger generated by the conditions of extreme 
social inequality is misdirected toward various treacherous “others” and 
the intellectual elite should be held responsible for this misdirection. The 
mantra of free market and democracy was directly imported to the former 
Eastern bloc as part of the hegemonic political economic project with its 
expansion of the mode of flexible accumulation. Yet, after the disastrous 
transformation from state socialism to capitalism, Bulgaria, as other countries 
in Eastern Europe, was practically relegated from the Second (the socialist 
bloc) to the Third World. This becomes clear if one looks at the structure 
of deindustrialized Bulgarian economy with its dire consequences for the 
majority of workers (see Vassilev, 2003; Tsoneva, Medarov, Nikolova, 2018; 
Traykov, 2018). It is not surprising that the more severe the current socio-
economic crisis, the more intense the search for culprits in the past becomes, 
as was shown with the case of Sofia Platform foundation. The Bulgarian 
liberal elite, strictly modeled on its Western counterparts, fails to see the 
crisis within the structure of capitalism itself and continues its perpetual 
search for evildoers from the past – bad communists who taught Bulgarians 
to rely on the state, instead of on themselves. The ongoing production of 
anti-communist narratives is part of a larger ideological constellation with 
the objective to sustain Bulgaria’s peripheral position inside the global 
neoliberal order. The ongoing hegemony by default of the neoliberal politico-
economic project has dire political consequences within Bulgaria with the rise 
of fascist and xenophobic movements and sentiments. Quijano’s analysis 
of the geopolitical significance of the coloniality of power provides a larger 
context to Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and passive revolution that 
help us understand why in times of severe crisis of capitalism, once the 
left is marginalized or defeated, the vacuum is filled by the rise of fascism.
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Image Description: 
The image depicts the death of David 
Dragičević which triggered daily protests in 
Banja Luka from the day his body was found 
on March 24 until today 
Source: Vladimir Šagadin
Danijela Majstorović
Postcoloniality 
     as peripherality 
in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina
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On being peripheral 
T wo wars and their aftermath mark Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) statehood: World War II (WWII) and the 1992-1995 war. It was During WWII that the modern Socialist Republic of BiH (SRBiH) and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were founded, as the State 
Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of BiH (ZAVNOBiH)* became 
the highest governing organ of the antifascist movement in the country in 
1943. SRBiH was built on the famous principle that it was “neither Serb, nor 
Croat nor Muslim, but Serb and Croat and Muslim”. After the 1992-1995 war, 
the new BiH state was created during the peace talks in Dayton, Ohio** as a 
federation of two entities: Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of BiH 
(FBiH) along with the Brčko district. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) thus 
legitimized the ethno-nationalist division of the country marked by ethnic 
hatred, and genocide. As one of the most peripheral European countries 
today – following the 1992-1995 war and the strong involvement of the 
international community in the peace and statebuilding processes thereafter –  
BiH in many ways remains locked in a protocolonial situation, which is why 
it is important to analyse it both as a postsocialist, post-war periphery and 
a society under a twenty-three year long neocolonial administration. 
The paper seeks to explore the conditions and constitutive factors of 
multiple peripherality/marginality as a result of wartime destruction and an 
uncertain post-war transition. It further examines these conditions in the 
light of new struggles against exploitation and domination articulated as 
decolonial acts of resistance and with a reference to a formerly existing socialist 
modernity. By delineating BiH’s empirical and historical “postcolonial” and 
“postsocialist” specificity and singularity (Hallward, 2001), I hope not only 
to add to the dialogue between the posts, but also to contribute to “critical 
investigations of the complexities of the socialist period” and the production 
of “decolonial scholarship in the region” (Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018: 1). 
* ZAVNOBiH stands for Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine.
** The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH or the Dayton Agreement is the peace agreement 
reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 1 November 1995, and 
was formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the three and a half 
year-long war in BiH.
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In doing so, I propose alternative decolonial conceptualizations and readings 
to the problems reflected in contemporary struggles on the ground. 
Firstly, I address relevant theoretical grounds of peripherality and marginality, 
differences between colonial, postcolonial and decolonial perspectives and the 
Yugoslav socialist modernity as an intervening variable in these trajectories. 
The vantage point of the decolonial perspective does not neglect the problems 
of the actually lived state socialism in SFRY (Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018), 
but values its socialist emancipatory potential, especially in comparison to 
the post-1995 period marked by repatriarchization and retraditionalization, 
international interventionism, and ethno-nationalist capitalism. 
Secondly, I explain the connections of these markers to BiH’s postsocialist 
condition by reflecting on the specificity and singularity of the country’s 
peripherality/marginality. BiH is both specific and singular compared to other 
former Yugoslav countries because of its contextual conditions, including 
the 1992-1995 war, the post-1995 state and peacebuilding practices of the 
international community, and because of the different phases of politico-eco-
nomic restructuring from 1995 until today (recontextualized as the country’s 
Europeanization and democratization).
Lastly, I analyse the struggles on the ground that challenge the practices of 
postsocialist domination of both local and international authorities who have 
been creating and exploiting Bosnia’s post-war state of emergency to their 
own ends. I refrain from treating these struggles as attempts at “becoming the 
centre” but see them as an opening of “space(s) of resistance and alternatives to 
both capital and coloniality from the locale of Eastern Europe” (Tichindeleanu, 
2011) and the “organisation of alternative and resistant modernities” (Karkov 
and Valiavicharska, 2018: 6) that are able to offer different, better lives for 
Bosnia’s people.
Some theoretical concerns: from world-systems to 
postcoloniality via the socialist past
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory (1974) accounts for the social structure 
of global inequality by dividing global society into core, periphery and 
semi-periphery. He understands peripherality to be a state and a position 
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with socio-economic origins. World-systems theory works with relatively 
unchangeable and predefined categories which define a country’s position 
solely according to its socio-economic, core- and state-centric make-up. 
While the core exploits the periphery, the periphery is dependent on core 
countries for capital. Furthermore, the semi-periphery shares features 
of both core and periphery while occupying an “in-between” position of 
being. From a world-systems perspective, the semi-periphery is therefore a 
“permanent feature of the world-system” (Arrighi, 1985: 245), characterized by 
asymmetrical power relations (Jessop, 1994), exclusion from highly developed 
capitalist networks (Syrett, 2012), and a greater level of industrialization in 
relation to the periphery. 
In world-systems scholarship, SFRY, as a Second World, socialist, East-
ern European country, was first classified as semi-peripheral in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Wallerstein, 1974) and some thirty years later as a “periphery” 
(Dunaway and Clelland, 2017: 415). In terms of different textual collocations, 
BiH has also at times been referred to as “semi-periphery” (Bonfiglioli, 
2015; Blagojević, 2009) and, more recently, as a “super-periphery” (Bart-
lett 2009), or “periphery of the periphery” (Bechev, 2012). The reason for 
this “escalating” peripherality is not just the terrible devastation suffered 
during the 1992-1995 war, but also the exceptionally high unemployment* 
and low growth rates during the country’s postsocialist phase, marked by 
incompetent, corrupt governments, migration processes and crises spilling 
over from the EU. 
These centre/periphery classifications are further complicated by inter-
sectional axes of oppression, both spatial and non-spatial. The non-spatial 
dimensions are partly structural, exploitative and capitalist, and partly 
historical, longue durée dimensions in which the so-called peripheral selves 
are socially nested within both the spatial, historical and structural relations. 
To account for spatial as well as non-spatial dimensions of peripheralization 
and the internal and external processes creating peripherality in a non-tra-
ditional periphery, I use the notion of multiple peripherality/marginality.
Multiple peripherality/marginality reflects itself more as an in-between-
ness, rather than edgeness (Herrschel, 2012: 31). I thus treat being marginal 
* According to the most recent statistics, unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) averages 
around 42.39 per cent (2017-2018).
135
and peripheral more as a both-and, rather than an either-or thing. It also 
accounts for the different ways of being peripheral and marginal – both 
in the supposed centre and the periphery. There is a difference between 
living as a middle-class person in Swedish Lapland and being a poor, black, 
unemployed mother in the Bronx, just as you can hold a more central 
position in the periphery: like belonging to the high echelons of the Party 
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) or the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA)* in BiH. Both centre and periphery have suffered from varying degrees 
of socio-economic peripheralization as there are social groups and individ-
uals who are in different proximity to the communication systems and the 
controlling centres of the economy (Fudurić, 2007: 4). In BiH, this has been 
exacerbated due to untrammelled neoliberal capitalism that was ushered 
through war and privatization but also through different biopolitical regimes 
producing peripherality by marginalizing ethnic others both symbolically 
(with no hope of common life and togetherness like in SFRY), and demo-
graphically by implementing ethnic cleansing campaigns. More recently, 
biopolitical regimes of state governance have been focused not only on 
cleansing Serbs from the Federation of BiH and Bosniaks from Republika 
Srupksa but on members of the dominant ethnicity. One such example is 
the police brutality unleashed against participants in the Justice for David 
movement (I return to this later in the article) and the subsequent departure 
of public figures and intellectuals whose life has been put in danger.** 
In a nutshell, BiH is not just a political periphery in relation to the rest 
of the EU but it has been continuously peripheralized from within by ruling 
oligarchs doing all they can to secure their untrammelled political and 
economic power while leaving most people at the socio-economic margin. 
Socio-economic marginalization has so far resulted in migration and public 
protest (I focus on both of these later in the article), both of which emerge as 
reactions to the dominant sense of injustice and a lack of political alternative 
in an already divided and impoverished country. 
* SNSD (Stranka Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata) is now considered the most powerful political party in BiH 
and the Republika Srpska entity. Their leader, Milorad Dodik became the Serb member of the three-partite 
rotating Presidency of BiH. SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) is the strongest political part in the Federation 
of the BiH and their current representative in the BH Presidency is Šefik Džaferović.
** Srđan Šušnica, Davor Dragićević and Daniela Ratešić are some of the critics of the regime who were forced 
to leave BiH after receiving death threats.
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German language encompasses the subtle difference between the terms 
marginal and peripheral better than English. In German to be am Rande 
der Gesellschaft is to be socially marginalized or to be at the edge, while 
die Peripherie (e.g. der Stadt) has more spatial connotations. Despite a 
greater degree of synonymity, “peripheral” and “marginal” still maintain their 
distinctiveness, even in English. While marginalization can be considered 
a stronger form embedded in social and economic powers and structures 
(Danson and de Souza, 2012), peripheralization may also be “actively created, 
intentionally or not, in the form of exclusions and marginalizations of actors 
through the ways in which policies and power are implemented and defined” 
(Herrschel, 2012: 30), something that was seen in the examples from the 
previous paragraph. 
These peripheries are not merely the result of geographic distance from a core 
in the sense of a distance decay relationship in a neo-classical explanation, 
but rather need to be also understood as the result of social relationships in a 
behavioural context. Here, communicative, participative distance to functional 
networks between policymaking actors matters, and thus the scope to participate 
in, and influence, decision-making and outcomes. Marginality is thus not merely 
about infrastructure alone and the notion of ‘getting to places’, although this may 
have a role when it comes to enabling face-to-face contacts at an operational 
level. (Herrschel, 2012:32)
To say that periphery is always constructed vis-á-vis an imagined centre 
renders it as an inherently relational concept, a condition characterized or 
constituted by relations extending far beyond spatially conditioned disparities. 
This relational character of core and periphery is implicitly characterized by 
connotations of power and/or inequality, suggesting that periphery should 
be understood as a “subordinate of the core” in “a vicious cycle created in 
space over time and riven by distance” (Anderson, 2000: 92). 
The 1992-1995 war in BiH and the transition of the country to a free 
market economy and “(il)liberal”* democracy from the previous system 
* Ignatieff (2014) defines “illiberal” democracy as a chameleon-like regime that is “authoritarian in political 
form, capitalist in economic and nationalists in ideology” (Ignatieff, 2014: n.p.)
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of state socialism and self-management has in fact produced not one but 
several peripheries in the former Yugoslav spaces and has multiple times 
marginalized its population. It has left most people in a peripheral position 
in relation to an imagined centre due to socio-economic migrations and 
brain drain, infrastructural devastation, loss of major industries and the 
inability to ever “catch up” in terms of economic development. This state 
of peripherality/marginality also refers to the wealth distribution and job 
creation in the new order which has to a great degree depended on the 
networks created by post-war elites, leaving the majority on the verge of 
poverty and survival. 
Whereas the SFRY had a privileged international role after WWII, being 
“between the East and the West,” after its breakup the newly-formed 
states were removed from this former Second World centrality. While new 
“ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” (Brubaker, 2002: 166) benefited from ethnic 
nationalism and ethnic cleansing, for others – those who still see the socialist 
Yugoslav period as a period of modernity (see Pavićević in Kožul, 2018 and 
Dvornsek-Zorko, this issue) – Yugoslavia has remained an open wound. 
The 1992-1995 war was the rupture in which the Yugoslav socialist legacy 
died – the baby was proverbially thrown out with the bathwater and the 
ethnonationalist and capitalist hegemony won as the mainstream political 
vision. Post-war historical revisionism of real socialism came hand in hand 
with the new hegemonic order, paving the way for the processes of external 
and internal privatizations and destruction by the elites at the expense of 
most citizens. BiH has thus been peripheralized multiple times – from the 
inside by local ethnonationalist political elites who control everything, from 
police to the media, universities and public property (that can be privatized 
as they see fit), and from the outside by interference of the neighbouring 
Serbia and Croatia and the tutelage of the international community. 
Grosfoguel (1996) reminds us that nationalism provides Eurocentric 
solutions to a Eurocentric global problem as it reproduces an internal 
coloniality of power within each nation-state and reifies the nation-state 
as the privileged location of social change. In BiH, the two entities, the 
mini nation-states created by the DPA after the 1992-1995 war (Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), which were then 
presented as the solution to it, today prove to be the problem. In voicing 
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and reclaiming their own underprivileged position within a state run by the 
ruling ethno-capitalists, social activists and citizens alike seem to detect the 
problem of their more than two decade-long subjugation more easily than 
ever. Aside from the elites and the small yet stable salariat (Standing, 2011) 
as the paid, permanently employed workforce of the ruling party, most BiH 
citizens live in precarity, with scarcity of jobs at home and a highly controlled 
work visa regime for those wishing to emigrate. This condition has opened 
up a space from where new political imaginaries and decolonial epistemic 
perspectives can be developed and put to practice. 
The colonial matrix of power is not just about the control over state and 
economy but also over subjectivity, gender and sexuality. The potential of 
Yugoslav alternative socialist modernity after 1945 was reflected in women 
getting the right to vote, the right to education and to enter the world of paid 
labour (Majstorović, 2016). The mass literacy campaigns of the Antifascist 
Women’s Front (Okić and Dugandžić, 2016) and the expansion of state 
schools and universities (Georgeoff, 1982) were some of the measures that 
contributed to the emancipation of socialist women. Following socialist 
industrialization in SFRY in which women were encouraged to enter the 
public realm and participate in political and economic decision-making, in 
postsocialism their roles became “hierarchically reorganised” (Burcar, 2014) 
and the reproductive work naturalized as solely women’s. As was the case 
before WWII, the collusion of institutionalized religion and ruling elites in the 
new postsocialist era (power is evenly distributed between the clergy and 
ethno-capitalists) resulted in the retraditionalization of society. Misogyny, 
discrimination, exploitation and violence have become integral parts of the 
process of restoration of patriarchal capitalist relations and the pertaining 
peripheralization of women that ran contrary to the victories women had 
achieved during Yugoslav socialism (Majstorović, 2016)*. 
Stoler’s (2016: 4-5) argument that we have to reexamine “what constitutes 
contemporary colonial relations, what counts as an imperial pursuit, and 
which geopolitics rest on residual or reactivated imperial practices” urges 
us to inquire into the relationship between the postcolonial and peripheral/
marginal here. Much in the same vein, Boatcă (2012: 133) argues that a 
* We should keep in mind that patriarchal social relations persisted well during socialism (Petrović, 2018).
139
growing body of world-systems scholarship, historical as well as recent 
postcolonial and critical development studies “have revealed that the eco-
nomic, political, and ideological domination that different parts of Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe experienced at different times, beginning in 
the sixteenth century, followed a sequence that went from protocolonial 
to neocolonial at best despite the absence of formal colonization”.
Still, as Todorova reminds in a 2018 interview:
[we] should be careful with the notions of the colonial and postcolonial […] to hinge 
them to a broader universal theory. Granted, one can use decolonization as a 
metaphor and as a synonym for the struggle against subjugation and exploitation, 
but this leads us in the midst of a methodological conundrum where any form of 
subjugation and power hegemony can be termed colonial. (EuropeNow, 2018) 
However, unlike other ex-Yugoslav republics (perhaps with the exception of 
Kosovo), post-war BiH did have a fully operative neocolonial administration 
with political and bureaucratic governance from 1996 onwards, which 
between 2002 and 2011 appointed a High Representative who was also the 
European Union’s Special Representative to BiH (see Majstorović, 2007).
In the light of all this, I argue that BiH, as a former socialist country and 
one of the last European countries not admitted to the EU, simultaneously 
occupies a peripheral, marginal, and postcolonial position, even though 
Bosnian colonialism is a non-conventional, hybrid type with a spate of con-
tradictions, including different racialization strategies* and complex forms of 
exploitation. According to Quijano, the “axis of coloniality… overdetermines 
the network of social relations that deal with control over labour, nature, 
gender and reproduction, subjectivity and knowledge, and authority with 
all their products and resources” (Quijano, 2000a: 344-45). Hence, it is 
important to analyse and map these networks within a specific geographic 
space. Moreover, such comparisons are useful as world-systems and 
postcolonial theory share “a critique of developmentalism, of Eurocentric 
* Despite being predominantly white, Bosnians and Herzegovinians are both racialized and racialize displaying 
what Balibar calls “racism without races” (2005), visible in chauvinistic and nationalist attitudes bordering 
with racism towards visible Others but also the urban/rural divide reflective of cultural racialization. For more 
on contemporary structures on Eastern European othering, see Kolodziejczyk and Sandru (2016).
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forms of knowledge, of gender inequalities, of racial hierarchies, and of the 
cultural/ideological processes that foster the subordination of the periphery 
in the capitalist world-system” (Grosfoguel, 2008).
For those reasons, a decolonial approach that “dissolves the anti-capitalist 
postcolonial dichotomy in postsocialist studies by locating simultaneous 
origins of capitalism and coloniality” (Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018:5) is 
a possible way out. This is especially true in the light of the struggles going 
on in this Balkan periphery that are not just meant as acts of restoration and 
nostalgia for the past (Boym, 2001) but are the acts of decolonial resistance 
of repressed social groups. These specificities and singularities open up 
room for “multiple, heterogeneous, and even conflictive pressures or logics” 
(Quijano, 2000b: 347 in Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018: 5). 
Conditions/constituents of peripherality in today’s 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
As a part of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empire and the poorest part of 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, until WWII BiH was mostly rural and 
agrarian. This was followed by fifty years of Yugoslav socialism, which ceased 
to exist in 1992 when chauvinistic nationalism, equipped with ammunition, 
reared its ugly head resulting in close to 100 000 war casualties (Tokača, 2012).* 
After the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in late 1995, the 
international community  led by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
for BiH, created under the DPA to oversee the implementation of the DPA’s 
civilian aspects, began to intervene in the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
in BiH. The OHR quickly became the most powerful international body and 
final authority regarding the implementation of the DPA and the subsequent 
accession of BiH into the European Union (EU). Between 1998 and 2005, 
in a neocolonial manner, successive High Representatives “issued 757 
decisions, removing 119 people from public office and imposing 286 laws or 
amendments to laws, with a gross lack of due process in exercising these 
powers” (Parrish, 2007: 15). 
* The estimated death toll is 95 940 of whom more than 38 239 were civilians (31107 Bosniaks, 4178 Serbs, 
2484 Croats and 470 others).
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Despite the diminished influence of the OHR since 2006,  reflecting the 
change in the world’s geopolitical influences, the country still formally has 
a neocolonial administration headed since 2009 by the Austrian diplomat 
Valentin Inzko. As the rest of former Yugoslavia, the most visible axis of 
oppression in BiH was not “classic” racism (see Baker, 2018), but ethnic 
nationalism coupled with neoliberalism as an oppressive strategy used to 
“other” different social groups (Majstorović and Turjačanin 2013). Although 
it formally ended the war, the Dayton Peace Agreement in fact legitimized 
ethnic nationalism by rendering it the only imaginable and authentic way of 
doing domestic politics. This state of affairs was completely unproblematic 
for the OHR’s neocolonial administration as long as it served the goal of 
bringing market economy to BiH. Yet, while purporting to provide ethnic 
justice among the three divided BiH peoples in the post-war period, ethno-
nationalists’ rule became complicit in shady privatizations and irresponsible 
selling off of the country’s natural riches such as forests, waters and energy 
(see Clancy, 2004). While holding a strong grip over the public sector and 
the distribution of jobs to a political clientele, the ethno-nationalist elite 
also contributed to a third wave of BiH immigrants leaving the country to 
become a new workforce in the EU.* 
The socio-economic origins of peripherality can be looked at from the 
position of a politico-economic restructuring and its three phases (Majstor-
ović et al., 2015). The early political restructuring includes the neocolonial 
style Europeanization and democratization of the OHR-led international 
community between 1996-2006. The second phase is the one of the late 
political restructuring (2006-2014) marked by the rise of the new ethno-na-
tionalist elites whose members privatized strategic companies and thus 
solidified themselves as the most enduring political elites. The third phase, 
involving the period after 2014, was marked by the protests and plenums 
against shady privatizations that have resulted in the burning of several 
cantonal government buildings. This phase has had its continuation on the 
main square of Banjo Luka, where the father of the brutally murdered David 
* The first wave of BiH gastarbeiters after WWII happened during the 1960s and 1970s, the second wave 
was a result of war-related migrations whereas the third wave started in 2013. Although there are no official 
statistics, some 300 000 people have left BiH since 2013, contributing to an already existing BiH diaspora 
of almost one million people (see Bougarel, 2018).
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Dragičević − a student whose death the authorities refused to investigate −  
held a 300-day plena accusing the Republika Srpska entity (as part of the 
new Dayton state) for the mysterious death of his son (I explore this in 
more detail in the next section). 
Imposed Europeanization, transition from socialism to market econ-
omy and supposed democratization have been previously analysed (see 
Majstorović, 2007). Here, it suffices to say that during the first ten years 
after Dayton, Europeanization in BiH conducted under the auspices of the 
OHR was discursively constructed as a change to normality presupposing an 
abnormal Bosnia. Joining the EU was often recontextualized as accession 
to NATO, as the guarantee of peace, security and stability for BiH. The 
EU was discursively constructed as the locus amoenus, an idyllic space 
of well-being and prosperity. The legitimization of the OHR’s middleman 
position through a “stick and carrot” strategy best reflects the paradox of 
forced democratization in Bosnia, an experiment that did not yield much 
self-sufficiency and democracy in the country, but has strengthened the 
international community’s liberal imperialism (Knaus and Martin, 2003). The 
highly interventionist approach detected in discourses and practices of the 
international community to post-war BiH as a response to a near-permanent 
state of emergency can be ascribed to a yet another “failed” Europeanization 
in which the conventional and free style conditionality, characteristic of EU 
enlargement, simply did not work (Aybet and Bieber, 2011).
In the background of the ethnic war of 1992-95 BiH also experienced 
significant economic changes losing the horizons of social property and 
self-management – two imperfect but real artefacts of Yugoslav socialism, 
all of which further peripheralized the country. The 1992-1995 war in BiH 
was an attempt at political as well as economic reorganization par excellence, 
as both ethnic difference and economic motives played a significant role in 
it. During the war, what had previously been defined as socially-owned was 
declared by various laws to be state-owned property or private capital – a 
practice of dispossession through which the political elites and warlords 
robbed Bosnian citizens (Majstorović et al., 2015). The new ethno-nationalist 
elites thus became the legal successors of the country they helped abolish. 
In postsocialism, the self-managed social property was passed into the 
hands of private individuals or political parties. The old socialist working 
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class has practically disappeared (Stenning, 2005) as “workers today are 
not only the few employed in industry, but also a huge number of unem-
ployed, unpaid, and precarious workers in the service sector” (Škokić and 
Potkonjak, 2016: 129).
Resisting peripherality: workers, protesters, 
immigrants
In terms of responses to post-war marginality/peripherality in which the 
greatest majority of workers became pauperized, the workers of the former 
Yugoslav giant detergent factory DITA from Tuzla provide an example of how 
such processes can not only be resisted but even subverted. In response 
to their management’s decision to privatize the factory, DITA workers 
attempted to reassert their interests by organizing strikes, holding watches, 
and using their bodies to protect the factory. 
Studying workers’ protests in Tuzla (Majstorović and Vučkovac, forth-
coming), we found that through successful self-organization workers have 
managed to have a say and prevent the “fritting away” of the factory by 
stopping its sell out on three different occasions. Subsequently, they have 
attempted to start the production with the little raw materials that they 
had but eventually came to the realization that the factory needed to be 
privatized, the only thing left to insist on was a “responsible owner”. Their 
goal was to continue working and producing and they were well aware that 
reclaiming the factory as owners (for different examples see Kojanić, 2018) 
would be close to impossible. Their ambiguity towards privatization thus 
remained a blind spot, blurring the relation between them, the new state 
and the private owner. In this indeterminacy their peripheral selves were 
torn between nostalgia for the socialist past (Kojanić, 2015) and a belief in 
the necessity of capitalist privatization and entrepreneurship (see Fudurić, 
2007). This fight for survival between the presumed inevitability of privati-
zation and the damage done by a series of private owners reveals a place 
of decolonial resistance in the absence of a restorable past. 
Research on social movements and protests in post-Dayton BiH from 2012 
to 2014 (Arsenijević, 2014; Majstorović et al., 2015; Kurtović, 2015; Mujanović, 
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2018; Riding, 2018) reveals the dynamic life of radical politics after socialism 
as newly appearing groups and movements in the region struggle to forge 
radically democratic visions of society. As attempts at deperipheralization 
and challenging exploitation, they have pivoted the struggles in the Balkans 
against social misery, deindustrialization, mass unemployment and living under 
a postdemocratic governance of repression. As Edin Hajdarpašić remarks: 
If someone had said in 1995 that the politicians of this small war-torn and 
impoverished country heavily scrutinized by the international community would 
go on to make themselves the proportionately highest paid representatives in 
Europe, to expropriate the country’s key economic resources with impunity, to 
take out staggering loans for unrealized projects, and to block any attempts at 
changing this situation – all in less than 20 years after the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace – most experts would have dismissed such statements 
as ‘unrealistic’ and ‘impossible’. Yet that is precisely what happened with the 
formation of new political forces after GFAP (Hajdarpašić in Arsenijević, 2015:105). 
Plenums and informal assemblies of citizens that emerged out of the February 
2014 protests throughout BiH, as the most radical experiment in non-institutional 
politics since the collapse of Yugoslavia, were a meaningful grassroots change 
(albeit short-lived). They were motivated largely by the so-called “white bread 
allowances” for parliamentarians who were no longer performing their civil 
duties but were still getting paid while advancing the privatization of state 
industries. First, the Tuzla workers took to the streets. Soon, they were joined 
by students and other young people in the towns of Bihać, Gračanica, Zenica 
and the city of Sarajevo creating a unified front, at least in the early days, 
voicing their dissatisfaction with Bosnia’s state and burning several cantonal 
buildings (see Arsenijević, 2014). Protesters stated they were “hungry in all three 
languages” and through acts of rebellion marked by significant “cross-entity” 
relations of cooperation bypassed Dayton-embedded ethnic divisions. They 
have paved the way for common citizenship and class solidarity, more social 
justice and redefinition of left politics in BiH – all of which can be interpreted 
as a decolonial struggle against the peripheral/marginal predicament. 
With the 2018 Pravda za Davida (Justice for David) movement in the BiH 
entity of Republika Srpska (RS), issues such as police brutality, weak legal 
145
system, public security and trust in the public institutions were voiced out 
as additional elements of distrust, especially in the eve and the aftermath 
of the October 2018 state elections. Following the movement on social 
networks and live streams from the Banja Luka’s main square, nicknamed 
“David’s square”, revealed a scene of cathartic private mourning by family 
and friends which had gradually turned into a public democratic plenum of 
citizens. There, the popular dissent against the ruling party looked unin-
hibited and solidarity re-emerged as more and more people were coming 
to the square for the six o’clock protests, while others were bringing hot 
food and drinks to those gathered around David’s father Davor Dragičević.* 
In this case, the periphery strikes back − this movement and its leaders 
continue to speak truth to power in an unprecedented act of bravery. We 
cannot forget that the Republika Srpska, especially after the 2018 elections, 
is de facto becoming a one-party state. The active role of plena and bare-
handed citizens’ protests as “bodies that matter” in a “performative power 
of assembly” (Butler, 2015) may be a beginning of an active act of protests 
especially after the banning of public assemblies and the increasing police 
brutality since the end of 2018.**
Another response to peripheralization that gained prominence since 
2013 is migration − more and more BiH citizens are moving to the supposed 
“core” either through permanent or temporary arrangements or through 
applying and reapplying for work visas in the EU. Since 2013, BiH citizens 
have been quietly taking either “grey economy” jobs or more permanent 
employment arrangements mostly in Germany and Austria but also in other 
EU countries. Germany is the target country, for which the Sarajevo embassy 
approved 13 300 visa application only for the first nine months of 2017, and 
the number is estimated to have tripled since. Germany provides 24-hour 
care for some 1.86 million elderly for whom around 300 000 mostly female 
*  The dead body of the 21-year-old David Dragičević was found in March 2018 in a ditch in Banja Luka. The 
refusal of the police to investigate the case as a murder started the protest movement Pravda za Davida, led 
by David’s parents Davor and Suzana.
** The situation became particularly grave after 30 December 2018 when Davor Dragičević went missing 
after having been on a search warrant under the assumption that he led a coup d’etat and tried to violently 
change the RS constitution. After the official prohibition to gather on the public square or to walk the streets 
of Banja Luka, the remaining citizens kept assembling in front of the Temple of Christ the Survivor although 
the church doors remained closed.
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Eastern Europeans already work (Lutz, 2015), young men get recruited 
too as the need is growing. These new socio-economic migrants comprise 
of mostly care, domestic and construction workers, as these are the most 
widely available entry-level jobs. 
Migration is a strategy embraced by most people as they do not appear 
to view struggle and resistance as a viable means to reclaim a life and a 
social environment under acceptable conditions. These people seemingly 
escape the fate at home by taking precarious jobs abroad, thus reclaiming 
livelihoods they could not previously afford. Succumbing to the volatility of 
visa regimes, hard work and uncertain market conditions in Western European 
countries, they accept being marginalized but “under their own terms”, in 
the hope of creating better lives for their children – if not for themselves.
By way of conclusion
Demonstrating a careful approach to the application of the terms “peripheral” 
and “peripherality”, Domanski and Lung (2009: 8) argued that two important 
fallacies have to be avoided in the debate on the periphery: a static view 
of the periphery, and the purposeful disregard of its relational character. 
First, there is no reason to believe in the stable status of the periphery; 
there are rather processes of creation, reproduction and/or breaking out 
from peripherality. Second, the periphery can only be understood in the 
context of its relationships to the core and other peripheries. Whereas 
contextual and historical preconditions are indispensable for determining 
the relationship between core and periphery, various trigger factors and 
other types of political influences that define the direction, nature and 
progress of this relationship also play a role. 
The position of the periphery is also not determined once and for all. The peripheral 
status of countries may be subject to change if they manage to achieve success 
in enhancing their position and change their relations to the core” (Domanski 
and Lung, 2009:9). 
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There are several key, and occasionally overlapping, constitutive factors for 
peripherality in BiH today: repatriarchization, imposed Europeanization, 
privatization, and protests and migrations as the responses to it. These 
processes define how peripheral selves are formed at the margin of Europe 
with respect to ethnicity, class, and gender but also as disenfranchized, 
non-European others. 
Danson and de Souza (2012: 4) highlight the need to see the periphe-
ry as more than just “the container for a specific group/kind of people” 
inhabiting it. They argue that the periphery is not just “the outcome of 
the centre’s development” but a “space with a past, present and future”, 
constantly in the process of becoming (Danson and de Souza, 2012). 
They write: 
There are some people among us that grow up, eat, go to school, make love, that 
live there. Periphery is created, experienced and continuously present. There is 
always something to be done about the periphery, whatever its appearances or 
circumstances, and this is also true – or maybe even more so – in an intellectual 
capacity (Danson and Souza, 2012: 4).
BiH powerfully shows that the “periphery” is not a homogenous container 
where everyone is marginalized – with a closer look, we see a polarized 
society made of “the people” and ethno-nationalist elites. While these 
elites promise nationalist fantasies bordering with neofascism, patriarchy 
and religious conservatism, after more than twenty-year long largely 
incompetent and irresponsible rule, they have privatized, plundered and 
squandered the former social property, leaving the country impoverished 
and indebted. Unlike the 1990s and early 2000s when international 
interventionism in BiH was at its peak (Majstorović, 2007), today neither 
the OHR nor the EU seem too keen to intervene in BiH’s internal affairs. 
In the absence of the rule of law that can sanction the untrammelled 
power of local elites, the international community seems to acquiesce 
to the status quo. 
Perhaps there is potential in this abandonment − without the inter-
national community, the simultaneously peripheral, marginal, and 
postcolonial selves on the margin of Europe have to deal with difficult 
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histories, contest ethnic capitalism, and carve out a space for a dynamic 
emancipatory politics that will decolonize this space by creating more 
social justice, less misery, and better lives for all. “Nothing will be named 
after you”* Sarajevo and Tuzla protesters were shouting in February 2014 
to their politicians just as Davor Dragičević rose from a wailing father to 
a political activist who bravely and loudly continues to repeat on the 
main square in Banja Luka that “the RS is a criminal state and the RS 
police a narco-cartel killing children and youth.” Drawing either on the 
antifascism of ZAVNOBiH or perhaps forging new legacies in battles to 
come, the transgenerational questions remain of when and who will get 
the job done. 
Bibliography 
* “Po vama se ništa neće zvati” is an allusion to the line of the famous Bijelo Dugme song “Pristao sam biću 
sve što hoće”.
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Image Description: 
Protest sign from March 
Against Racism, London 2017. 
Source: Tim Dennell, 
Licence: CC BY-NC 2.0.
Špela Drnovšek Zorko
Migrant encounters between 
postsocialism and postcolonialism
Uneasy solidarities?
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I am neither a postsocialist scholar nor a postcolonial theorist, nor do I – perhaps most pertinently, and puzzlingly – conduct any research in Central East Europe. As an anthropologist of postsocialist memory whose 
ethnographic work has unfolded in Britain, however, I have found “dialoguing 
between the posts” to be primarily about the question of encounter. It is 
about many different encounters: encounters between migrants, encounters 
between struggles, and encounters between the experiences and histories 
of people from seemingly disconnected parts of the world. Yet they are 
encounters that do not preclude difficult conversations. 
In a 2009 interview, Walter D. Mignolo proposed that:
...the decolonial future of Europe and America is in immigration. People move, 
they come to different places with a colonial wound. And then there are those 
who were born in the empire or on its margins. They will realize that they have to 
join forces with other migrants and listen to their own voices instead of claiming 
their Europe-ness.*
In a somewhat similar vein, several years before the “Balkan route” became 
a keyword of the European refugee crisis, Stef Jansen (2012) imagined 
a future in which Bosnia and Serbia have joined the EU. He wondered 
whether the memory of Bosnians’ and Serbs’ enforced immobility after the 
loss of the Yugoslav passport might one day provoke empathy with other 
border-crossers: “As rows of other people, seeking to travel to Europe, 
are being treated as ‘idiots’ in the queues under the EU flags in front of 
some BiH or Serbian embassy, will anyone be able to turn the memory 
of their own humiliation into a source of solidarity?”
These are good questions, and optimistic prophecies. Does migration 
to postcolonial Western Europe – and its border regimes – present an 
opportunity for decolonial politics that unites the postcolonial and 
postsocialist worlds in solidarity from the peripheries? Perhaps. But 
seeking such a dialogue requires us, to borrow from US labour histori-
an David Roediger (2017), to “make solidarity uneasy” – to recognize 
how overlapping structures of domination leave different imprints on 
* Walter D. Mignolo and Madina Tlostanova, interview.
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the differently positioned, without giving up hope for connection and 
meaningful entanglement. 
This article is born from my reflections on these intersections as they 
have emerged in my ethnographic research, as well as during my time spent 
in British higher education. It presents a necessarily partial, necessarily 
open-ended view. Drawing on data collected for my PhD and arguments 
developed for a recent academic article (Drnovšek Zorko, 2018), I first explore 
the ambivalent relationship between post-Yugoslav migrants and British 
hierarchies of belonging, which reveals the extent to which solidarity is 
shot through with a distinctly colonial Eurocentrism. I then turn to the kinds 
of dialogues and intersections I am currently seeking in my postdoctoral 
research, which explores Central East Europeans’ encounters with race 
and coloniality in post-Brexit Britain. I end on a coda about my personal 
encounters with decoloniality in the context of the university – many of 
which were rooted in and routed through the study of diaspora, and which 
continue to underpin my warily hopeful attachments to “uneasy solidarity”.
Race and colonialism  
in the dialogue between the “posts”
Numerous inches of academic journals and not a few books have been 
dedicated to probing the vexed question of the comparisons – nay, the 
analogies – nay, the intellectual resonances – that emerge when we put 
postsocialism and postcolonialism into the same picture. In one vein, we see a 
firmly-established tradition of drawing on postcolonial theory to analyse the 
representational hierarchies that still maintain Eastern Europe in a position 
of civilizational inferiority, particularly in the work of scholars such as Maria 
Todorova (1997), Vesna Goldsworthy (1998), Nataša Kovačević (2008), or in 
Milica Bakić-Hayden’s (1995) metaphor of “nesting Orientalisms”. In a slightly 
different vein, the analogy would seem to be more direct, with scholars 
seeking the inclusion of regions ruled by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian 
and Ottoman empires and the USSR in the analytical scope of mainstream 
postcolonial studies. Here there appears to be some frustration over the 
one-way traffic in ideas: Dorota Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Şandru (2012)  
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note that while postcolonial theory has reverberated widely in the scholarship 
on postsocialist Europe, “in the postcolonial scholarly arena per se, the 
intersections between these two paradigms continue to be of marginal 
significance”, suggesting that postcolonial theory has largely failed to 
recognize the imperial character of state communist regimes. Yet comparisons 
between Western European colonialism and Eastern European state socialism 
are complicated by the latter’s historical record of anti-imperial solidarity, 
which, while contradictory, as well as contingent, disrupts the drawing of 
a straight line between the two systems (Karkov and Valiavicharska, 2018).
As Neil Lazarus (2012) points out, one must always ask what such com-
parisons are intended to 
achieve. Lazarus identifies 
two key stumbling blocks 
preventing the postsocialist 
experience from becoming 
as popular a reference point 
among postcolonialists as 
has been the reverse: the 
first being postcolonial 
theorists’ attachment to 
the “Third World” and the 
exceptionalism of the colo-
nies that shaped it, and the 
second being a widespread 
suspicion of Marxist thought 
among many postsocialist 
scholars, which prevents 
them from engaging with 
the anti-capitalist thought 
that forms a significant part 
of postcolonial critique. 
While the degree to which 
this holds true could be 
debated (some scholars of 
postsocialism are indeed 
 A poster in Ljubljana, which displays images of animals and 
plants alongside a photo of a black child, reads: ‘Biodiversity is 
the diversity of all living things’; November 2018; Source: Špela 
Drnovšek Zorko, Licence: CC BY-NC 4.0.
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hostile to Marxism, as are indeed some decolonial theorists – but by no 
means all), his intervention highlights some of the difficulties of entering 
into truly mutually transformative dialogue, as well as the extent to which 
some scholars from the European postsocialist region have felt marginalized 
or ignored by the global academic marketplace.
Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery’s (2009) influential article on 
“thinking between the posts” – whose call to abandon the pretence that 
postcolonial and postsocialist subjects have ever occupied discrete worlds 
has been widely responded in recent scholarship – proposed several avenues 
for putting the two paradigms into productive conversation. One of Chari 
and Verdery’s suggestions is for scholars to refine their understanding of 
“state-sanctioned racisms” beyond “colour, physiognomy, creed, or blood” 
(2009). The comparisons might be particularly fruitful, they note, for stu-
dents of communist regimes’ productions of internal enemies, as it “reveals 
processes that Marxist orthodoxy passed over but that come into view with a 
postcolonial lens focused on racialized biopower” (2009: 26). Indeed, Dušan 
Bjelić’s (2018) recent work engages with how class and ethnicity have in the 
Balkans been variously mobilized in the form of “race”. And yet – matters of 
“color, physiognomy, creed, or blood” are not absent from the postsocialist 
world, nor have they ever been. As Catherine Baker (2018) has shown in 
her recent book Race and the Yugoslav Region, and as other scholars have 
done for other parts of Central East Europe, the region as a whole was never 
immune from the same racial logic that is often deemed to plague Western 
European colonizing powers or their former overseas territories. Ideologies 
and practices of exclusion that predated or survived the reign of communist 
regimes, including histories of anti-Semitism, anti-Roma xenophobia, and 
Islamophobia, enter into and hybridize with the conceptions of race routed 
through those other colonizing geographies. These conceptions have been 
circulating for centuries: they are firmly embedded, frequently unexamined, 
in Central East European imaginaries, as I was forcefully reminded on a 
recent trip to Slovenia, where a poster campaign promoting “biodiversity” 
implicitly relegated a black child to the status of flora and fauna.
Since Europeanness is itself steeped in racialized hierarchies of belonging 
that are fundamentally colonial (El-Tayeb, 2011), aspirational identifications 
with Europe on the part of its peripheries frequently become a matter of 
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excluding or dominating the non-European. As Dace Dzenovska (2013) has 
demonstrated in the case of Latvia, colonial aspirations can be deployed 
to establish one’s right to a place at the European table. She writes about 
attempts to incorporate the colonizing ventures of the 17th century Duchy 
of Courland – which briefly owned colonial outposts in West Africa – into 
Latvia’s national history, thus revealing the double-sidedness of coloniality: 
“on the one hand”, she writes, “postsocialist Eastern Europeans facilitate 
the erasure of coloniality from Western Europe’s self-narrative by becoming 
objects of democratization projects” – such as those claiming to promote 
liberal and democratic values in postsocialist European countries (2013: 
411). “On the other hand”, continues Dzenovska, “postsocialist Eastern 
Europeans throw that project into disarray when in order to overcome their 
seemingly permanent ‘not-quite-European’ position they strive to identify 
with colonialism” (2013: 411).
Post-Yugoslav emplacements
Within my own research, the postsocialist articulations of relative “world-
ness” – the matter of who “we” were, and who we are today – are intimately 
joined to the particularity of the postcolonial British milieu. This allows 
me to explore how race and coloniality affect the way that migrants from 
the Central East European region relate to a purportedly multicultural, 
if increasingly isolationist, society. Rather than positing the two “posts” 
as distinct historical and cultural entities, I am interested in how people 
perceive their encounters with difference as encounters with difference, 
mediated by specific points of origin, collective histories, and the cultural 
archives (Wekker, 2016) that migrants necessarily bring with them. In my 
current research project on what I am calling “diasporic postsocialism”, 
this means tracing the lived experiences of contemporary encounters 
across geographical, cultural, and racialized difference as migrants seek 
to emplace themselves within a (post-)imperial nation – Britain – still and 
perhaps increasingly convulsed by what the cultural theorist Paul Gilroy 
(2004) terms “postcolonial melancholia” (Britain is, of course, just as much 
a postcolonial space as the nations it once ruled). Specifically, what does 
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it mean to be a Central East European migrant – a postsocialist migrant, if 
you will – in contemporary Britain, encountering, not only in London but 
in many urban centres, migrants and citizens who trace their descent to 
former European overseas colonies? What can “diasporic postsocialism” 
say about the dynamics of migrant politics in a postcolonial metropole?
But my research is also fundamentally about historical entanglements: 
the need to understand such contemporary encounters against the backdrop 
of already-there historical interactions between the Second and the Third 
World during the Cold War, in political alliances such as the Non-Aligned 
Movement or in often-fraught “friendships” embedded in cultural exchanges. 
On one level, this simply means challenging perceptions of Britain as the 
only possible place for people from particular world peripheries – the “post” 
worlds – to encounter each other, and to encounter each other’s histo-
ries.  On another level, tracing such historical entanglements also means 
recognizing that postsocialist European migrants’ perceptions of their place 
in the world are deeply affected by the racialized legacies of colonial and 
imperial projects that define the conditions for Europeanness itself. 
Based on fieldwork conducted between 2013 and 2015 among families and 
migrant community organisations from the Yugoslav region, largely in London 
but also in several other locations in England, my PhD research explored 
the conceptual terrain that my interlocutors traversed when constituting 
intergenerational knowledge about the past. In particular, I explored the 
ways in which stories of socialist Yugoslavia become especially pertinent 
when my interlocutors – who were primarily but certainly not exclusively 
Bosnian Muslims, sought to establish a sense of coevalness and equality 
between themselves as migrants and the rest of British society, or between 
themselves and their children who were born or raised in Britain.
The comparably small numbers of Bosnians, Croatians, Serbs, and 
other migrants from former Yugoslavia has proved both a blessing and a 
curse when it comes to establishing a collective narrative. On the one hand, 
their invisibility in the larger British discourse about migrants as bearers of 
dangerous cultural difference means relative safety from the worst of the 
stigmatization that befalls some communities, particularly black or brown 
Muslims (Bosnians’ whiteness plays a significant role in their failure to be 
read as Muslim – that is, dangerous – in the same way). On the other hand, 
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the lack of recognition this implies gives rise to frustrations at being lumped 
into undifferentiated, if relatively privileged, categories of foreignness. The 
following is an excerpt from a conversation I had with three women from 
Bosnia, all of whom came to England as teenagers (all names used in the 
article are pseudonyms):
Asja: I used to get that a lot: are you Polish, are you Polish. A lot. No, I’m not Polish!
Fata: I used to get South African.
Me: South African!
Asja: Before they said Spanish, because we had few Polish people, but recently 
they started [saying] Polish, Polish.
Me: For a lot of people here there’s no difference... Eastern European, one flavour.
Fata: Just one big lump.
While the consistent misrecognition of Asja’s and Fata’s origins might be a 
case of the changing same, the evolution from “Spanish” to “Polish” also 
represents a fundamental shift in British imaginaries of white foreignness 
following the 2004 EU expansion, which led to increased numbers of 
migrants from formerly socialist Europe, especially Poland. The resulting 
racialization of these migrants (Fox, Moroşanu, and Szilassy, 2012) has seen 
“East Europeans” transformed into a homogenous collective subject that 
inhabits an ambivalent form of whiteness. 
Much less attention has been paid to the legacies of Cold War divisions 
into the First and Second World, which some of my interlocutors saw as 
central to the welcome they encountered upon first arriving in the United 
Kingdom. In an interview with a man I will call Asim, he recounted his 
memories of the reception that Bosnian refugees received in Britain in the 
mid-1990s:
The Cold War made it so that people in Eastern Europe are somehow seen as 
some other kind of people [neki drugi ljudi]. Something shocked me when we came 
here, and when the refugees came. They taught Bosnians how to use a toilet. 
‘That’s where the water flows’, and so on. So people [Bosnians] were thinking 
‘what, are you normal, what’s wrong with you?’
159
The discursive association between “Bosnian” and “backward” has another 
aspect in the continued interest among undergraduate, postgraduate, and 
PhD students in researching suffering Bosnians. According to a friend who 
volunteers at a supplementary school for Bosnian children in London, where 
parents bring their young on the weekend so they can hone their language 
skills and learn to name all the rivers in Bosnia, the organisation receives 
near-monthly requests for interviews. “Bosnia is very popular, it would 
seem”, my friend said diplomatically – but added that she mostly feels she 
can’t ask the parents if they’d like to take part, not when so many of the 
research projects are about trauma, genocide, or war rape. 
Such misrecognition is not limited to Bosnians. Several Serbs I spoke with 
were still occasionally wary of proclaiming their origins when speaking to British 
people, remembering the automatic association between “Serbian” and “war 
criminal” that reigned in the 1990s. They perhaps need worry no longer: a 
young third-generation British-Serbian woman told me that when she told her 
high school friends she was visiting Serbia, most thought she had said Siberia.
Some of my Yugoslav interlocutors’ responses, however, were deeply 
intertwined with the questions of race and coloniality. This was most clearly 
seen in the persistence of an insidiously white Europeanness that haunts their 
claims to recognition in the face of perceived misrecognition – particularly when 
demonstrating the ability to participate appropriately in a diverse, multiculturalist 
society, which remains a significant element of Britain’s self-perceptions even 
in the wake of a resurgent isolationism and white nativism. A man called Samir 
explained to me with satisfaction that the Bosnian community had been fully 
accepted as multicultural citizens by a local English council: 
[A member] of the City Council says: ‘Samir, you’re the best group.’ No: ‘the 
best-organized group that has come here’. It’s logical that we are. Because we 
come from Europe. Those others come either from Asia or from down in Africa 
somewhere. But we come from Europe. We know the system of organization, we 
were an organized country.
On another occasion Samir spoke to me of the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
as a result of political machinations, emphasizing that this could not be 
ascribed to ethnic differences – after all, “we never had tribes like they have 
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in Africa”. While Samir’s antipathy to the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis 
that permeated Western media and academia in the wake of Yugoslavia’s 
downfall is fully understandable, his recourse was to lump the entire con-
tinents of Asia and Africa into a less rational imagined geography in order 
to demonstrate Bosnians’ Europeanness, and therefore, rationality. It is 
difficult to imagine a more apt example of the ways in which race and colo-
niality inform postsocialist – in this case, post-Yugoslav – claims to being 
worthy residents of British society.
And yet, in other contexts, Samir was surprisingly critical of Britain’s 
chequered colonial past. Once we were rehashing the matter of British 
people who had viewed Bosnian refugees as backward:
“They looked at us like people who came out of the jungle, like we had 
no clue about anything”, he commented.
I asked how he thought this compared with the way migrant communities 
from Africa or Asia were perceived. 
“Probably the same. Probably the same”.
“I think Britons often forget about their history of colonialism and 
imperialism”, I offered. 
This colonialism, imperialism and that”, said Samir, “that’s something which… It 
led to the fact that they ruled over so many nations. In all honesty, they crossed 
the line, it was simply exploitation. Of resources. And then at one point, when 
this couldn’t go on any longer, when it was all over, they mentally remained in 
the same system. Mentally. It’s the way they feel.
In Samir’s denunciation of British colonialism, a dialogue between post-
socialism and postcolonialism allows for the translation of some concepts –  
Marxist anti-imperialism, for instance – but not others. While exposing British 
hypocrisy in its treatment of the people it had once colonized allows Samir 
to rhetorically ally Bosnian migrants with African and Asian migrants, he 
is somewhat less alert to the centuries-long reverberations of the colonial 
project that shape not only British attitudes toward civilizational hierarchies 
but his own imagined cartography – in part, perhaps, because Yugoslav 
anti-imperialism never explicitly confronted its own place within global 
hierarchies stratified by race (Subotić & Vučetić, 2017).  
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In my PhD research, references to Britain’s imperial past in connection 
with Yugoslavia emerged in a multitude of ways, which did not necessarily 
reflect the same political standpoint. I once asked Vera, a middle-aged 
Serbian woman who had lived in London for over twenty years, if she had 
noticed a rise in anti-migration rhetoric in the British media. Vera nodded 
firmly and launched into a short monologue. Britain, she told me, occupies 
countries – like it did ‘Yugoslavia’ in the 1990s – so that their people have 
to leave and then they come here because they have connections, like her 
family did. But people only come because Britain meddles abroad, and 
then they wonder why everyone comes here. Just look at the Indians here, 
that’s what happened to them as well. “Yes”, I said, “Britain was an empire, 
and then…” Vera jumped in: “Exactly! An empire”.
While it was my helping nudge that elicited the word in this case, the 
term “empire” emerged organically in a conversation I had with Jasmina 
over a London lunch. Jasmina commented that she finds it fascinating 
the way the British and the Americans represent the Second World War 
differently, and who gets to be the victor in each narrative. She also finds 
it amazing, she added, that the British have never really owned up to 
their history of imperialism, at least not in terms of public culture or even 
the school curriculum: “So many of them don’t even know what went on”, 
she concluded. 
When I saw her again in the autumn of 2015, the media was saturated 
with images and stories of the refugee crisis. Talking about European and 
British responses to the crisis, Jasmina shook her head and told me that 
she feels increasingly proud to have been raised in Yugoslavia: to come 
from a country that stood for “just values”, to have been educated in the 
values of the struggle against fascism and the solidarity of non-alignment. 
Yugoslavia helped other countries shake off colonialism – did I know that? 
She didn’t think that this memory should be forgotten. The intersections 
brought to light by these conversations with two women with very different 
national, religious, and political affiliations can bring into view some of the 
cross-cutting narratives that underlie postsocialist alliances not only with 
fellow white Europeans, but also with so-called postcolonial migrants. 
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Post-Brexit solidarities?
These conversations also inspired my current postdoctoral project, which 
explores the intersections between postsocialism and postcolonialism 
through the experiences of Central East European migrants in Britain. 
In an interactive art installation from the Trigger Warning project by There There, staged in 
Wolverton in 2018, two boxes labelled ‘Leave in the UK’ and ‘Remain in the UK’ allow participants 
to fish for ‘fact checked prophecies’; Source: Špela Drnovšek Zorko, Licence: CC BY-NC 4.0.
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Thinking through the ambivalences in how post-Yugoslav migrants located 
themselves within British narratives made me wonder what other histories 
and cultural archives might be relevant when studying migrant lives in the 
present moment. Is it possible to conduct an ethnography of the imaginaries 
of race in post-Brexit Britain from the point of view of postsocialist migrants 
from the broader Central East European region? The seams where the 
“Second World” meets coloniality might become clearer with reference to 
Brexit: not (only) because it is presently nigh impossible to write anything 
about the United Kingdom without mentioning the B-word, but because the 
responses and discussions it has set in motion are in many ways illustrative 
of longer trends.
For one thing, Brexit has revealed the many joints where (South) 
Eastern Europe meets migration meets “race”. Many East European 
migrants in Britain faced discrimination and abuse even before the ref-
erendum (Rzepnikowska, 2019), all while being confronted by the latest 
tabloid headlines on job-stealing Polish plumbers and criminal Romanian 
beggars. In 2014, UKIP leader Nigel Farage, asked in a radio interview to 
explain the difference between living next to a Romanian and a German 
family, responded “you know what the difference is”. In the run-up to the 
referendum, the pro-Brexit campaigns gleefully fanned popular anxieties 
about migration, epitomized by Farage’s infamous Breaking Point poster, 
which used an image of refugees crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border 
to depict the unfettered threat that free movement poses to Britain. (It 
is worth noting that the government then helmed by David Cameron, 
the official voice of Remain, had vigorously fanned and appeased those 
very same anxieties for years.) In her analysis of referendum campaign 
materials, Alexandra Bulat (2017) found numerous references to “future 
Europe” migrants who were prophesied to pour into Britain in the near 
future, including from Turkey, Serbia, and Macedonia – much as their 
imminent right to free movement may come as a surprise to the citizens 
of these countries. When the Polish Social and Cultural Association in 
West London was defaced with graffiti several days after the referendum, 
the consensus of both police and most mainstream media was that this 
had been “racially motivated”. As Brexit introduced a new category of 
migrant to the popular imagination – “EU migrants”, that is, EU citizens 
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who had been in the privileged position of not previously noticing they 
were migrants – it became clear not only that East was still less desirable 
than West, but that Central East Europeans still struck many people as 
white-but-not-quite (Roediger, 2005).
On the other hand, the rise in reported hate crime (Devine, 2018) after the 
referendum affected not only the “New Europeans”, but everyone deemed 
to embody the foreigners that the British people had purportedly voted to 
expel, including British citizens from minority communities. Unfortunately, 
we cannot count on any automatic affinity or solidarity on the part of 
Central East Europeans toward those who have long experienced the white 
nativism of British national identity: research has highlighted a tendency 
amongst Central East Europeans to claim whiteness as a defence against 
discrimination (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2015). At the same time, while 
black and ethnic minority voters for the most part backed Remain, many 
did vote Leave – citing, among other motivations, the ease with which EU 
citizens could settle in the United Kingdom compared with people from other 
parts of the world, including Commonwealth countries, who are currently 
subject to stringent immigration rules.
While the subject of Brexit and migration has doubtlessly launched 
a thousand research projects since the vote to Leave, my own interests 
emerged more directly from the themes that surprised me in my PhD project: 
primarily the many angles from which postsocialist Europeans could relate 
their own experiences to the question of Britain as a postcolonial space. 
As my previous anecdotes above have indicated, these articulations – or 
dialogues – with race and (post-)coloniality might draw on unexpected 
historical phenomena to explain the present; they might be as much about 
identifying with exclusionary Europeanness as about recovering the memory 
of anti-colonial solidarity. The question I am taking into my current research 
conversations is whether the historical and contemporary archive connecting 
postsocialist subjects with race and coloniality, which is so readily apparent 
in the anti-migrant hostility gripping the British Isles, can yield possible 
solidarities, as well as frictions.
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Learning decoloniality
What is the place of decoloniality in this picture? Unlike postcolonial theory, 
which I devoured like the bright-eyed, politically righteous undergraduate 
I imagined myself to be, I admit that I am decidedly under-read in the 
theoretical canon of decolonial theory. In fact, my first meaningful encounter 
with decoloniality was during my time at SOAS – formerly the School of 
African and Asian Studies – where I did my PhD, in its form as an activist 
rather than theoretical project. Renowned for its student activism* as much 
as its regional specialisms, SOAS would seem an apt place to encounter 
demands to decolonize the curriculum, or long-standing student societies 
campaigning against immigration detention. At the same time, SOAS had 
started out as a training college for colonial officials, with its library still home 
to important missionary archives – and that legacy remains, too. As the 
university leadership gradually subsumed the energies of the decolonizing 
campaign into a bureaucratic “vision”** – while failing to meaningfully address 
the student achievement gap, the overrepresentation of women and black 
and ethnic minority staff on casual contracts, or decolonizing pedagogy – 
and as some of my students’ hopes for an institution of higher education 
where they could be free of everyday white supremacy proved doomed to 
disappointment, the decolonizing project revealed itself to be as messy 
and open to co-optation as it was clearly necessary.
Yet where I perhaps learned most about decolonizing was from my 
PhD supervisor, Parvathi Raman, who saw teaching as an essential site of 
activism. Her course on migration and diaspora studies was where I truly 
grasped that my nascent undergraduate postcolonialism had been missing 
a keen understanding of colonialism and anti-colonialism. The “diaspora” 
she taught me was the “diaspora” of Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, and Avtar Brah; 
cultural theorists who grounded their critique of British nativism in their 
own experience, and the experience of others not exactly, but somehow, 
like them. It was the “diaspora” born out of the slave trade and indentured 
labour migration, and the “diaspora” of the radical creativity required of 
* more on this link
** more on this link  
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those who have been forcefully displaced not only from their homes but 
from their frames of reference. Yet it was also the “diaspora” of nationalist 
movements and conservative calls to homeland: the inevitable antidote to 
over-romanticising the political potential of hybrid identities. If my time at 
SOAS reminded me that “we” can be both radical and reactionary, it also 
taught me that seeking out those historical migrations, circulations, and 
exchanges that defy the image of a neatly bounded culture is a project 
worth pursuing, even when some imagined geographies might seem to be 
distinctly self-contained. 
We should not underestimate this decolonial potential of diaspora – in 
its more expansive, connecting sense that can unsettle the collective subject 
in postsocialist as much as postcolonial Europe. In my interview with Asja, 
Fata, and Belma, the three Bosnians who had lived in Britain since their late 
teens, the conversation turned to certain changes they now see occurring 
in Bosnia:
Asja: Someone was telling me a story, Bosnians in Sarajevo, and they actually 
saw two black people and they spoke Bosnian. They said, “I was shocked”! Before 
we never saw, obviously, but now there is more.
Belma: When I was on a beach last year, we saw a little girl, I think her mother is 
Bosnian, dad probably from Jamaica, she speaks Bosnian, and my little nephew 
told me, “auntie, look! Crna curica, a black girl!” He was amazed, you know...
Me: But because she spoke Bosnian.
Belma: Because she is black.
It is of course the conjunction of “black” and “speaking Bosnian” that evinced 
such astonishment. In Belma’s speculative description of the little girl on the 
beach – “I think her mother is Bosnian, dad probably from Jamaica” – the 
little girl stands for a changing vision of Bosnia made possible by diasporic 
inscriptions. Even if Bosnia is largely understood to be fundamentally, even 
monolithically white, these scenes from the beach and the coffee shop 
offer proof that it might not stay that way forever. If there is a decolonial 
politics in the way we think about migration, it lies also in acknowledging 
these changes and incorporating them into the way we speak of collective 
postsocialist subjects.  
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There are, I know, those who are currently conducting much-needed research 
on, or are themselves experiencing, the entanglement of the “posts” in 
Central East Europe through migration, at border fences or in the difficult 
intimacies of daily lives in predominantly white cities, towns, and villages. 
There also those who are actively trying to connect across struggles, histories, 
and positionalities. My view from a (small, and possibly-disintegrating) 
postimperial island places such encounters in a very different frame, yet 
represents a slice of the same dialogue unfolding in postsocialist Europe. 
The work of deconstructing postsocialist subjectivity so that it acknowledges 
its colonizing and colonized position – as well as its anti-colonial legacy – 
does not preclude a reconstruction aimed at interrupting hegemonic white 
Europeanness, a project that finds urgent echoes in the post-Brexit landscape. 
As my ethnographic anecdotes reveal, “the migrant” is not always right, or 
always right-on; in most cases solidarity is not only uneasy, but has yet to 
coalesce. Yet the everyday humdrum of struggles has the potential to force 
an unexpected awareness and recognition of what “we” have in common, 
as well as where our experiences and positionalities diverge – and forge 
alliances that decentre, or could decentre, the unbearable lightness of 
Western European coloniality.
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Image Description: 
Seizure. Rewriting Counter-Histories (2015), Marina Gržinić and 
Aina Šmid. Source: Marina Gržinić;
Marina Gržinić
Theorizing decoloniality 
in Southeastern Europe:
Vocabularies, politics, perspectives
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T he joints and fissures between postsocialist and post-/decolonial perspectives are of key importance today.* Exploring these in search of new openings and potential is necessary as the changes and 
deregulations brought by neoliberal global capitalism make us aware of the 
reconceptualizations of the notions of socialism, capitalism, postsocialism, 
postcoloniality and decoloniality – concepts that are not (only) rhetorical 
figures but denote concrete historical processes. I pose the question:  What 
is the relevance of post-/decolonial and postsocialist approaches for the 
study of power, hierarchy and resistance in Southeast Europe? What are the 
decisive innovations of decolonial strategies in an Eastern European space 
that is already transformed into territories as Southeast Europe, Western 
Balkans etc., vis-á-vis other approaches in this context?
On the one hand, it is obvious that the relation between socialism and 
capitalism implicates the understanding of the mode of reproduction and 
relations of exploitation through an analysis of labour, (state-) capital and 
property, as well as conditions of reproduction that include the whole strata 
of institutional, legal and political readings of power and dispossession. 
On the other hand, if we want to proceed with theories of the postcolonial, 
postsocialist and decolonial in both Eastern Europe and Europe, we have 
to analyze how decolonial thought develops, individually, with each of its 
authors, and how it is configured in specific geopolitical spaces.
Lastly, we talk about Eastern Europe, though paradoxically what is lurking 
here as even more demanding is the relation between the postcolonial and 
decolonial. I proceed by placing the dialogue between postsocialist and 
post-/decolonial approaches in its wider context, to then formulate my thesis 
about the potential of this dialogue and spell out its significance in regard 
to the four key relations defining the synthesis between post-/decolonial 
and postsocialist inquiry in the remainder of the article, namely those 
between capitalism and socialism; the postcolonial and the postsocialist; 
the decolonial and the postsocialist; and the decolonial and the postcolonial.
* For the final editing of this text I am indebted to the editors of this special issue Philipp Lottholz, Polina 
Manolova and Katarina Kušić. The text benefits from commentaries of many, nevertheless I want to name 
Šefik Tatlić (Bihać, BiH), Tjaša Kancler (Barcelona/Maribor (Slovenia) and Borut Mauhler (Ljubljana); for 
decades we have engaged in merciless debates and productive work.
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Dialoguing
The idea of “dialoguing” between postsocialist and post-/decolonial 
perspectives is conceptually linked to a conference that took place in April 
2015 under the title Postcolonial and Postsocialist Dialogues: Intersections, 
Opacities, Challenges in Feminist Theorizing and Practice,* at Linköping 
University (Sweden). There, it became clear that although “postcolonial 
theory has already evolved into a sophisticated theoretical apparatus 
for the investigation of the power imbalance between the West and the 
rest”, it missed to take on board postsocialist perspectives and was still 
insufficient in the range of perspectives and depth of analysis it provided. 
The conference exposed three pertinent lines of thinking.** 
First, one of the most tangible shortcomings of the postcolonial and 
postsocialist approaches, exposed by Grada Kilomba, is that they have been 
inattentive to the role of race and colour in the processes of ordering and 
domination in the region. Kilomba likened this colour-blindness to that of 
“dominant Western feminism”, which, according to her “has [also] failed to 
address ‘race’ and racism as integral parts of feminist discourse, relegating 
the reality of Black women/Trans/Queers and those of colour to invisibility”.
Second, Tanel Rander proposed the periodization of Eastern European 
subjectivity as a body and relict/object of geopolitics. The proposed peri-
odization starts with the concept of “a piece of shit” that I developed in 
order to define Eastern Europeans’ subjectivities in the 1990s in my book 
Fiction Reconstructed (2000: 16-21). I compared Eastern Europe (after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) with a disgusting and indivisible remainder 
of a cyber/virtual identity. “A piece of shit” was put forward as a metaphor 
for postsocialist transformation that was mainly based on its unconditional 
linking with global capital and control. To this conceptualization, Rander 
added a further step, making reference to Ovidiu Țichindeleanu’s question 
“What is Eastern Europe now?” and the direct answer: “Nothing!” Rander 
went on and added to these two historical elaborations another process of 
the transformation of Europe. Based on mine and Šefik Tatlić’s observation 
* See the information presently available here
** The following references are taken from the collection of abstracts from the conference website, accessed 
in 2017 and currently unavailable
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of a shift from biopolitics to necropolitics that can be identified as Europe’s 
newest condition (Gržinić and Tatlić, 2014), Rander exposed that Eastern 
Europe returns in the new millennium as a geopolitical relict, and an object 
of necropolitics. Moreover, Rander states that through articulating the 
links between geo-politics and body-politics we open up the possibility 
of decolonizing areas of postcolonialism and postsocialism that are today 
under (quasi-)colonial control. 
Finally, the conference in 2015 exposed the question of how white 
people identify with black struggle inside the regime of whiteness. Or, to 
put it differently, while not aiming to create a rhetorical binary, to ask, via 
the conference agenda, “How does Black Europe identify with Eastern 
Europe’s White ‘decolonial’ strategies?”. In her proposal entitled Unequal 
and Gendered Access: Citizenship Rights in the Longue Durée, Manuela 
Boatcă captured the exclusion at the heart of this regime of whiteness most 
poignantly, claiming that an “institution of citizenship has developed in the 
West through legal (and physical) exclusion of non-European, non-White 
and non-Western populations from civic, political, social and cultural rights, 
all of which were additionally filtered through a gendered lens”;  and next, 
that “citizenship and gender are the most decisive factors accounting for 
extreme inequalities between individuals in rich and poor countries in the 
21st  century”. Based on these conceptual and empirical entry points that 
emerged at the 2015 conference, I put forward my thesis on the paramount 
relevance and importance of decoloniality in Southeast Europe and beyond.
Thesis
My thesis is that a pertinent decolonial turn deploys the constitutive linkages 
between colonialism, coloniality, capital, power, biopolitics and necropolitics, 
racism and other forms of dehumanization including exploitation, extractions, 
and dispossessions, on one side, and, on the other, positions of subjectivities, 
agencies, and empowerment. Today, racism and the contemporary forms of 
necrocapitalism and dispossession produce modes of life that are despoiling 
entire populations of humanity, dying from hunger in thousands, evicted from 
their homes in millions, secluded and brutalized. However, these experiences 
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also open possibilities for an inter-linking of decolonial transmigrant and 
transfeminist conceptualizations of history, life, and agency as suggested 
by Samir Amin in 1990. He claimed that it is through the identification of 
such interconnections that we can delink from the deep contradictions and 
antagonisms between the economic, social, cultural, and political norms 
and forms of global necrocapitalism (Amin, 1990). 
Where do I stand in this analysis? It is vital to state that the decolonial 
perspective, or turn, or horizon, brought three key lines back into the purview 
of analysis. These are racialization, the colonial matrix of power, and the 
hyper-violent regime of whiteness. These three lines are foundational for 
neoliberal global necrocapitalism that entered the world stage on September 
11, 2001 with all its subforms of violent disfiguration of humanity: financiali-
zation, turbo- and postmodern fascism, scientific racism, etc. In my earlier 
work,* I entangled these three lines with necropower and necropolitics in 
order to think of a historical mode of capitalist reproduction that appeared 
as a genocidal turbo fascist regime in the 1990s in former Yugoslavia, most 
clearly in the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995.** 
Walter Mignolo (2000) elaborated poignantly the “modern/colonial world 
system” that is the basis of the racial logic of neoliberal global necrocapi-
talism. Next, as exposed by other key writers like Ramón Grosfoguel (2011) 
and Maria Lugones (2007), the decolonial horizon sharply criticizes the 
regime of whiteness. Lugones develops, along the critique of the regime of 
whiteness, a perspective on the coloniality of gender, exposing and criticizing 
not only the colonial regime of power but its heteronormative foundation. 
This regime is fully at work in the racial system of Eastern Europe too, where 
whiteness and heteronormativity present themselves as rooted in blood 
and soil, thus unifying the nation-state.
In the West the white “Eastern European” seems to be “grey.” This simply 
means that although the majority of East Europeans are white and therefore 
part of the regime of whiteness and its power mechanism, they are as well 
discriminated, seen as inferior and not civilized enough, as still tainted by 
* See the journal Reartikulacija, specifically issue no. #3 (2008)
**  The Srebrenica genocide consisted of the systematic murdering of more than 8,000 Bosniaks, mainly 
military-aged men and boys, in and around the town of Srebrenica during the Bosnian War by the military 
forces of “Republika Srpska” [“Serb Republic”] and other Serbian paramilitary forces
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their communist past. In these relations of power, East Europeans are seen 
as backward, populist and nationalistic, and therefore they are treated as 
grey and not privileged white. This is necessary to incorporate into the 
analysis of the relation between the East and the West of Europe. Further-
more, whiteness is not only a colour, but a regime of white supremacy that 
works structurally under neoliberalism through procedures of racialization. 
As an institution claiming to embody Western Europe and its values, the 
EU is a hyper neoliberal regime with a huge amount of hatred, and, let us 
be precise, with a huge amount of racial, class and gender hatred toward 
the Other, the migrants and the refugees. 
Discrimination, subjugation, degradation of the LGBTQI people, Roma 
and other minorities, not to talk of the Erased people, are disturbingly real. 
The Erased (Izbrisani) is the name used in the media for a mass of people 
in Slovenia that remained without a legal status after the declaration of 
the country’s independence in 1991. The Erased are mainly people from 
other former Yugoslav republics, who had been living in Slovenia. They are 
mostly of non-Slovene or mixed ethnicity, and include a significant number 
of members of Romani communities. In 1992, when they were all stripped 
of their documents, we became witnesses to a necropolitical procedure 
by the newly born state of Slovenia. The Erased lost all health, social and 
other support from the state, and were, together with their families and their 
Slovenian-born children transformed into a category of superfluous people 
without any rights; alive, but socially, politically, economically dead, erased. 
While making reference to perspectives like that of Böröcz and Sarkar (2017), 
Piro Rexhepi, speaking at the above-mentioned conference in Linköping, 
asked: Who speaks in the name of the postsocialist subject? This question is 
very important because it also highlights the frequently ignored discriminatory 
hierarchies that operated during socialism by anchoring the contemporary 
rise of racism as a simple outcome of postsocialist Europeanization.
First, this means that Eastern Europe is white, Christian, heteronormative 
and racist, class-subjugated and gender-blind in its “inside” while from the 
“outside” it is being provincialized by the West. But although it is infantilized 
and deprived of the history of socialism and at the same time subjugated to 
exploitative labour-capital relations, it is completely “autonomously” racist 
towards the refugees, people of colour, and sexual and ethnic minorities. 
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Therefore, we have to be very precise when we talk about being colonized 
as Eastern Europeans, while being white, mostly Christian, heteronormative 
and racist. Colonized? For Eastern Europe this label is decisively suitable 
as a shield, while exercising “internally” nationalist violence throughout its 
whole territory.
Second, it is important to say that analyses of neoliberal global cap-
italism are not done only from a decolonial perspective but as well, and 
poignantly so, from leftist, feminist, LGBTQI and anti-fascist, anti-racist, 
migrant standpoint. New generations of those who think of politics and 
the future exist and they need to be acknowledged. They are situated 
along the lines of Marxist-Black studies and transfeminist studies that 
are trying to present a disassembling, sharp analysis of necrocapitalism. 
What does this mean?
In order to better explain these lastly mentioned positions, I first have 
to elaborate on the notion of modernity/coloniality that was key for the 
introduction of the “decolonial turn” in the USA in the 1990s. Modernity/
coloniality was, schematically speaking, also an attempt to insert Latin 
America in a global debate on postcolonialism. In 1997, Aníbal Quijano 
connected modernity/coloniality with the colonial matrix of power.  One of 
its axioms is fundamental for all of us working with the present neoliberal 
moment, and holds that “Coloniality is constitutive of Modernity” (Quijano, 
1997). The colonial matrix includes, among other lines of power, the control 
of gender, though in Quijano’s perspective it is too tightly connected to 
biological sex. In her analysis, Maria Lugones, member of the same working 
group, contested a binary system of gender as a base for decolonial feminist 
approaches (2007). This helped develop strategies of depatriarchization of 
state power and gave new insights on third world feminism. The influence of 
decolonial feminism is not only materializing in Black, Afro-Latin, Chicana, 
women of colour (from the USA), and indigenous feminisms, but has effects 
on former Yugoslavia and throughout Europe.
The third component of the decolonial turn in contemporary analysis is 
the uncovering of “racial capitalism”. In the foreword of the second edition 
of Cedric J. Robinson’s Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical 
Tradition (originally published in 2000), Robin D.G. Kelley elaborates on 
Robinson’s “racial capitalism” (as part of compelling memorial thoughts on 
176
the passing away of Robinson in 2016).  Kelley stated that what Robinson 
exposed with “racial capitalism” was that:
[…] capitalism emerged within the feudal order and flowered in the cultural soil 
of a Western civilization already thoroughly infused with racialism. Capitalism 
and racism, in other words, did not break from the old order but rather evolved 
from it to produce a modern world system of “racial capitalism” dependent on 
slavery, violence, imperialism, and genocide. Capitalism was “racial” not because 
of some conspiracy to divide workers or justify slavery and dispossession, but 
because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society. The first 
European proletarians were racial subjects (Irish, Jews, Roma, Slavs, etc.) and 
they were victims of dispossession (enclosure), colonialism, and slavery within 
Europe (Kelley, 2017: n.p.).
In the following, I trace this entanglement of class, gender and race through 
four key relations emerging from the dialogue between post-/decolonial 
and postsocialist inquiry, namely: 
a) Capitalism and socialism; 
b) Postcolonial and postsocialist; 
c) Decolonial and postsocialist; and 
d) Decolonial and postcolonial. 
a) Capitalism and socialism 
My intention in this section is to roughly recuperate a series of contemporary 
shifts that are fundamental for the relation between capitalism and socialism. 
I have elaborated (see Gržinić and Tatlić, 2014) on them in the past decades 
and they are: the shifts from liberalism to neoliberalism; from multiculturalist 
capitalism to global capitalism; from administration of life towards the 
administration of death; and, from a change in the first capitalist world 
of imperial nation-states to militarised war-states. Finally, it is of utmost 
importance that historical colonialism has changed into a contemporary 
colonial matrix of power, presenting, as I argue, a change or a reappearance 
of two forms of management of life – governmentality and sovereignty. In all 
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these radical shifts of forms of power, we also see two different forms of the 
constitution of the social bond: on the one hand, a postsocialist ex-Second 
World – Eastern European states – turning into turbo-fascist societies, and, on 
the other hand, the old colonial imperialist Occidental states, that were once 
nation-states, changing not only into war-states but developing postmodern 
fascist social structures, based on a pure individualization, fragmentation and 
mobilisation of  agents, with a persistent rejection of the “Other.”  
A decade ago, Santiago López Petit in his book Global Mobilization: A 
Brief Treatise for Attacking Reality* drew on Marx to provide a key under-
standing of the way capitalism functions. He exposed that although we are 
constantly pushed to think that capital has a tendency to “emancipate” and 
progress, this is not the case. Capitalism, as elaborated by López Petit, is 
not an irreversible process but a reversible, circular and conflictual event. He 
states that in the world today, all is brought back to one single event, what 
he calls the unleashing of capital (in Spanish des[z]boc[k]amiento), that 
can be more colloquially grasped as “unrestraining” or “runaway” of capital. 
Neoliberal globalization, as stated by López Petit, is nothing more than the 
repetition of this single event (López Petit, 2009: 24). The same way as 
thinking of capital as being “emancipatory”, we are willing to accept almost 
naturally made discourses of morality with which neoliberal global capitalism 
tried to cover up the outcome of various crises: the financial one in 2008, or 
the so-called “refugee crisis” that is not a refugee but an EU crisis. 
But what is important to expose in order to capture the relation between 
socialism and capitalism, is two different relations between capital and 
power. In the neoliberal era, what we see is the co-propriety capital/pow-
er, which presents a graduation from the unity of capital/power in liberal 
understandings (López Petit, 2009: 30). What I want to emphasize is that, 
following López Petit, the space created by neoliberal globalization presents 
an inextricable complexity. It is not a pluralistic space but a space in which 
complexity does not permit extrication. It is therefore a space that is not at 
all plural, but one that cannot be disentangled or untied. Achille Mbembe, 
in his analysis of Africa as the “postcolony”, envisioned precisely such a 
process, which he calls “entanglement” (2001).
* My translation of the Spanish original (López Petit, 2009).
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If we try to delineate a genealogy of a short but dramatic restructuring 
of the composition of capital and its consequences for the historicization 
of capitalism, then we have to take into account its transformation that 
started in the 1970s and that today, as stated by López Petit, has come 
to its end (2009). This is why we talk about global capitalism and its logic 
of financialization. The change that Karl Polanyi has named the Great 
Transformation (2001 [1944]) presents the disarticulation of politics, of 
the economy, and of the social life of the working class, who is the main 
protagonist of capitalism and its cycle of struggles in the 1970s. This period 
is best illustrated by Margaret Thatcher’s class struggle on the miners 
striking against the closures of mines in 1984-85 in Great Britain, or in the 
protests of the Solidarity labour union under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa 
in socialist Poland throughout the 1980s. Before the disarticulation of the 
working class we could talk, via López Petit, about the unity capital/power. 
In the course of the Great Transformation we see the dismantling of this 
unity and its transformation into the co-propriety capital/power. 
The unity capital/power presented a social pact between workers and 
capitalists (i.e. the bourgeoisie) and the outcome was capitalist social 
democracy that brought – not as a generous gift but through struggles – 
social, health, and pension benefits for the workers. The welfare state was 
the most advanced form of this unity and labour unions had an extremely 
important role in the process of establishing it. López Petit argues that class 
struggle was functioning, so to speak, within the plan of capital. Capitalism 
needed a pact in order to make surplus value, and labour functioning within 
the particular social composition of capitalist production presented the only 
way for capital to survive. 
The socialist planning state is the best example of this unity, but was rarely 
part of such a discussion in the West. Rather, it has usually been seen as a 
totalitarian apparatus restricting workers’ rights. Therefore, it is possible to 
say that the imposed vision of socialism as solely totalitarian was necessary in 
order to hide the better alternative to the West’s Fordism, which had already 
been realized in its nightmarish form. Yugoslavia was a role model at the 
time but was hidden from both public debates and academic analysis in the 
West. Today, being a true historical model, it is being presented in numerous 
academic panels and political discussions in the East and West as a brand, as 
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I argue, for a defunct future. The socialist planned economy was the perfect 
display of what was in Fordist capitalism, so to speak, hidden.
When the unity capital/power was threatened, the response, or to put 
it differently, the punishment that capitalists imposed, as explained by 
López Petit, was exemplary (2009). López Petit talks not of the “control” 
that is connected with post-Fordism but of true social engineering methods 
of punishment, that were presented in a vertiginous forms of inflation and 
open-ended crisis. This is why the penalization of the miners by Margaret 
Thatcher in Great Britain in the 1980s, when post-Fordism had already been 
ushered in, was so exemplarily tough. What we witnessed was “class struggle” 
in the West at its purest. Thatcher’s transformation of the society in 1984 
was violent. She succeeded with pure violence to change the perception of 
class struggle that was central for miner strikes into a view where workers’ 
demands seemed as demands raised by groups of people fighting each 
other. What we witnessed was the transformation of the capitalist society 
in the UK into devastated hyper-neoliberal global capitalist communities 
that executed the complete invalidation of the working-class position.
In socialism, the state responded to such a threat not only with inflation, 
which was used as a repressive apparatus in capitalism as well, but also with 
true food shortages that proliferated in the last decades of the 1970s and 
1980s (manifesting in humorous narratives on how to get a cup of coffee). 
In addition, many of the strikes, let alone the violent ways in which police 
forces attempted to suppress them, were not at all mentioned in the former 
Yugoslavian mass media but they were, as reported by Fredy Perlman in 
the period from 1957 to 1968, massive.*
So the question is how to think about the fundamental change between 
the relation of capital and labour in modernity, namely the unity of capital/
labour being transformed in neoliberal global capitalism into a co-propriety 
of capital/labour. In putting this shift in relation to coloniality/modernity 
and the colonial matrix of power, I put forward the following extrapolations:
First, the neoliberal Western democracies, which used to be colonial states 
as well, changed from nation-states into war-states (Germany, UK, France, 
US, etc.) that exercise governance and violence with brutal exploitation, 
* See Fredy Perlman, ‘Birth of a Revolutionary Movement in Yugoslavia’, edited by Zdravko Saveski, no date, 
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expropriation, discrimination, repression, and postmodern fascism (López 
Petit, 2009: 84). The war-state is a purely necropolitical mode of life. It 
works in conjunction with postmodern fascism that serves as the dissolution 
of the “democratic” war-state in a multi-reality of social technologies, most 
importantly digitalization of data and related forms of control. I claim that 
the war-state, in its verticality – functioning by way of force, violence and 
fear – is but a pure fascist state. However, using historical fascism to name 
it would be too simple because we would fail to emphasize the major logic 
of dominance in the world today: the logic of war. The war-state definitely 
has elements of classical fascism: a sovereign leader, people, and death 
as a tool for the management of life. On the other hand, there is also the 
neoliberal context of the autonomy of individuals, which foregrounds the 
neoliberal freedom of having rights to be an individual brand. For this reason, 
as proposed by López Petit, we name it postmodern fascism, which sterilizes 
the “Other”, evacuates the conflict from public space and neutralizes the 
political (2009: 84). It is thus logical that we continuously repeat that global 
capitalism is about depoliticization. 
Second, it is important to state that after the fall of the Berlin wall, 
postsocialist countries remained just nation-states without an international 
sovereignty but with enough domestic power to control and systematically 
produce homophobic terror and systematic erasure of their socialist history. 
This includes the suppression of all counter, alternative, emancipatory and 
leftist, even though also modernist, projects, practices, and interventions. 
Nationalism has played an important role as an atavistic format of ideology.
Consequently, the third observation is that to Eastern Europe the 
process of turbo-nationalist neoliberalism has applied a specific format of 
Fascism that the feminist theoretician Žarana Papić called Turbo-Fascism 
(Papić, 2002). → Consequently, the third observation is that, to Eastern 
Europe, the process of turbo-nationalist neoliberalism has applied a specific 
format of Fascism that the feminist theoretician Žarana Papić (2002) called 
Turbo-Fascism. Papić proposed Turbo-Fascism to conceptualize hegemonic 
postsocialist nationalisms in the Balkans in the 1990s, specifically in Serbia, 
that is, national separatisms, chauvinist and racist exclusion or marginali-
zation of (old and new) minority groups. All these processes were, and are, 
closely connected with patriarchal, discriminatory and violent politics against 
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women and their civil and social rights. Papić admits that it is, of course, 
known that Fascism is a historical term; that the history of Nazi Germany 
is not the same as that of Milošević’s Serbia. However, in postmodernist 
and feminist theory we speak of “shifting concepts” when “a new epoch 
inherits, with some additions, concepts belonging to an earlier one”, like, for 
instance the feminist notion of shifting patriarchy (2002: 134). She further 
argues that “we should not fear the use of ‘big terms’ if they accurately 
describe certain political realities” (Papić, 2002: 192). 
Finally, if we think about the EU legislative policy we see that the passages 
described above result in intensified racism and class racialization that are 
constantly reinvented as neo-colonial structures. In this sense, from a lens 
that is interested in the colonial matrix of power, we can see a convergence 
or parallel between the Turbo-Fascist and necropolitical regimes in the 
former socialist East of Europe, and the war-states and forms of postmodern 
fascism in Western neoliberal democracies. In the following section, I show 
how this trajectory can be traced with the help of postcolonial thought, and 
how the latter relates to postsocialism.  
b) Postcolonial and postsocialist  
In this section, I will first set out my understanding of postcolonial thought 
with the help of the work of Achille Mbembe, and subsequently try to 
establish a relation between the postcolonial and the postsocialist.
What is the postcolonial? As Mbembe stated in an interview for a French 
magazine Esprit in December 2006:
Postcolonial thought seeks to document what it was to live or to survive under the 
sign of the Beast. It shows that there is in European colonial humanism something 
that has to be called unconscious self-hatred. Indeed, racism in general and 
colonial racism in particular, represents the transference of this self-hatred to 
the Other (Mbembe, 2006: n.p.).
He was even sharper when he wrote that “this form of death [that is an 
outcome of intensified racialization processes] was necessarily conveyed 
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through that of others, it was a delegated death” (Mbembe, 2006: n.p.). It 
is this delegated death that is visibly and without shame, without the “old 
European” morality, imposed today onto refugees. Postcolonial thought, 
in deconstructing the “mental infrastructures, the symbolic forms and 
representations underpinning the imperial project” reveals:
[...] how what passed for European humanism manifested itself in the colonies 
as duplicity, double-talk and a travesty of reality. Indeed, colonial regimes never 
ceased telling lies about themselves and others. As Frantz Fanon explains so 
clearly in Black Skin, White Masks, racialization was the driving force behind 
this economy of duplicity and falsehood. Race was the Beast at the heart of 
European colonial humanism (Mbembe, 2006: n.p.).
Today colonialism repeats itself lethally in the wake of the “refugee crises,” 
and this “economy of duplicity and falsehood” stays at the centre of European 
neoliberal necrocapitalist humanism.
I would say, in parallel to Mbembe, that socialism was the great labo-
ratory of modernity in the 20th century. Yet in this very same century, the 
extermination camps on the soil of Europe were conceived, managed and 
devised by the German Nazi regime. If we are to really understand the 
status of socialism and postsocialism with all the paths that went wrong, 
we have to be clear that they are diametrically opposed to Nazism and 
fascism (as Nazism and fascism have no perspectives of the future, only 
death, destruction, genocide, while socialism brought an utopia for a 
possible emancipation that went wrong). So I schematically draw a line 
between the changes regarding the relation of capital/labour (from unity 
to co-propriety); the historical differences of communism and Nazism and, 
further, the outcome of a past brutal colonialism as it presents itself in the 
recent “refugee crisis”, for instance. 
To such a setting we should add the changes that happened after World 
War II, specifically the processes of migration and reconstruction of the 
West. Western Europe needed a reconstruction labour force, which was 
recruited specifically from the immiserated south of Europe, such as Italy, 
and from the three fascist dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. This 
gives a possibility to understand that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, class 
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antagonism vanished suddenly from the picture and was substituted with 
other forms of conflict based on cultural racism that had been hidden under 
the multicultural Western European agendas. The segregation of the “Other” 
based on a perception of her cultural difference turned into an open form of 
marginalization, exclusion and hostility. Additionally, in the wake of processes 
of decolonization, many people from Africa and the Caribbean region moved 
to the former colonial state in Europe. Today in the European Union, we have 
political demands made by them that are constantly negotiated (also after 
several generations) as diaspora citizens in Europe.
All of this brings to the fore the continuity and entanglement of questions 
of race, class and gender inequalities in the present neoliberal global capi-
talist regime. However, to further complicate a possible binarism following 
from the above questions, I have to put forward the following question: Is 
decolonial queer politics in Europe and globally viable without a more precise 
re-elaboration of the relation between queer and the categories of nationality 
and race? No! I argue that we can learn plenty from the conceptualization 
of queer discourse in relation to nation-state, geography and processes of 
racialisation – institutionalized, structural, and social racism(s). Why queer? 
Because we face a question of identity that entangles race and sex and 
class in the form of a queer condition in the present neoliberal capitalism. 
Therefore, only if we are able to question the relations between postcolonial 
and postsocialist subjectivities through constantly imposed race and gender 
divisions and processes of racialization and class antagonisms inside the 
hegemonic structures of (Western) European nation states, we will manage 
to form alliances and coalitions in Europe. 
To further elaborate on the mode of operation of present regimes, I 
argue, based on Paul Preciado’s work, that there are at least two types of 
capitalism: a “hot” (punk) capitalism that is developing overwhelmingly in 
the West and the capitalist First World (2013). The specific meaning of this 
hot capitalism is mostly semiotically-technologically organized. On the other 
side, there is a “cold” capitalism, a necropolitical discourse of power that 
extracts its surplus value from non-mediated dispossessions, exclusions, 
looting, and death. We saw violence of unbelievable proportions against 
the LGBTQI people in the former Eastern Bloc, in the former Yugoslavia: 
beatings, killings, as well the negation of their basic human rights. We also 
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see on a daily basis corpses floating in the sea, corpses of those who want 
to enter Western Europe: refugees, people without papers, from Africa and 
Asia, people who drown along the coasts of Italy, Malta, Greece, etc., and 
lately, more and more, near Libya. The colonial/racial division is applied to 
citizenship so that we have two categories of citizenship: one is the category 
which I will name this, following the work of Foucault, biopolitical citizenship 
(the EU “natural” nation-state citizens) and the other is, following Mbembe, 
necropolitical citizenship, given to refugees and sans-papiers (paperless) 
after they die on EU soil.
The “cold” East’s necropolitics presents a brutal logic of violence, persecu-
tions, discrimination, and racializations in the former Eastern European space 
(the former Yugoslavia, Russia, and other post-Soviet countries). Biopolitics 
and necropolitics work globally, though necropolitics operates visibly mostly 
in the so-called periphery and create surplus value by death  (real and  social 
death of any kind where mostly non-mediated violence is present).  
It is clear that what global capitalism brings before us is a necessity to 
revisit globally racist, homophobic, and discriminatory processes, not as simple 
identity differences but as processes that are entangled with capital, new media 
technology and death. On the other side, it is important to emphasize lines 
of common struggles. A good reflection is provided by Stanimir Panayotov 
(2018), who rethinks alliances and lines of common struggle as follows:
The work on Balkanism needs the return of “class” as racialization to survey 
 ethnicity-as-race as a continuity. Something of a merger between (...)   
Gržinić’s  necropolitics can be sensed in El-Tayeb’s proposal of “queering of ethnicity”: 
A queering, or “creolizing” of theory, if you will, that works on the intersections of 
concepts and disciplines, opens the potential of expressing exactly the positionality 
deemed impossible in dominant European discourses, namely that of Europeans 
of color... The contact zone between Gržinić and El-Tayeb (...) is not an academic 
contest to mark CEE as colonial, but as racist colonial. For if the colonial analytic 
crumbles each time under silently racialized class and ethnicity, then what is the 
use of “de-provincializing Europe”?* (Panayotov, 2018: 66-67).
* Panayotov refers to my part of the book coauthored with Šefik Tatlić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and 
Global Capitalism. Historicization of Biopolitics and Forensics of Politics, Art, and Life (2014) and to Fatima 
El-Tayeb’s text Creolizing Europe (2014).
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The presentation above allows to understand that postsocialist space or the 
space of what is today termed Central-East Europe can be seen as colonial 
space not because it is colonized but because it is governed by the centre of 
the EU and its Occidental core through modes of suppression, discrimination, 
infantilization, etc., that are established along racial (the CEE still not being 
civilized enough), class (labour and by means of underdeveloped capitalist 
production) and gender lines. Of course, this is a process that is reinforced 
internally by the hyper-neoliberal and nationalistic policies of political elites 
and economic tycoons.  
c) Decolonial and postsocialist
At this point we have to enter the discussion of the relation between the 
decolonial and the postsocialist. Two writers are central to this relation: 
Madina Tlostanova and Walter Mignolo, who established a decolonial 
perspective on how to enter this relation, centring on Russia (Mignolo and 
Tlostanova, 2006; Tlostanova and Mignolo 2009). To be very clear, Madina 
Tlostanova was amongst the first ones who engaged in these questions. On 
the other side, however, what is also to be exposed is what I will name a 
blockage of the future for millions of Eastern European subjects, who are 
today framed as post Eastern Europeans by turbo capitalism. One of my 
theses is that such a blockage is the outcome of rethinking the relation of 
the state, former socialism, modernity and socialist society, and last but 
not least, the October revolution. Some parallels that I want to establish in 
between theoreticians coming from the former Soviet Union and working 
on the listed topics and some decolonial post-Soviet elaborations are 
important for the analysis and my thesis.
Already in 2004, Sergey Nazipovich Gavrov devoted his book Modernization 
of the Russian Empire to the problems of Russia’s modernization and post-
imperial transition. The author tries to find answers to key questions: what 
distinguishes “us” in a cultural and institutional sense, from the “old” Europe? 
Why, in spite of changes in the surrounding world, does Russia still come back 
to familiar imperial or quasi-imperial ways? Gavrov (2004) exposes that the 
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social and cultural aspects of modernization in Russia were just an external 
and a not very successful strategy, while the imperial consciousness remained 
essentially the same under Peter, Stalin and Putin. In other words, the concept 
of modernization in Russia was purely compensatory and was generally aimed 
at strengthening the imperial system.
Gavrov argues that Russia, after having lost its theocratic element in 
the form of the Soviet myth with the collapse of USSR, unsuccessfully tries 
to transform this lost myth into a nationalist ideal, but that its globalist 
imperial origins constantly stick out. So the process of modernization in 
Socialist Russia followed the idea of “progression” established by Western 
civilization but imposed it only in terms of a modernization in industrial and 
military technology. This means that military-technical elements are the 
only ones that mattered and all the other aspects traditionally associated 
with modernization efforts in a social and political sense – such as civil rights, 
freedom, and civil society – practically did not matter. He concludes that 
Russian modernization did not include modernity but served to strengthen 
the past Russian feudal imperial grounds into a civilizational-cultural system.
Madina Tlostanova on her part, and from the viewpoint of decoloniality, 
approaches these problematic relations in a slightly different manner, 
stating that:  
The concept of the Second World including the ex-socialist world is a typical 
product of Western modernity looking at its non-absolute other from outside 
and, consequently, homogenizing its multiplicity and diversity following the 
well-known logic of either neglecting the other or misinterpreting it as the same 
or as the predecessor of the same. Instead of the Second World we should 
speak of the world of imperial difference which would allow to understand its 
specificity in its own terms and logic and also vis-à-vis the Western modernity 
marked by global coloniality. If for Latin America it is the colonial difference 
that plays the crucial role, then for Russia, as well as for Spain, that lost its 
dominance in the second modernity, it is the imperial difference that comes 
forward (Tlostanova, 2008: 1). 
Furthermore, she proposes that we see the imperial difference as divided in 
two: as internal and external imperial difference. Tlostanova argues that the 
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internal imperial difference works inside the “Western European reference 
system, Western Christianity, and Latin-based languages” (2008: 1). On 
the other hand, she states that Russia is an example of an external imperial 
difference: “[Russia’s] imperial populace is Slavic, i.e. rather remote from 
Western Europe, it is Orthodox Christian and even its alphabet does not 
correspond to European expectations of imperial language and literacy” 
(Tlostanova, 2008: 1).
Tlostanova develops a turbo decadent picture of Russian imperialism, 
without any form of opening for resistance or self-determination by popular 
mobilisation or by civil society. She states: “Russia is a second-grade imperial 
force, an external imperial force looking from the east. Russia itself felt a 
colony in the presence of the West and at the same time half-heartedly 
played the part of the caricature – a civilizer in its non-European, mostly 
Islamic colonies” (Tlostanova, 2008:  2). In her view, “The Soviet empire in 
its subaltern imperial nature was not essentially different from the Czarist 
one, though it reformulated the main developmentalist slogan in a more 
radical way, attempting to build a socialist modernity – to catch up and leave 
behind, while also escalating its global geopolitical appetites” (Tlostanova, 
2008: 2). Tlostanova is clear: “Russia is secondary subaltern empire marked 
with external imperial difference, Russia is also a curious example of a 
survived theocratic empire, at least in its intentions and in its mentality, if 
not in reality” (Tlostanova, 2008: 2).
The difference between Gavrov and Tlostanova is conceptual and 
political. Gavrov shows the ways in which economic, political and social 
factors deprived the space and what are the elements that the continuation 
of the feudal into the imperial hinges upon. He emphasizes visions of civil 
society and civil rights,* while for Tlostanova who is engaged solely in a 
semiotic-decolonial re-reading of Russia as secondary subaltern empire, 
there is nothing else than a desert in this regard.
The next conceptual step is provided by Tlostanova and Mignolo who 
in 2009 specifically elaborate on the Russian October revolution but as 
only a socialist modernity that comes after the split of the Enlightenment 
* He talks of the co-existence of heterogeneous Russian regions and their inhabitants based on the principles 
of federalism with elements of confederacy, and of the existence of a civil, multi-ethnic nation. Civil, rather 
than ethnic nation is for him an important aspect of this proposal (Gavrov, 2004).
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project into two modernities, i.e. a liberal and a socialist one (Tlostanova 
and Mignolo, 2009). As they state: 
It is possible to argue, of course, that there were already too many revolutionary 
projects in modernity. But most of them were based on Western modernity products 
or their local clones – from the leftist discourses to various kinds of nationalism, 
including the postcolonial nationalism, ethnocentrism and religious fundamentalism. 
(Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2009: 132).
They continue:  
a polycentric world order has made obsolete the modern idea of “revolution”, for 
two reasons. One is that in polycentric world order, in spite of the competition for 
control of authority, there is no more room for an idea of revolution that will consist 
in taking control of the state (like the bourgeoisie did in Europe over the monarchy; 
the Bolsheviks over the Russians Czars; like the Creole from European descent 
(except in Haiti) did in the Americas since the end of the 18th century; or the natives 
did in Asia and Africa, during the era of decolonization, after WWII). The second 
reason is that all the revolutions we have mentioned were revolutions within the 
same cosmology, within the same rules of the game. And the word “revolution” 
itself is meaningful only within the ideology of progress and development, within 
the realm of sameness (Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2009: 139-140). 
I argue that it is necessary at this point to clash with such a view as it presents 
a total closure – even more, it erases the whole former Eastern European 
space. It can be added that even though in her book Decolonial Gender 
Epistemologies and Eurasian Borderlands (2010) has offered indications of 
the ways in which (formerly) imperial subjects can resist the production of 
exclusion, in her later works such as Can the post-Soviet Think? (2015), she 
has completely overlooked initiatives to recover post-identitarian, decolonial 
potentialities in the history of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that I 
expose in this text.
More to the point, central reference for my thoughts is provided by 
another forerunner of decolonial thought, Lewis Gordon. In 1997, in his 
brilliant introduction to the anthology Existence in Black, Gordon stresses 
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that “Africana philosophy’s history of Christian, Marxist, Feminist, Pragmatist, 
Analytical, and Phenomenological thought has... been a matter of what 
specific dimensions each had to offer the existential realities of theorizing 
blackness.” (Gordon, 1997: 4).  Marxism is a key theoretical line in the whole 
idea of transformation of the exploitative bourgeois society that the socialist 
revolution aimed to dismantle. Gordon exposes that: 
For Marxism, for instance, it was not so much its notions of “science” over all other 
forms of socialist theory, nor its promise of a world to win, that may have struck a 
resonating chord in the hearts of black Marxists. It was, instead, Marx and Engels’ 
famous encomium of the proletarians having nothing to lose but their chains. Such 
a call has obvious affinity for a people who have been so strongly identified with 
chattel slavery (Gordon, 1997: 4).
  
Reiland Rabaka in his Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black 
Radical Tradition (2009) quotes Gordon referring to his chapter Existential 
Dynamics of Theorizing Black Invisibility in Existence in Black: 
Cabral, Fanon, Du Bois, James, and the theorists of Negritude, among other 
Africana intellectual-activists, have each critically engaged Marxist (socialist and/
or communist) theory, among other traditions and schools of thought, precisely 
insofar as they understand them to offer viable alternatives to the human suffering 
and misery of their respective times and circumstances. Césaire (1972) may very 
well have said it best when he stated that the necessity of “our liberation placed 
[and continues to place] us on the left” (Gordon, 1997: 78 in Rabaka, 2009: 280).
Rabaka further references Gordon: “Marx is all right, but we need to complete 
Marx” (Gordon, 1997: 70 in Rabaka, 2009: 280). To turn back to my initial 
discussion, my critique of Tlostanova and Mignolo’s argument is based on 
their inability or unwillingness to think any potentiality for contemporary 
counter-positions and communities in Russia and the postsocialist world 
more generally. Although not developed explicitly, their argument applies 
to most parts of formerly Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and, more 
implicitly, the Yugoslav socialist state with its very similar mode of operation 
and overarching modernist worldview. 
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The dismissal of the socialist past and its positive potentials begs the question: 
What do we do with positions envisioned as Black Europe, the LGBTQI, 
and migrant viewpoints, as well as the new generation of young critical 
postsocialist activist youth that are asking for decolonial transformations 
of their nationalistic societies? Or, as was asked by the Balkan Society 
for Theory and Practice (BSTP) in Prizren (Kosovo), as part of a workshop 
concept in July 2018, how do we approach places traditionally deemed 
unphilosophical as sites of theoretical and practical resistance that are capable 
to re-think and re-engage resistance? Or how do we read some politically 
leftist projects that oppose the right-wing nationalistic and turbo-fascist 
structures developed palpably after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the former 
Eastern European context? One possible answer is that we cannot dismiss, 
contra Tlostanova and Mignolo, the analysis of the political economy, the 
question of how capitalism deprives the “white” working class and, finally, 
the struggles of new generations  of people in the former East that fought 
and are fighting to preserve social justice, entitlements and dignity (e.g. 
abortion rights, public schools, public health, etc.).
Furthermore, Tlostanova and Mignolo’s discussion is mainly centred on 
the question of knowledge, while the labour-capital relations, the dispos-
session and exploitation, the necro-turbo nationalistic capitalism that have 
manifested on the Balkans, are all left out of view. By adopting exactly a 
decolonial lens, I would rephrase Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni’ question: “can 
Africans create African futures within a modern world system structured 
by global coloniality?” (2014: 181). This  same question can be posed for 
the whole territory of the defunct East of Europe, particularly because 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni was already in 2014  clear that we are facing a situation 
where “Even the current global power transformations which have enabled 
the re-emergence of a Sinocentric economic power and de-Westernization 
processes including the rise of South-South power blocs such as BRICS, 
do not mean that the modern world system has now undergone genuine 
decolonisation and de-imperialisation to the extent of being amenable to 
the creation of other futures” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014: 181). The logic is that, 
although it is a constant idea of a saviour, we see that “revisionist” changes 
of geopolitical relations and expectations do not bring about the results one 
would hope for. On the contrary, the rise of the BRICS appears to have led 
191
to a reproduction or deepening of the colonial-capitalist system, even if in 
less obvious ways or even under claims to more equal and “non-conditional” 
forms of cooperation and support.
At this point it is important to expose the difference between postcolonial 
and decolonial thinking, as the emergence of decolonial theory opened a 
renewed possibility for discussions on the postsocialist space. Decolonial 
theory, explicitly, intensified and re-invigorated  the whole discussion on 
a past colonialism in the 21st century. With this, it also opened questions 
of dependence, subjugations and erasure of other past territories and 
populations.
d) Decolonial and postcolonial 
Where does decoloniality stand? Its most distinctive characteristic is 
geographical. Decolonial thinking was developed by scholars from Latin-
America mostly based in the US in the 2000s, while postcolonial thought 
was significantly, though not only, formed by Indian scholars (the most 
known is the “Subaltern Studies Group”) with a history going back to the 
1970s. This is maybe a schematic line of sorting out the genealogies, but it is 
important to understand as well the precise geopolitical place of formation 
of these different discourses. Why? Because what we see is connected not 
only with epistemology but struggles in concrete geopolitical spaces. 
As Ramón Grosfoguel explains in a remarkable analysis of the relation 
between decoloniality and postcolonial studies, “the moment of coming 
to a life of a decolonial view was in October 1998, there was a conference/
dialogue at Duke University between the South Asian Subaltern Studies 
Group and the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. The members of 
the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group were primarily Latin-American 
scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alter-
native knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies 
in the United States” (2011: 3-4). Grosfoguel further situates the line of 
the split “between those who read subalternity as a postmodern critique 
(which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who 
read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of 
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Eurocentrism from subalternized and silenced knowledges) (Grosfoguel, 
2011: 3-4). Thus, Grosfoguel exposes three main points:
1) that a decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought 
than simply the Western canon (including the left Western canon); 2) that a 
truly universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal 
(one particular that raises itself as universal global design) but would have to 
be the result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/
political projects towards a pluriversal as opposed to a universal world; 3) that 
decolonization of knowledge would require us to take seriously the epistemic 
perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical scholars from the Global South 
thinking from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. 
Postmodernism and postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught 
within the Western canon reproducing within its domains of thought and practice 
a particular form of coloniality of power/knowledge. (Grosfoguel, 2011: 4).
My stance in this relation is that the decolonial is extremely important 
as it resituates racialization in the middle of neoliberal global capitalism. 
Although race and racism were present in conceptualizations of the 
postcolonial, they were discussed and analyzed through questions of 
cultural and other forms of differentiation. Decolonial thinking recovers 
racialization as the most important mechanism that organizes the global 
neoliberal system.
This becomes even more apparent when reading Grosfoguel further. In 
order to build a genealogy of racialization(s), it is of key importance to include 
two systems of annihilation, one being colonialism and the other being the 
Holocaust with its contemporary formats of anti-Semitism. The decolonial 
discourse aims to call out imperial forces and to expose the annihilations of 
millions of slaves in colonialism, through the transformations brought through 
the colonial matrix of power (Grosfoguel, 2011). This means that a process of 
racialization is at the core of the organization of contemporary global capitalist 
society. This process is not simply a cultural differentiation in a society, but 
a process of steady racial classificatory matrix that sustains a monopoly on 
classification; at the same time, racialization is obscured with the processes 
of rationalization of capitalist expansion and exploitation.
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Conclusion
In this article, I tried to expose the relevance and divisions between 
postsocialist and post-/decolonial perspectives. I did so from a political-
theoretical point that endorses the thesis that decolonial theory intensifies 
and re-invigorates the discussion on colonialism in the 21st century. Decolonial 
theory/thought and the associated “decolonial option” discloses that 
colonialism does not belong to the past, but that in the time of neoliberal 
global necrocapitalism through the colonial matrix of power (Quijano, 1997) 
violently racializes people and nations all around the world.
Therefore, decolonial theory develops a set of theoretical notions allowing 
for the pertinent analysis of changes and deregulations brought by global 
necrocapitalism. Furthermore, it also offers essential vocabularies with 
which to frame EU racializations and the subjugation of former colonized 
peoples (from Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, etc.), coming to Europe 
as migrants and refugees (due to the war induced by the Occident in the 
Middle East and North Africa).
With the processes of the enlargement of the European Union after the 
Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the external division of Europe (the Cold War 
Europe of the 1950s-1970s) has changed into an internal division. After 
2001, the EU started to re/produce a divide along an Occident/Orient line, 
transforming the external into an internal division through the War on Terror 
in the Middle East. This division resides on racialization. Racialization is not 
just a process of producing tropes, it is not only about a fast process of a 
capital’s narrativization of racialization, not only about immanent levels of 
dispossession but also a process inherent to capital itself.
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Poslije Kraja Socijalizma. Zagreb: Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung.
Butler, J. (2015). Notes Toward a Performative 
Theory of Assembly. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
Clancy, T. (2004). The War on Bosnia. 
Worldwatch Institute. Retrieved from http://
www.worldwatch.org/node/545 (2.12.2018).
Danson, M. and De Souza, P. (2012). 
Regional Development in Northern Europe: 
Peripherality, Marginality and Border Issues. 
London: Routledge. 
Dolenec, D. and Žitko, M. (2016). Exploring 
Commons Theory for Principles of a Socialist 
Governmentality. Review of Radical Political 
Economics 48 (1): 66-80.  
Domanski B. and Lung, Y. (2009). The 
Changing Face of the European Periphery in 
the Automotive Industry. European Urban and 
Regional Studies 16 (1): 5-10.
Dunaway, W. and Clelland, D. (2017). Moving 
toward Theory for the 21st Century: The 
Centrality of Nonwestern Semiperipheries 
to World Ethnic/Racial Inequality. Journal of 
World-Systems Research 23 (2): 399-464. 
Fudurić, N. (2007). Entrepreneurship in 
the Periphery: Characteristics and Trends. 
Paper presented at International Conference: 
Regions in focus, Lisbon, Portugal. Retrieved 
from http://vbn.aau.dk/files/13219787/
ENTREPRENEURSHIP_IN_THE_PERIPHERY.
pdf (12. 11. 2018).
Georgeoff, J. (1982). The Educational System 
of Yugoslavia. Education around the World. 
U.S. Dept. of Education, International 
Education Programs.
Grosfoguel, R. (1996). From Cepalismo to 
Neoliberalism: A World-System Approach to 
Conceptual Shifts in Latin America. REVIEW 19 
(2): 131-54.
Grosfoguel, R. (2008). Transmodernity, Border 
thinking, and Global Coloniality: Decolonizing 
Political Economy and Postcolonial Studies. 
Revista Crítica De Ciências Sociais. 
Retrived from https://www.eurozine.com/
transmodernity-border-thinking-and-global-
coloniality/. (02.12.2018.) 
Hallward, P. (2001). Absolutely Postcolonial: 
Writing Between the Singular and the 
Specific. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
Herrschel, T. (2012). Regionalisation and 
Marginalization: Bridging Old and New 
Divisions in Regional Governance. In M. 
Danson and P. de Souza (eds.), Regional 
Development in Northern Europe: 
Peripherality, Marginality and Border Issues. 
London: Routledge, pp. 30-48.
Ignatief, M. (2014). New World Disorder. New 
York Review of Books. September 25 issue.
Jessop, B. (1994). Post-Fordism and the State. 
In A. Amin (ed.) Post-Fordism: a Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Karkov, N. and Valiavicharska, Z. (2018). 
Rethinking East-European Socialism: 
Notes Toward an Anti-Capitalist Decolonial 
Methodology, Interventions, 20 (6): 785-81.
Knaus, G. and Martin, F. (2003). Lessons 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the 
European Raj. Journal of Democracy 3 (14): 
60-74.
Kojanić, O. (2015). Nostalgia as a Practice of 
the Self in Post-Socialist Serbia, Canadian 
Slavonic Papers 57 (3-4): 195-212. 
Kojanić, O. (2018). Flipping the Transition 
Script. Anthropology News 59 (2) Retrieved 
from https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/abs/10.1111/AN.826 (02.12.2018).
Kolodziejczyk, D. and Sandru, C. (2016). 
Postcolonial Perspectives on Postcommunism 
in Central and Eastern Europe. London: 
Routledge. 
Kožul, D. (2018, December 3). Intervju sa 
Borkom Pavićević, Yubilej: To je Bila Kulturna 
209
Utopija. Novosti. Retrieved from https://
www.portalnovosti.com/yubilej-to-je-bila-
kulturna-utopija?fbclid=IwAR09UMpsqlQJES
0IfefNfNZcaVepfN1cKnIX6pi8_w-IBNDJiFr0Q-
RBeqk. (02.12.2018).
Kurtović, L. (2015). ‘Who Sows Hunger, 
Reaps Rage’: on Protest, Indignation and 
Redistributive Justice in Post-Dayton Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies 15: (4): 639-659.  
Lutz, H. (2015). 2015. Ausländische 
Pflegekräfte in Deutschen Privathaushalte-. 
An Interview with Helma Lutz. Retrieved from  
http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/
kurzdossiers/211011/interview-mit-helma-
lutz?p=all (02.11.2018).
Majstorović, D. (2007). Construction of 
Europeanization in the High Representative‘s 
Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Discourse and Society 18 (5): 627-651. 
Majstorović, D. and Turjačanin, V. (2013). 
Youth Ethnic and National Identity in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Social Science Approaches. 
London: Palgrave McMillan.
Majstorović, D., Vučkovac Z. and Pepić A. 
(2015). From Dayton to Brussels via Tuzla: 
Post-2014 Economic Restructuring as 
Europeanization Discourse/Practice in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 15 (4): 661-682. 
Majstorović, D. (2016). Stvaranje „Nove“ 
Jugoslovenske Žene: Emancipatorski Elementi 
Medijskog Diskursa s Kraja 2. Svjetskog Rata. 
In T. Okić and A. Dugandžić (eds.) Izgubljena 
Revolucija: AFŽ Između Mita i Zaborava. 
Sarajevo: Crvena and Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung. 84-116. English version retrieved from 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/10/03/
the-lost-revolution/ (01.09.2018). 
Majstorović, D. and Vučkovac, Z. (2018). 
Discursive Construction of Peripheral Selves 
at the Margin of Europe: Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian DITA Factory Workers from 
Self-Management to Factory Occupation. A 
presentation held on 20 September 2018 at the 
European Viadrina University, Frankfurt Oder.
Mujanović, J. (2018). Hunger and Fury: The 
Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans. Hurst 
Publishers and Oxford University Press.
Okić, T. and Dugandžić, A. (2016). Izgubljena 
Revolucija: AFŽ Između Mita i Zaborava. 
Sarajevo: Crvena and Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung. 84-116. English version retrieved from 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/10/03/
the-lost-revolution/ (02.11.2018). 
Quijano, A. (2000a). Colonialidad del Poder y 
Clasificacion Social. Journal of World-Systems 
Research 6 (2): 342–386. 
Quijano, A. (2000b). Coloniality of Power, 
Eurocentrism, and Latin America. Nepantla: 
View from the South 13 (1): 533–580. Retrieved 
from http://www.decolonialtranslation.com/
english/quijano-coloniality-of-power.pdf (20. 
11. 2018).
Parrish, M. (2007). The Demise of the Dayton 
Protectorate. Journal of Intervention and State 
Building-Vol.1 Special Supplement: 11–23.
Petrović, J. (2018). Women’s Authorship in 
Interwar Yugoslavia: The Politics of Love and 
Struggle. London: Palgrave McMillan.
Riding, J. (2018). A New Regional Geography 
of a Revolution: Bosnia’s Plenum Movement. 
Territory, Politics, Governance 6 (1): 16-41. 
Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: The New 
Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic.
Stenning, A. (2005). Where is the Post-
socialist Working Class?: Working-Class Lives 
in the Spaces of (Post-)Socialism. Sociology 
39(5): 983–999. 
Stoler, A. L. (2016). Duress: Imperial 
Durabilities in Our Times. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Syrett, S. (2012). Conceptualising 
Marginalisation in Cities and Regions. 
In M. Danson and P. de Souza (eds.), 
Regional Development in Northern Europe: 
Peripherality, Marginality and Border Issues. 
London: Routledge, pp. 65-77. 
Škokić, T. and Potkonjak, S. (2016). Working 
Class Gone to Heaven”: From Working Class to 
Middle Class and Back. Narodna Umjetnost: 
Hrvatski Časopis za Etnologiju i Folkloristiku 
53(1): n.p.
Țichindeleanu, O. (2011). Decolonizing Eastern 
Europe: Beyond Internal Critique. IDEA Arts 
+Society 38: 101–104. 
210
Tokača, M. (2012). Bosnian Book of the Dead. 
Sarajevo: Research and Documentation 
Center.
EuropeNow (2018). To the Center via 
Periphery: An Interview with Maria 
Todorova. Retrieved from https://www.
europenowjournal.org/2018/06/24/to-the-
center-via-the-periphery-an-interview-with-
maria-todorova/. (03. 11. 2018).
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World 
System, Bd. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in 
the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic 
Press.
Uneasy solidarities? Migrant 
encounters between postsocialism 
and postcolonialism Þ
Baker, C. (2018). Race and the Yugoslav 
Region. Postsocialist, Post-Conflict, 
Postcolonial? Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
Bakić-Hayden, M. (1995). Nesting 
Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia. 
Slavic Review, 54(4): (917–931).
Bjelić, D. I. (2018). Toward a Genealogy of the 
Balkan Discourses on Race. Interventions, 
20(6): 906–929. 
Bulat, A. (2017). ‘The brightest and best’, 
us – and the rest: desirable and undesirable 
migration in EU referendum leaflets. 
Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
brexit/2017/09/15/the-brightest-and-best-
us-and-the-rest-desirable-and-undesirable-
migration-in-eu-referendum-leaflets/ ( 7. 02. 
2019)
Chari, S., & Verdery, K. (2009). Thinking 
between the Posts: Postcolonialism, 
Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the 
Cold War. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 51(1): 6–34. 
Decolonising SOAS Vision (2017). Retrieved 
from https://www.soas.ac.uk/decolonising-
soas/ (January 15, 2019)
Devine, D. (2018, March 19). Hate crime did 
spike after the referendum – even allowing for 
other factors. Retrieved from https://blogs.
lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/19/hate-crime-did-
spike-after-the-referendum-even-allowing-
for-other-factors/ (8. 02. 2019)
Drnovšek Zorko, Š. (2018). Articulations of 
Race and Genealogies of Encounter among 
Former Yugoslav Migrants in Britain. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 1–18. 
Dzenovska, D. (2013). Historical Agency and 
the Coloniality of Power in Postsocialist 
Europe. Anthropological Theory, 13(4): (394–
416). 
El-Tayeb, F. (2011). European Others: Queering 
Ethnicity in Postnational Europe. Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Fox, J. E., Moroşanu, L., and Szilassy, E. 
(2012). The Racialization of the new European 
Migration to the UK. Sociology, 46(4): (680–
695). 
Fox, J. E., Moroşanu, L., and Szilassy, E. 
(2015). Denying Discrimination: Status, ‘Race’, 
and the Whitening of Britain’s New Europeans. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(5): 
729–748. 
Gilroy, P. (2004). After Empire: Melancholia or 
Convivial Culture? London: Routledge.
Goldsworthy, V. (1998). Inventing Ruritania: 
the Imperialism of the Imagination. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Jansen, S. (2012). After the Yugoslav passport. 
Retrieved from http://www.citsee.eu/citsee-
story/afterlives-yugoslav-red-passport (7. 09. 
2016)
Karkov, N. R., & Valiavicharska, Z. (2018). 
Rethinking East-European Socialism: 
Notes Toward an Anti-Capitalist Decolonial 
Methodology. Interventions, 20(6): (785–813). 
Kołodziejczyk, D., & Şandru, C. (2012). 
Introduction: on Colonialism, Communism 
and East-Central Europe – Some Reflections. 
Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48(2): (113–
116). 
Kovačević, N. (2008). Narrating Post/
Communism: Colonial Discourse and Europe’s 
Borderline Civilization. London; New York: 
Routledge.
211
Lazarus, N. (2012). Spectres Haunting: 
Postcommunism and Postcolonialism. Journal 
of Postcolonial Writing, 48(2): (117–129). 
Liberation. (2018). Retrieved from https://
soasunion.org/liberation/ (15. 01. 2019)
Roediger, D. R. (2005). Working toward 
Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became 
White - the Strange Journey from Ellis Island to 
the Suburbs. New York: Basic Books.
Roediger, D. R. (2017). Class, Race, and 
Marxism. London; New York: Verso. 
Rzepnikowska, A. (2019). Racism and 
Xenophobia Experienced by Polish Migrants in 
the UK before and after Brexit Vote. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(1): 61–77. 
Subotić, J., & Vučetić, S. (2017). Performing 
Solidarity: Whiteness and Status-Seeking in the 
Non-Aligned World. Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 1–22. 
Todorova, M. N. (1997). Imagining the 
Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wekker, G. (2016). White Innocence: 
Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.
Theorizing decoloniality in 
Southeastern Europe: Vocabularies, 
politics, perspectives Þ
Amin, S. (1990). Colonialism and the Rise of 
Capitalism: A Comment. Science and Society 
54(1): 67-72
Böröcz, J. and Sarkar, M. (2017). The 
Unbearable Whiteness of the Polish Plumber 
and the Hungarian Peacock Dance around 
„Race“. Slavic Review 76(02): 307-314.
El-Tayeb, F. (2015). Creolizing Europe. 
Manifesta Journal 17: 9-12.
Gavrov, S.N. (2004). Modernization of the 
Empire. Social and Cultural Aspects of 
Modernization Processes in Russia. Moscow: 
Editorial URSS.
Gordon, R. L. (ed.) (1997). Existence in Black: 
An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. 
New York: Routledge.
Grosfoguel, R. (2011). Decolonizing 
Post-colonial Studies and Paradigms 
of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, 
Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality. 
TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral 
Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic 
World, n.p.
Gržinić, M., and Tatlić, Š. (2014). Necropolitics, 
Racialization, and Global Capitalism. 
Historicization of Biopolitics and Forensics 
of Politics, Art, and Life. Lanham: Lexington 
Books.
Gržinić, M. (2000). Fiction Reconstructed: 
Eastern Europe, Post-socialism and the 
Retro-Avant-Garde. Vienna: edition selene + 
Springerin.
Gržinić, M. (ed.) (2018). Border Thinking. 
Disassembling Histories of Racialized 
Violence. (vol. 21). Vienna, Berlin: Publication 
Series of the Academy of Fine Arts and 
Sternberg Press.
Kelley, D.G.R. (2017). What Did Cedric 
Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism?  Boston 
review. Boston Review, Retrieved from http://
bostonreview.net/ race/robin-d-g-kelley- 
what-did-cedric-robinson-mean-racial-
capitalism (12.01.2019).
López Petit, S. (2009). La Movilización Global. 
Breve Tratado Para Atacar la Realidad. 
Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños.
Lugones, M. (2007). Heterosexualism in the 
Colonial/modern Gender system.  Hypatia 
22(1): 186-209.
Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Mbembe, A. (2006). Postcolonial Thought 
Explained to the French. Esprit. Retrieved 
from http://jwtc.org.za/the_salon/volume_1/
achille_mbembe.htm (17.09.2018).
Mignolo, W. and Tlostanova, M. (2006). 
Theorizing from the Borders: Shifting to Geo- 
and Body-Politics of Knowledge. European 
Journal of Social Theory 9(2): 205-221.
Mignolo, W., (2000). Local Histories/Global 
Designs: Essays on the Coloniality of Power, 
Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
212
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. (2014). Global 
Coloniality and the Challenges of Creating 
African Futures. Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa 36(2):181-202.
Panayotov, S. (2018). Necropolitics in the 
East. In M. Gržinić (ed.) Border Thinking. 
Disassembling Histories of Racialized 
Violence. (pp. 60-70). Vol. 21. Vienna and 
Berlin: Publication Series of the Academy of 
Fine Arts Vienna and Sternberg Press.
Papić, Ž. (2002). Europe after 1989: Ethnic 
Wars, the Fascisation of Social Life and Body 
Politics in Serbia.  In M. Gržinić Mauhler (ed.), 
Filozofski vestnik. special Issue: The Body (pp. 
191-205). Ljubljana: Institute of Philosophy 
ZRC SAZU.
Polanyi, K. (2001 [1944]). The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Preciado, B. (2013). Pharmaco-Pornographic 
Capitalism, Postporn Politics and the 
Decolonization of Sexual Representations. 
In The editorial group for writing insurgent 
genealogies. Utopia of Alliances, Conditions 
of Impossibilities and the Vocabulary of 
Decoloniality. Vienna: Löcker Verlag, (pp.245–
255).
Rabaka, R. (2009). Africana Critical Theory: 
Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, 
From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to 
Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Robinson, C. J. (2000 [1983]). Black Marxism: 
The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Quijano, A. (1997). Colonialidad del Poder, 
Cultura y Conocimiento en América Latina. 
Anuario Mariateguiano 9. Lima: Amauta.
Țichindeleanu, O. (2010). Where are We when 
We Think in Eastern Europe?.  Art Always 
Has Its Consequences, WHW/Tranzit/kuda/
Muzeum Stzuki: Zagreb. Retrieved from www.
artalways.org (17.09.2018).
Tlostanova, M. (2008). Towards a 
Decolonization of Thinking and Knowledge: 
a Few Reflections from the World of Imperial 
Difference. Retrieved from https://antville.
org/static/sites/m1/files/madina_tlostanova_
decolonia_thinking.pdf (17.09.2018).
Tlostanova, M. and Mignolo, W. (2009). 
Global Coloniality and the Decolonial Option. 
Kult 6. Epistemologies of Transformation: 
the Latin American Decolonial Option and its 
Ramifications, 130-147. Retrieved from http://
postkolonial.dk/artikler/kult_6/MIGNOLO-
TLOSTANOVA.pdf (17.09.2018).
Tlostanova, M. (2010). Gender Epistemologies 
and Eurasian Borderlands. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.
Tlostanova, M. (2015). Can the post-Soviet 
think? On coloniality of knowledge, external 
imperial and double colonial difference. 
Intersections 1(2): 38-58.
213
Manuela Boatcă is Professor of Sociology 
with a focus on macrosociology and Head of 
School of the Global Studies Programme at the 
Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Germany. 
She was Visiting Professor at IUPERJ, Rio 
de Janeiro in 2007/08 and Professor of 
Sociology of Global Inequalities at the Latin 
American Institute of the Freie Universität 
Berlin from 2012 to 2015. Her work on world-
systems analysis, postcolonial and decolonial 
perspectives, gender in modernity/coloniality 
and the geopolitics of knowledge in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America has appeared in the 
Journal of World-Systems Research, Cultural 
Studies, South Atlantic Quarterly, Political 
Power and Social Theory, Berliner Journal 
für Soziologie, Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie, Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte, 
Theory, Culture and Society, and Current 
Sociology. She is author of Global Inequalities 
beyond Occidentalism, Ashgate 2015 and 
co-editor (with E. Gutiérrez Rodríguez and S. 
Costa) of Decolonizing European Sociology. 
Transdisciplinary Approaches, Ashgate 2010 
and of Dynamics of Inequalities in a Global 
Perspective (with Vilna Bashi Treitler), Current 
Sociology monograph issue 63 (2), 2016.
Marina Gržinić (1958) is a philosopher, artist, 
and theoretician. She lives in Ljubljana, 
Slovenia and works in Ljubljana and Vienna. 
She is Professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in 
Vienna, Institute of Fine Arts, Post Conceptual 
Art Practices and researcher at the Institute 
of Philosophy at ZRC SAZU (Scientific and 
Research Center of the Slovenian Academy 
of Science and Art) in Ljubljana. She also 
works as a freelance media theorist, art critic, 
and curator. Her recent publication is  M. 
Gržinić, ed. Border Thinking, Academy of 
Fine Arts Vienna, Sternberg Press, 2018;. 
In collaboration with Aina Šmid, since 1982, 
Gržinić has produced more than 40 video art 
projects and  numerous media installations. 
http://grzinic-smid.si/
Nikolay Karkov is an Assistant Professor in 
Philosophy at SUNY Cortland, U.S.A. His 
current projects investigate the Eastern 
European socialist traditions and also South-
East conversations and collaborations, 
including in the present.
Katarina Kušić is a currently precariously 
employed with University of Bristol teaching 
development studies and feminist political 
economy.  Her own research uses ethnographic 
methods to complicate narratives of transition 
and international intervention in the Balkans. 
She received her PhD in International Politics 
from Aberystwyth University in 2018. 
Philipp Lottholz works at the Collaborative 
Research Centre/Transregio 138 “Dynamics 
of Security”, Justus Liebig University Gießen, 
Germany. His research focuses on security 
practices and discourses in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan and the wider trajectory of social 
change in post-Socialist Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe. 
Danijela Majstorović is Professor of Linguistics 
and Cultural Studies at the University of Banja 
Luka’s English department teaching Discourse 
Analysis and Cultural Studies. After completing 
her MA at Ohio University (2003) and PhD at 
the University in Banja Luka (2006), she was 
a visiting researcher at Lancaster University 
(2006), a Fulbright fellow at UCLA (2012-
2013) and a Canada Research Chair in Cultural 
Studies Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of 
Alberta in 2014. Her research interests involve 
critical discourse analysis, critical theory, 
gender and feminism, post-colonial and post- 
socialist studies. Her most recent work on 
Southeast European peripheries examines 
the intersections between patriarchy, (ethnic) 
capitalism, social movements and migrations.
Polina Manolova has a PhD in anthropology from 
the University of Birmingham. She is currently 
a mobile academic worker. She’s interested in 
migrations, class, and Western influences.
A
ut
ho
rs
Bozhin Traykov is pursuing a PhD in Sociology 
from University of Alberta, Canada. He 
studies the processes of transformation of the 
Bulgarian state and society after the fall of the 
Berlin wall, focusing on forms of nationalism 
and neoliberalism.
Zhivka Valiavicharska is a researcher and 
teacher of political and social theory at the 
Social Science and Cultural Studies Faculty 
of Pratt Institute, New York, and an associate 
researcher at the Global South Center of Pratt 
Institute. She works in the spheres of critical 
theory, political theory, cultural studies, 
gender studies, and postcolonial thought. She 
publishes studies on social history, political 
thought, and material culture in socialism and 
postsocialism in Bulgaria, on the Balkans, and 
in Eastern Europe in a global-comparative 
context. Valiavicharska obtained her Phd at 
the University of California, Berkeley, and has 
specialised at the University of Chicago.
Špela Drnovšek Zorko is a Leverhulme Early 
Career Fellow in the Department of Sociology 
at the University of Warwick. Her current 
research investigates how ‘postsocialist’ 
Central and East European migrants living 
in Britain articulate their encounters with 
race and coloniality in the Brexit landscape. 
She obtained her PhD in the Department 
of Anthropology and Sociology at SOAS, 
University of London, where she conducted 
research on intergenerational memory among 
former Yugoslav migrants. Between 2012 and 
2015 she was an Early Stage Researcher in the 
Marie Curie Initial Training Network ‘Diasporic 
Constructions of Home and Belonging’ (CoHaB) 
based at the SOAS Centre for Migration and 
Diaspora Studies and has also worked at SOAS 
as a Senior Teaching Fellow.
